Hundreds of Bodies Found in Soviet-Era Prison
The Moscow Times quotes a BBC report, "An underground prison dating back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has been found on the northern outskirts of Kabul."
Quote:
"This is a big mass grave from the Russian days," said General Ali Shah Paktiwal, a senior police official, the BBC reported.
The Defense Ministry could not be reached for comment Friday afternoon. But retired general Makhmud Gareyev, who served as senior military adviser to the Afghan government from 1989 to 1992, told Interfax on Friday that the BBC report was "disinformation."
"Maintaining underground prisons is a tradition of the mujahedeen," Gareyev told Interfax.
Paktiwal, the Afghan police official, told the BBC that the prison was located at a base that had belonged to the country's communist-era defense ministry.
"There are at least 15 rooms full of dead bodies," he said, adding that more rooms could still be discovered underground, the BBC reported.
In 2006, NATO-led forces found a mass grave in Afghanistan that was also believed to contain victims of the country's communist government. Some 2,000 bodies were found near the notorious Pul-e-Charkhi prison east of Kabul.
L. Grau's "Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos"
Moderator's note: I have today 16th Jan '09 consolidated several threads on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. In January 2013 several, small thread located and merged here - mainly on intelligence aspects..In January 2015 several old posts (held elsewhere were released here).
Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan, By Mr. Les Grau, FMSO-JRIC Analyst. This article was previously published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, April-June 2007, Volume 20 Number 2.
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/doc...Withdrawal.pdf
The Soviet experience in and leaving Afghanistan
Somehow in all these years I missed this:
The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear Versus the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, 1979-1989
Quote:
This manuscript analyzes the failure of Soviet air and ground forces to defeat the Afghan mujahideen during the nine-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In pursuit of this objective, Soviet military strategy underwent a process of increasing radicalization that eventually resulted in a sanctioned policy of terror by Soviet air and land forces. During this period, airpower played a critical role in this campaign of terror by providing the platforms for punitive bombardment, chemical attack, aerial mining, troop insertion, and fire support. The ability of a relatively ill-equipped and technologically inferior opponent to force the eventual withdrawal of one of the world’s most vaunted military powers has broader implications for contemporary political and military leaders. Soviet military operations against the mujahideen in Afghanistan, from December 1979 until the withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in February 1989, provide an instructive case study for evaluating the efficacy of airpower as an instrument of coercion. The Afghanistan example offers an excellent historical case for measuring the inherent limitations of airpower as a coercive instrument in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.
Soviets experience in Afghanistan (consolidated thread)
Recently a former Soviet (Red) Army general reflected upon his experiences in Afghanistan and the situation today.
This was his opening:
Quote:
Our mission was never to win. The Soviet Army was sent in to prop up a corrupt regime and the AFG leadership was all too happy to stand back, stay in the safety of their guarded compounds in Kabul, and let the Russians do the fighting for them. "They refused to do anything for the benefit of the people. In his mind, "from the perspective of the average Afghan, little has changed since".
davidbfpo
Mountain Pass battlefield again
Thanks to MPayson for pointing at this.
Let slip the dogs of war, Paul McGeough (Australian), writes on the Soviet and current campaigning at Satukandav Pass, Paktia Province: http://www.smh.com.au/world/let-slip...0925-g6bi.html (This item will be copied to the 'Soviet General comments' thread).
davidbfpo
Soviet Intelligence Operations in Afghanistan
Any good works out there on Soviet intelligence operations in their Afghanistan war?
How they were organized? Where they focused? What methods were used? Successes and failures?
Soviets experience in Afghanistan (consolidated thread)
From a comment left by poster "1110" on the blog:
Russian Advice on Afghanistan
I found a lot to agree with and a lot with which to disagree. I felt like a lot of the article was posturing and manipulative, but I tend to read a lot into fairly innocous statements.
For example:
Quote:
It is not only the nature of war and its means that have changed; the whole world has evolved.
Disagree.
Quote:
Officials in Brussels and Washington who are thinking of a rapid exit strategy for the ISAF mission are engaged in elaborating on a suicide plan. Withdrawal without victory might cause a political collapse of Western security structures.
Ehh...
Quote:
A “successful end” to the operation in Afghanistan will not come simply with the death of Osama bin Laden. The minimum that we require from NATO is consolidating a stable political regime in the country and preventing Talibanization of the entire region.
That is the Russian position. We are ready to help NATO implement its U.N. Security Council mandate in Afghanistan. We are utterly dissatisfied with the mood of capitulation at NATO headquarters, be it under the cover of “humanistic pacifism” or pragmatism.
Fair enough.
Quote:
That said, we are training CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces — an operational formation of elite units from Russia and our allies in Central Asia — in case of a NATO fiasco.
At first, sounds cool, but... huh? What are these elite units going to do? Be the Uzbek Border Patrol?