GP vs. Specialized Capabilities -- COIN & Beyond

fm SWC Admin -- this discussion spawned from this thread after this post. Definitely on to something, just not "Non Cents"...
----------------

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by slapout9

S.E. the whole idea of assigning assets whether they be air,land or sea based upon your mission makes a whole lot of sense as opposed to way it is done now. I think the concepts of Air force, Land force, Sea force are obsolete. As you suggest they should be mission forces and they should have any and all vehicles air,land,sea to accomplish the mission.

---

Pardon me for moving this discussion almost completely off topic...

However, an additional advantage is that it would likely lead to cheaper weapons systems. No longer would the Military-Industrial Complex be bent on producing a fighter-interceptor-bomber-reconnaisance-tanker-EW-FAC(A)/TAC(A) aircraft (like the F-18). Rather than have jacks-of-all-trades, we would have more lower-cost platforms with specialized somewhat specialized crews. Remember, the original F-16 was a reaction against the movement to "missionize" the hell out of aircraft so as to create a very basic, extremely lethal, agile, and lightweight fighter.

Not that Boyd is god, but he would have preferred simple, lightweight, and lethal to the missionized monstrosities of multipurpose aircraft we fly today.

Furthermore, the crews of these aircraft would be imbued with the ethos of the forces they support, rather than the bureaucracy that writes their fitreps and pays their bills. This is probably the greatest benefit

Allow me to heave this derailed conversation back on the tracks...

As much as I appreciate my Leatherman, I would not want to have to rely on it in a knife fight.

As someone who used to race sail boats, one of the things you notice quickly is that boats built for cruising are rarely across the finish line first. The compromises one has to make to make any craft do too many things makes it less than perfect for any. Which is not to say that any craft can't be tweaked and improved. Keep it light and keep it smooth and it will be faster and more maneuverable.

Of course that rule does not apply to an Abrams tank which is better as a tank than a Humvee is.

Maybe the marines could be of help, here, but in my Army experience, it is "natural" for specialties like aviation and artillery to start to build their own, separate kingdom, completely cut off from the Army they are supposed to support. My very first CAV Squadron I belonged to, went through the extremely painful process of starting to act as a team, instead of two separate entities. When I became a Troop Commander, THAT squadron never did come together; it wasn't until I became an HHT Commander, and made the point of visiting the "guys at the airfield" that we started to act as a unit.

The problem is not entirely the Air Forces' fault. the Army abrogated their responsibilities vis-a-vis the tactical air arm prior to 1947. It was only after their little brother started playing with their old toys that they started to want them back.

I think the Marine Corps can help a lot on this in many ways, but is falling prey in others to the same snake charmer. Maybe the Osprey, but look at the EFV in particular for an example of the complete opposite of specialization. It is being forced to do everything, but with such onerous ship-to-shore requirements (plane at ?? mph), that it is a ginormous engineering compromise and increasingly a pariah rather than our salvation.

However, there is a lot to be said for versatility. So while I will jump on the bandwagon for the KISS rule applied to equipment (Keep it Simple and Specialized), I am also painfully aware of how ineffective a force of one-trick wonders might be, especially given underlying U.S. assumptions and expectations about its force (e.g. it's not the yellow-horde / human wave).

The wicked problem is getting adequate versatility without excessive complexity. In particular when we factor in some more employment -ities, such as quanity, affordability, availability, deployability, affordability, it is enough to make your head hurt.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Merv Benson

As much as I appreciate my Leatherman, I would not want to have to rely on it in a knife fight.

---

Funny that you say that. Recently, my husband was looking a new knife to carry on patrol -- the KaBar was just a bit unwieldy (but at least it had been used in combat, and he was proud of that). He laughingly said that the thing he used most was the Leatherman, to cut IED wires, and that what he should really get was a pair of wire cutters. He figured in a worst-case scenario, he could always stab someone with the things.

So the question would be, how many knife fights do you realistically expect to get into? That is, yes, if you train or buy a piece of gear that is mission specific, hopefully you're doing that because it's the most likely need or use. And if the odd "knife fight" comes along, are you smart and adaptable enough to use what you've got to get the job done?

Smitten Eagle, yes we are drifting off the thread topic, but it it very interesting so may be you should start a new thread? I have some questions and comments. I have a couple of LE knife fight stories to:D

I think Sargeant is on to something though.

In this forum, I don't think I need to walk to dog explaining that COIN/MOOTW/LIC/SASO/Small Wars are the norm and major conflicts like WW II are exceptional circumstances for U.S. forces.

Occasionally, soldiers have asked my thoughts on what kind of knife they should get for the field. One they can make a sandwich with. One they can open boxes and mail with. Because these uses are the norm. Granted, I'll recommend one sturdy enough to defend yourself with at need, but that is an exceptional circumstance.

Analogy is always a deceitful son of a biscuit, but if we don't get carried away with the word games, it might shed some light.

The analogy suggests that the U.S. military, including the Air Force, should be optimized for the norm, Small Wars, but ready for exceptional circumstances, mid- to high- intensity conflict. So in air power, the priorities should be (roughly) airlift, ISR assets, space-based comms, support to SOF, CAS, bombers, and at the very bottom of the list, fighters. Note that this is pretty much the reverse of the AF's current priorities (culturally, if note doctrinally).

And for the cutlery affeciandos; a Spyderco Endura is one I'll recommend, a Mission knives MPF Ti drop point folder is my deployment knife, but when my wife deployed last summer, she carried a Boker Arbolito hunting knife (a Bavarian style hunting knife) that I gave her. All designed for the norm, but suitable for exceptional circumstances in a pinch.

Personally, I found my Camillus (What IS it about you rich Marines and your Ka-Bars, anyway?) was the best damned can opener in the world. It also can dig small holes and hammer in tent stakes like nothing else.

The Leatherman Crunch I carry on my belt has saved my hide both figuratively and literally more than once.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by 120mm

Personally, I found my Camillus (What IS it about you rich Marines and your Ka-Bars, anyway?) was the best damned can opener in the world. It also can dig small holes and hammer in tent stakes like nothing else.

The Leatherman Crunch I carry on my belt has saved my hide both figuratively and literally more than once.

---

You must be talking about later generations of Ka-Bars. I should have been more specific -- the Ka-Bar in question was the ye olde school style, fixed blade version, like you see in WWII movies, and that certainly would not be considered the province of the "rich." Something like this, but a little less jivey:

http://www.marineheritage.org/Store_...62&SortOrder=1

I use mine as a letter opener.*


============================
* My real knife collection is in the kitchen, and I'm fairly handy with them -- I can de-bone a fowl leaving nothing but a meat shirt that resembles the "boneless chicken" of Far Side fame. It's a skill that keeps my husband on the straight and narrow.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by 120mm

Maybe the marines could be of help, here, but in my Army experience, it is "natural" for specialties like aviation and artillery to start to build their own, separate kingdom, completely cut off from the Army they are supposed to support. My very first CAV Squadron I belonged to, went through the extremely painful process of starting to act as a team, instead of two separate entities. When I became a Troop Commander, THAT squadron never did come together; it wasn't until I became an HHT Commander, and made the point of visiting the "guys at the airfield" that we started to act as a unit.

The problem is not entirely the Air Forces' fault. the Army abrogated their responsibilities vis-a-vis the tactical air arm prior to 1947. It was only after their little brother started playing with their old toys that they started to want them back.

---

Interesting thing with the Cav squadrons (this is a pet topic of mine going back some years...might have to tap you with some questions sometime, 120mm). That trend of stripping away the aviation units started in Vietnam. Division tended to yank the organic air troop away and stick it with the aviation battalion. Some squadrons kicked at this (I believe 1/4 Cav was one of the first to do so...but they got nowhere in the face of DePuy), but tended to lose the battle. After that the drift (in organization and thinking) seemed to have cemented itself.

I'm working on a paper now about the Vietnam-era division cavalry squadron as a reaction force, so that also got me thinking about this. I'll stop derailing the thread now....:)

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by 120mm

The problem is not entirely the Air Forces' fault. the Army abrogated their responsibilities vis-a-vis the tactical air arm prior to 1947. It was only after their little brother started playing with their old toys that they started to want them back.

---

Ah...another thread-derailing possibility....:D

The change in the Army Air Corps was more in the lines of them following their own internal doctrine. Prior to World War II there was a fair doctrinal split between the unescorted bomber community and the fighter community. Guess what? The bomber generals won. So they ended up marginalizing the role and impact of CAS on their doctrine, to the point that by the late 1950s TAC was a shell of a command that could barely conduct its basic mission. The Army proper couldn't really have done much to stop this, since it was a political product of the Army Air Corps commanders. People like LeMay who rose to high rank during the war. Chennault was the only major fighter proponent from the pre-war period to assume a higher command position, and he was undercut during the war itself.

As an aside, it's also possible that the addiction to the multi-role aircraft began during this period. In an attempt to remain relevant within the AF political landscape, TAC began requesting aircraft that could deliver atomic munitions, turning themselves in the words of at least one author into a "mini-SAC." The F-105 was the first real example of one of these aircraft, though perhaps McNamara's F-111 (a supposed "do everything" platform that wasn't) is perhaps the best known. The Navy fought the push off for a time, but with the introduction of the F-4 the writing was on the wall. They did, however, hang onto specialized mission aircraft (the A-6 for one) longer than the AF did.

Personally, I've never been a big fan of multi-role, especially in a single-seat aircraft. You really risk crew overload, something that I don't think gets enough consideration. Some aircraft can pull it off, but when you look at the example of the A-10 and the performance of the A-6 and its crews over the years I really think there's something to be said for specialization.

All, I think you should build specialized weapons systems for the various reasons mentioned and then combine them into a mission based task force. i.e. my old unit the 82nd Airborne should have there own planes not wait around to see what the Air Force will do. The 82nd has the mission to be able to conduct forced entry operations from the air so by that standard it should have it's own planes of whatever type they determine in order to be able to accomplish their designated mission.


Knife fightin (yea I spelled it right) go to www.gutterfighting.org to see how to use a real K-Bar and some others as well. Me personally I have been cut by a box cutter,a cheap steak knife stolen from a restaurant and a x-acto knife which I managed to stop about 3 inches before it went into my neck collar bone area. Knife attacks are usually concealed ambush type attacks and can be really nasty and bloody.

With today's cost of equipment, specialization is almost impossible unless the acquistion communities are forced to become more competitive, held to higher standards regarding actual capabilities, lead times and delivery times, and officers/defense contractors are punished for missing any capabilities, lead times or delivery times.

Sole source contracting has ruined any competition within the defense industry. The consolidation of defense contractors over the last 20 years has also hurt competitive bidding.

My personal take on this specialization and "missionizing" the forces (as opposed to missionizing the crews and equipment), is that the advantages primarely accrue to the crews because of transfer of the the crew's ethos and loyalty from the bureaucracy to the supported commander.

Agreed: By this logic, the 82d should have its own fixed wing transport aircraft.

Secondarily, benefits may accrue based on lower costs of procurement of said equipment.

As far as aviation component vs. ground component goes (as in the army task forces mentioned), I would suppose that it's primarely a problem of leadership. The Marine Expeditionary Units manage to, in the course of their 6 month workups, meld detachments of 6 different types of aviation units (including the MWSS and MACG types), into a single squadron, and further manage to build strong relationships between the reinforced squadron and the supported reinforced battalion. It's painful, but it can be done rather successfully. I submit that the reason this is possible is because the supporting aviation elements are Marines themselves, and therefore have something of an appreciation of the supported ground folks.

As far as missionizing of equipment goes: Yes, we Marines are rather guilty of that too. We refuse to adopt anything unless we can somehow splice an "Expeditionary" into the nomenclature of the equipment. It prevents us from buying A-10s, or using non-carrier capable aircraft (KC-130 notwithstanding). Instead we bring our beach-crawling AAVs to the beaches, but only beaches without water (Anbar). Why not use a few Bradleys or M113s?

I carry a Ka-bar as my primary MRE opener. It's tried and true. But the issued USMC bayonet/knife combination is rather badass and I use that when I can get my hands on it. It scores the chili-mac bag lengthwise better than any knife I've ever used.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Sargent

You must be talking about later generations of Ka-Bars. I should have been more specific -- the Ka-Bar in question was the ye olde school style, fixed blade version, like you see in WWII movies, and that certainly would not be considered the province of the "rich." Something like this, but a little less jivey:

http://www.marineheritage.org/Store_...62&SortOrder=1

I use mine as a letter opener.*


============================
* My real knife collection is in the kitchen, and I'm fairly handy with them -- I can de-bone a fowl leaving nothing but a meat shirt that resembles the "boneless chicken" of Far Side fame. It's a skill that keeps my husband on the straight and narrow.

---

LOL - Actually, ma'am, I'm talking about the cheap Camillus knock-off of the WWII-era to present Ka-Bar you are talking about. I bought mine new in 1982 for $8 at the Navy Exchange at Camp LeJeune. My buddy bought a Ka-Bar that looked just like it and was at least 3 times as expensive.

Ski, can you elaborate on why specialized aircraft would cost more? I would have thought it would be just he opposite. I know very little in this area but would like to hear more.

Slap

Planes are now designed to have the latest technology. With the advent of Precision Guided Munitions, literally all planes have the capability to be bomb trucks. With the exception of the F-22, you could continue to incrementally upgrade F-16's, F-15's and F-18's as well as the B-1, B-2 and B-52 series of bombers for the next 15 years with little worry from other nations.

There is no such thing as a cheap aircraft any longer. The A-10 and F-16 were the last true cheap aircraft in the military, and the Air Force has continually tried to get rid of both, despite their effectiveness on the battlefield. The F-16 was the only plane in history to be cheaper than its immediate predecessor.

The Army is no better with their helo programs. The Comanche boondoggle lasted over 20 years and had 2 flying prototypes. Cost the taxpayers billions. The 101st, with all their helos, is the most expensive division in the history of the world. Aviation OPTEMPO funding in the Army is one of the most expensive accounts in the Army budget.

Major procurement programs in this country have a terrible record over the last 30 years. Especially for aircraft. Most of the aircraft we have in service now in the USAF, USN, USMC and USA were designed in the 70's, and are still the most advanced in the world. The two latest aircraft on the scene, the F-22 and V-22, have taken well over 20 years from start to first unit equipped, have suffered from terrible cost overruns and technological glitches, and are now just reaching line units. These aircraft are complex to produce, complex to maintain, and expensive to procure. There is no possibility of ever replacing combat losses in the most unlikely event of the USAF or USMC losing lots of these aircraft. They take too long to build - it's not just aircraft that are suffering from this, FCS will also be a program that falls into this category.

In any case, with the 4GW/COIN wars being the flavor of the future (who will fight us conventionally? A moron?), there's really little need to keep pushing high technology planes of all sorts into the USAF. I've heard the commentary about how we need to keep the engineers and designers busy...easy to do...just let them engineer and design high tech planes for prototype status and technology demonstrators until there is a real threat to our high tech planes.

In a way, the air forces of the USAF, Navy and USMC have been victims of their own successes. They are so dominant with the current aircraft that there is little need for modernization in the short term. PGM's have made aircraft of all sorts nothing more than bomb trucks - B52's in Afghanistan were being used as CAS delivery platforms dropping ordinance from 30K feet+.

If I was king for a day, all that money being spent on F35's would be diverted to find a replacement for the C5. We also need a hell of lot more C17's. But that's against the USAF culture. Every other program in the fighter/bomber world would be incrementally upgraded for the next 15 years. And then technology would be so far ahead of what we see today, that real leap aheads could be made at much less cost. Unmanned vehicles are also going to take the place of specialized platforms. That's another discussion for another day.

Note to self: don't bring up edged weapons or specific smallarms - will exceed safe load of thread :D

Back on track-

Since we're focused on A/C, consider the two most (arguably, as always) successful airframes since WWII, the C-130 and the UH-1. These two have done everything; transport, SAR, ELINT, gunships, etc for decades. The common factor is a capable and flexible base airframe. I would argue that this is relevant to almost any catagory of combat equipment. Look at, well, not a specific weapon system, but a caliber, the Browning .50 (12.7 x 99mm). Capable and flexible, it has been AA, anti-armor, heavy MG, and a sniper round. And it's little brother, the .30-06 and to a slightly lesser extent, the 7.62 x51mm NATO, flexible and capable. Rather than some super-specialized flechette, exotic projectile material, or radical weapon configuration, flexible and capable carry the day.

So why don't we just seek out flexible and capable from the git go, rather than falling back to it after the over-specialized items out-live their niche and make themselves obsolete.

I would argue that the principle here has broad application, from side arms to strategic weapons platforms...

Sadly, I know the basic answer why we don't follow this strategy; more money flows to congressional districts when 100 gadgets are made for 100 discrete tasks rather than a handful of gadgets that can accomplich the same 100 tasks.

Aircraft development is my very, very favorite subject. This discussion reminds me of the tendency for aircraft to become heavier and more complex. WWI aircraft development is an interesting case in point: As conventional competitiveness became more intense, airframes became heavier and faster (with lots of counter-intuitive designs staying "light", such as the Fokker D-VIII, due to other factors) culminating in large, complicated and heavy designs like the Bristol Fighter.

Ironically, the Bristol Fighter became the simple, light, multi-role COIN aircraft for between the wars, as airplanes became even bigger, faster and heavier.

If you take away the competitiveness of conventional warfare, you really don't gain an edge in technological advancement. But you DO make a lot of money, if you are a defense contractor.

Is this really about specialization vs. multi-role or is it about small wars forces vs. multi-role forces?

I believe in either case I'd opt for multi-role.

Small wars might be the norm, but I bet that it takes a while till memory has faded enough to trip off a new big COIN war. There was a generation between Vietnam end and Iraq beginning.
Even if small wars would be fought permanently, a small wars army would suck. A small wars-optimized army with lots of military police, light infantry, aerial surveillance, convoy forces, base defenses, civil affairs, military intellligence troops would simply be a poor deterrent against conventional foes. Think keeping Iran out of Iraq, for example. If Iran wanted to invade, it wouldn't be intimidated by a small wars army, no matter how large that would be.

Concerning mult-irole vs. specialized in general, it's important to remember that more serious and brutal wars can inflict as much losses to an army in a week as Iraqi insurgents in four years. The losses won't be evenly distributed, so the desired mix of capabilities wouldn't be kept if the force had lots of specialized assets. With lots of multi-role assets, it's possible to keep going after severe losses. And multi-role forces adapt more easily to changing conditions of warfare.



@120mm; combat aircraft don't become heavier anymore. Eurofighter is a weight category below F-15 for the same role. F-2 is (very) comparable to F-16. Gripen is even lighter as F-16. Super Hornet is similar weight as Tomcat.
Minor states develop typically light planes (like the Chinese, India, Taiwan, South Korea). I believe the heaviness trend ended with the F-15.

And today size and weight are not the primary problems. It's the long development, the gold plating and the super expensive electronics. Planes like Flanker/Berkut prove that size still permits high agility - only large target area, high fuel costs and high visibility remain as real problems of large aircraft.