A few notes on the topic by Anthony Cordesman of CSIS:
Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes
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A few notes on the topic by Anthony Cordesman of CSIS:
Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes
Jedburgh,
Thanks so much for this excellent thought piece, and I finally think I found a strategic soul mate with this author. I'll disseminate it throughout my community when I return to work, and I can only hope it generates the level of discussion that it deserves. I'll prod it along of course.........
Added this latest from Cordesman to our Counterinsurgency page in the SWJ Reference LibraryQuote:
Originally Posted by Jedburgh
Well, here's a sort of follow-up to Cordesman's "working notes", published today (29 Nov) online at CSIS:
Shaping the Future of Counterinsurgency Warfare: A Strategic Approach
I'll quote this bit, as it applies to my personal experience:
I strongly agree that we do not do a good enough job of integrating HUMINT collection and reporting of our coalition allies into our ongoing ops. Worries about compromise keeps us from fullly exploiting the potential of our Iraqi partners as well. Although there are still tensions and bickering over turf, we've greatly improved cooperation between services - its time to work out methods and agreements for effective integration of allied HUMINT into our intel cycle. Coalition ops are the way that we are going to continue to operate well into the future.Quote:
The last point I would like to raise today concerns intelligence. There are a lot of people here who have worked in the intelligence community and I know many are going to disagree with what I am about to say. Nevertheless, I don’t believe HUMINT is the panecea many promise. Good analysis is critical. Having allied countries, or allied forces, or allied elements, develop effective HUMINT is absolutely critical.
Far too often, we will have to go into counterinsurgency campaigns without being able to put qualified Americans in the field quickly enough to recruit effective agents and develop effective HUMINT on our own. Does that mean HUMINT isn’t important? No, of course it doesn’t; it is a useful tool. So is technical intelligence. But to create effective abilities to deal with security issues, you must have a local partner in most serious cases.
The point about analysis is also well taken. Bill Moore mentioned in another thread the potential lessons to be learned from LE in fighting an insurgency. This is especially applicable to intelligence analysis. Criminal intelligence analysis has advanced a great deal over the past few years - the tools used in the tracking of gangs and organized crime in cities are directly applicable to COIN in the urban environment. But that's another discussion altogether.
Excellent point, one all too often overlooked in the hyped discussions on intel and intel failures. The very best intel is often of little value unless it is analyzed and put in perspective. HUMINT is indeed thrown around as a panacea for "fixing" intel, especially in COIN. Yet--and I was a HUMINT collector as a defense attache--information even if it is correct, relevant, and timely rarely comes in with sufficient sidebar material to put it in perspective to be analyzed. Analysis is both science and art just like operations. You can teach the mechanics, the science, and get folks up to a basic level of proficiency where they are ready to begin developing the art. But you cannot teach experience and all our intel types at the tactical level are entry level practitioners.Quote:
Originally Posted by Jedburgh
Best
Tom
More along the same lines from CSIS: The Iraq War and its Strategic Lessons for Counterinsurgency
Here's the condensed version of his conclusions from the end of the paper:
Quote:
o Warfighters must focus relentlessly on the desired outcome of the war and not simply the battle or overall military situation
In strategic and grand strategic terms, it doesn’t matter how well the war went last month; it doesn’t matter how the US is doing tactically. The real question warfighters must ask is whether the US is actually moving toward a strategic outcome that serves the ultimate interests of the US?
o Warfighters need to understand, as Gen. Rupert Smith has pointed out, Iraq has shown that enemies will make every effort to try win counterinsurgency conflicts by finding ways to operate below or above the threshold of conventional military superiority
It is stupid, as some in the US military have done, to call Iraqi insurgents cowards or terrorists because they will not fight on our terms. The same remarkably stupid attitudes appeared in 19th century colonial wars and often cost those foolish enough to have them the battle.
o Warfighters and their political leaders need to acknowledge that enemies can fight above the threshold of US conventional ability, not just beneath it
The character of America's political system, culture, and values are not the answer to winning the political and ideological dimension of many counterinsurgency campaigns. There is no reason Americans should think it can win an ideological struggle over the future of Islam and/or the Arab world. Our Muslim and Arab allies, in contrast, may well be able to win this struggle, particular if the US works with them and not against them.
o The US does need to improve our counterinsurgency technology, but cannot win with “toys”
Technology is a tool and not a solution. Israeli technology failed in Lebanon as US technology did in Vietnam, and like Israel, the US can use technical means to defeat many IEDs, but not enough. Moreover, it is possible that the total cost of every insurgent IED to date is still lower than that cost of one AH-1S that went down over Iraq.
o The best “force multiplier” will be effective allies, and interoperability with a true partner
If it is true that the US can win most counterinsurgency campaigns if it creates strong allies, the US must act decisively on this principle. US victories will often only be a means to this end. The real victories come when the US has allied troops that can operate against insurgents in the field, and a friendly government to carry out nation building and civil action activities at the same time. The US really begins to win when it can find ways to match the military, political, economic, and governance dimension.
o Political legitimacy in counterinsurgency is measured in local terms and not in terms of American ideology
Effective warfighting means the US must recognize something about regional allies that goes against its present emphasis on “democracy.” In most of the world, “legitimacy” has little to do with governments being elected, and a great deal to do with governments being popular.
o The US needs to have a functional interagency process and partner our military with effective civilian counterparts
The Bush Administration began by going through an interagency process before the war, but largely chose to ignore it after January of 2003. This is the wrong approach. Counterinsurgency wars are as much political and economic as military. They require political action, aid in governance, economic development and attention to the ideological and political dimension. The US can only succeed here if the interagency process can work.
o Humancentric warfare does not mean "supersoldiers" or super intelligence officers
This is a particular problem for warfighting intelligence, given the limits of today's technical systemsand means. It is true that better intelligence analysis and HUMINT are critical. But, there will be many times in the future where we will also have to go into counterinsurgency campaigns without being able to put qualified Americans in the field quickly enough to recruit effective agents and develop effective HUMINT on our own. To create effective HUMINT abilities to deal with security issues, the US will need an effective local partner in most serious cases of both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
CSIS, 16 Oct 07: Afghanistan, Iraq & Self-Inflicted Wounds: The Strategic Lessons of Armed Nation Building
Other than the three page narrative intro, the rest of this 30 page pdf consists of bulleted briefing slides.Quote:
....The US needs to make far more careful strategic choices between invasion and/or active support of a host government, and efforts to contain a security problem by strengthening neighboring states and the threat within a nation involved.
The US may have to act in some contingencies, and may well have to engage in armed nation building in the future. This briefing suggests that if this is the case, it must never again repeat the massive grand-strategic and strategic failures of the Bush Administration, which has repeated many of the mistakes of the Johnson Administration, and which already seems to rival it as the worst wartime presidency in American history. Any future intervention must recognize from the start the scale of the challenges and risks involved in armed nation building. It must admit the level of resources and time that will probably be required, and it must build on local values and capabilities.
The US will also have to build a level of competence it simply does not have today. Good intentions have never been a substitute for competence, and half-measures have never been a substitute for adequate resources in terms of men, money, and time. The US military will not only have to adapt fully to the challenges of counterinsurgency, it will have to create the capability to carry out active security missions for aid and governance efforts, create the capacity to support embedded aid efforts, and provide soldiers as a substitute for the near certain continued failure of the State Department and civil agencies to develop the skill sets required for many aspects of armed nation building.....
I like reading Cordesman's work, although sometimes it is rather bulky / too long. How is he regarded in the USA, inside and outside "The Beltway" ?
Secondly on my reading this piece ignores partners. Do any other allies have capability / knowledge ? I'd say the French, Australia-New Zealand (albeit in small island states) and India do (internally).
davidbfpo