Why the U.S. Loses ‘Small Wars’

At the History News Network blog - Why the U.S. Loses ‘Small Wars’ by Larry Kahaner. Hat Tip to SWC member Mark at ZenPundit.

Quote:

---

... Why do powerful armies lose against decidedly weaker enemies, and what does it say about the US involvement in Iraq?

The answer lies in the study of “small wars.” At its simplest, a small war is one in which the relationship between the combatants is decidedly unbalanced. One side is not only militarily superior in size but its weapons are state of the art. Some call this Asymmetric Warfare or Fourth Generation Warfare, or the more familiar guerrilla warfare, from the Spanish for ‘small war.’ ...

While trying to understand how to win in Iraq, US military scholars are turning to the classics, and one of the hottest books making the rounds is, surprisingly, over a century old. Small Wars was written in 1896 by C.E. Callwell, a colonel in the British army, for British officers posted to Africa and India. It draws on his own experience in the Second Afghan and Boer Wars and claims that a powerful force can easily lose, if it doesn’t fully understand the enemy, fails to describe clear objectives or, worst of all, pursues military objectives that do not contribute to the conflict's political goal...

If Callwell got military scholars to think more clearly about small wars, a group of Marine Corps officers in the 1930s took it to the next level with production of the Small Wars Manual based on US experiences in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. While building on Callwell’s work, this landmark book published in 1940, points to what some say is one of the most important aspects of winning small wars - understanding the role of indigenous religion, ideology and tribal relationships. The manual not only talks about the military aspects of winning small wars – and yes, they can be brutal - but of more importance is a deep understanding of a society’s language, culture, religion, history, economic structures and mores. The manual is a hot seller from a much-clicked website, The Small Wars Center of Excellence, run by the Marine Corps, which advocates the use of simpler weapons and more complex soldiers in small wars – the opposite of current conventional wisdom. This is not the only take-away message from the manual, but it is a vital one.

Unfortunately the Department of Defense’s upper echelon are heading in the wrong direction. The proposed $200 billion Future Combat Systems is a mélange of expensive and complex high tech weapons that will be less effective in winning future small wars than thousands more soldiers with language skills, armed with durable rifles, who understand history, foreign culture, religion local customs and guerilla warfare.

The soldiers in Iraq understand this. Now it’s time for Pentagon planners to read and heed the classics. It’s not too late to win the ‘small war’ in Iraq, but the lessons of history must not be ignored.

---

Quote:

---

less effective in winning future small wars than thousands more soldiers with language skills, armed with durable rifles, who understand history, foreign culture, religion local customs and guerilla warfare.

---

Spot on! Just rereading T.E. Lawrence and found it interesting that he classified an British officer that he felt was very good at guerilla warfare, had excellent cultural awareness, and was an outstanding war fighter as “crippled” due to his lack of language ability.

There's also a question of political and social patience, since small wars typically span years and not months. While the US had this level of patience in the past, it's very questionable if we do now.

The Indian Wars are an example of a long conflict waged by volunteer / professional US forces that did receive support from the US public. The cold war is another example of a long term nontraditional conflict that was supported by the US populace. The US public would seem to support long conflicts if they perceive the conflict to be 1) morally justified, 2) in their long term interest and 3) the overall costs (manpower and budget) is not too high.

I am just waiting for a modern Alfred Thayer Mahan to define modern irregular warfare strategy and an Elihu Root to make the military and political establishments implement.

Actually the Indian Wars are a very complex example of this, since they were supported (on the whole) by citizens in the West but were either ignored or condemned by citizens in the East.

From the Thomas P.M. Barnett web log - What have we integrated in Iraq?

Quote:

---

ARTICLE: Why the U.S. Loses ‘Small Wars’, By Larry Kahaner, History News Network, 11-27-06

Well written.

I especially like the USMC's Small Wars Center of Excellence's calling for simpler weapons and more complex soldiers.

But I think the author's only looking at the post-colonial backside in his summary judgment. Truth is, the West has done plenty well on small wars, so long as the goal is political/economic integration.

Wasn't the American West won by a simple weapon?

Or did that gun just do the killing and was the real victory found in the subsequent integration?

What have we integrated in Iraq? Not much. So what should we expect to win?

Not much...

---

An over-simplification of the American West, but the entry itself is interesting.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Mondor

The Indian Wars are an example of a long conflict waged by volunteer / professional US forces that did receive support from the US public. The cold war is another example of a long term nontraditional conflict that was supported by the US populace. The US public would seem to support long conflicts if they perceive the conflict to be 1) morally justified, 2) in their long term interest and 3) the overall costs (manpower and budget) is not too high.

I am just waiting for a modern Alfred Thayer Mahan to define modern irregular warfare strategy and an Elihu Root to make the military and political establishments implement.

---

The one strategy American Indians never could have overcome, and didn't, was the uncontrollable and continuous movement of settlers from the Eastern states and Europe into the west.

Actually it was the pressure of that combined with the changes in their own culture that made them more vulnerable to military pressure. For good examples of this, compare the results of military operations against the Comanche (a buffalo culture people) with those against the Apache (a non-buffalo culture people). The buffalo tribes could never overcome the twin pressure of buffalo hunters and military campaigns aimed at their horse herds and supply bases (villages). The Apache were immune to the former pressure and proved very resilient against the latter.

An important aspect of understanding small wars is the fact the United States has not mobilized for total war since WWII. On the other hand, U.S. enemies, more often than not, have mobilized for total war. North Vietnam's entire society was war-oriented. It remains very difficult for the U.S. to prevail in small wars when facing an enemy that is organized, determined and above all, possesses the necessary total will to oppose the U.S.

Steve, what about the Seminole Indians which I believe never surrendered or signed a treaty with the US government. They adapted to terrain nobody wanted and the US army could not win in, so they just kind of left the AO. My Florida history is a little rusty so you might know how correct this statement is. Having met a few I would say there are some lesson to be learned form them and their method of warfare.

The Seminole were rather like the Apache in that they did not have an economic vulnerability that could be easily attacked. Unlike the Apache they did not live in an area that had great mineral wealth, so the pressure to subdue them was never as serious as it was with the Apache. It was also very difficult terrain, and at the time the army was actually smaller than the one that would fight on the Frontier after the Civil War. After a time the Army could muster overwhelming numbers against the Apache and do things like post guards on water holes and otherwise restrict their freedom of movement. The Army was never quite able to do this against the Seminoles. There were also other pressures on the Army's manpower during the Seminole Wars (most notably during the Third Seminole War which took place during the same time that major garrisons were needed in Kansas, for example). Wikipedia has a good overview of the various Seminole Wars. It's also worth noting that most of them were concluded by a treaty of one sort or another.

The Seminole situation is interesting, but there are a number of factors that come into play that were not seen on the post-War frontier (terrain, economic drives, vulnerabilities to attack, and so on).

Steve, I new you would know the answer. I was at a LE conference and met some tribal police and they where obviously very proud and FBI( F***** Big Indian) types so when I was told that they never lost,etc. I said you right, you right. They are very prosperous as a tribe now because of Casinos, no tax cigarette sales, etc. and they seem to manage it very well they look after the tribe.

Bernard B. Fall (Professor, author and lecturer, widely known for his writings on the French and American experiences in Vietnam ; he died in Hué, South Vietnam, in 1967, patrolling with U.S. Marines) put it concisely in a lecture entitled “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency” delivered at the Naval War College on December 10, 1964. Some quotes from that speech:

Quote:

---

“I would like to put it in even a simpler way: When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front. This is what I feel has to be clearly understood. Whether it is the Congo, Viet-Nam or Venezuela, is totally irrelevant. Whether we have the "body count," the 'kill count,' the 'structure count,' or the 'weapons count'--these are almost meaningless considerations in an insurgency situation. We can lose weapons and still win the insurgency. On the other hand, we can win the war and lose the country.”

---

Quote:

---

“What, then, can be done in a war like Viet-Nam? Does the West have to lose such wars automatically? I said at the beginning that even the non-Westerners can lose those wars. But, either way, one must attempt to preserve the essentials. The question in my mind is this: Can we in Viet-Nam, or anywhere else, save (or improve) the administrative or governmental structure? The answer is obvious, and there is no other effort really worth doing.”

---

Quote:

---

“In Viet-Nam and in many other similar situations we have worked too often with well-working but routine procedures and ideas. It is about time that new approaches and--above all--ideas be tried; obviously, the other ones have been unequal to the task.”

---