MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.
Has anyone taken a look at the paper "Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer" by MAJ Thomas P. Ehrhart? From what I have heard it has caused something of a stir within the US Army. The debate over replacing US infantry weapons and marksmanship training has gone on for a little, but here someone has finally put it into a serious thesis.
If anyone has taken a serious look at it, what are opinions?
Here's the pdf link.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
Also, here is an abstract of his paper. Sums up the intent pretty well.
Quote:
Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate. Comments from returning soldiers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain. This monograph reviews the small arms capability of the infantry squad from World War I to present. It then discusses current shortfalls with cartridge lethality, weapons and optics configurations, the squad designated marksman concept and finally the rifle qualification course. Potential solutions in each of these areas are discussed.
Once again, any thoughts?
As one involved in the Troop Test of the then AR-15 in 1964,
the good Major's conclusions mirror almost exactly what the report of that test -- which recommended retaining the M-14 for worldwide service while developing a better automatic rifle version and a shortened version for airborne use and buying a few AR-15s for special purpose units -- recommended to DA. I have it on good authority that that report was forward to DoD with a recommendation for approval.
In the event DoD -- Secretary McNamara (assisted by Curtis LeMay, whose troops needed no more capable weapon) -- decided to buy the M-16 and cancel the contract with TRW for the M-14. I'm sure that the fact TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's had no bearing on that decision. It is noteworthy that the Marines objected and the Army was, as usual, acquiescent...
MAJ Ehrhart's recommendations also track with a number of studies in the 1970-2000 period that found the same problems.
In short, he's right.