This is ground-zero for the SWC roundtable on John Robb's Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization.
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This is ground-zero for the SWC roundtable on John Robb's Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization.
John Robb's Web Page:
Reviews: (Hat Tip to MountainRunner and John Robb)
Additional relevant links – mentioned / referenced in Brave New War (partial list of online resources and books)
Articles
- Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us – Wired Magazine by Bill Joy.
- The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation – Marine Corps Gazette by William Lind, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, Gary Wilson
- Effects –Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare – Aerospace Education Foundation by David Deptula
- The Conflict in Iraq: Tactics; Insurgents Ware Attacks on Baghdad Fuel – New York Times by James Glanz
- Al-Zawahiri Encourages Targeting of Gulf Oil – Jamestown Foundation by Stephen Ulf
- Inching Along , One More Piece to Rebuild Iraq – New York Times by James Glanz
- Thailand Crisis Deepening – Jamestown Foundation by Stephen Ulf
- In the Line of Fire – Atlantic Unbound
- Mad Max in Borderland – Overnight with the Minutemen YO! – New America Media by Russell Morse
- Swarming and the Future of Warfare – Rand by Sean Edwards
- Making Swarming Happen – Conference on Swarming and C4ISR by H. van Dyke Parunak
- The New Warrior Class – Parameters by Ralph Peters
- Learning to Expect the Unexpected – New York Times by Nassim Nicholas Taleb
Books
- The World is Flat – Thomas Friedman
- Imperial Hubris – Michael Scheuer
- Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia – Ahmed Rashid
- The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century – Thomas X. Hammes
- The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century – Thomas P. M. Barnett
- The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order - Samuel P. Huntington
- Lawrence of Arabia – B. H. Liddell Hart
- The Rise and Decline of the State – Martin Van Creveld
Quotes
- Inside the Insurgency – Michael Ware quoted at PBS Frontline
I'd also add:
- The Transformation of War - Martin Van Creveld
2 more, these are referenced from some of the sources - ex. T.X. Hammes had recommended Linked:
- The Starfish and the Spider by Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom
- Linked by Albert Laszlo Barabsi
Cited in BNW:
- Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency - Strategic Studies Institute by Dr. Max G. Manwaring
Another one of John's favorites is this one:
- The Black Swan by Nassim Taleb
Hello All,
I volunteered to become the moderator for the discussion, so I wanted to kick it off. A read of the first few chapters and a scan of the book tells me that even if you have not got your copy yet, but have been participating on the SWC, then you are prepared to begin.
I thought about how best to moderate - like well, where do you start? I think much like Robb's book all the ideas are linked, and perhaps that is more appropriate then say an Oprah's Book club review
I think what we want to do is evaluate the Robb's ideas for accuracy and relevancy in the areas of future war. This is pretty broad, but it also suits this bunch as we have so many different back grounds and interests.
Feel free to pick out a major idea, or a theme and start up a conversation or just express yourself. One (or more) of us will jump in I'm sure. It will help if you type in the quote, and page number, and tie you thoughts to that - at least to kick it off. If we start bouncing back and forth between ideas I think that is OK because as I said, I think they are tied together - much like the problems we face. As we go we can look for those connectors and start forming a complete picture (Yes Steve - sounds like systems theory to me)
Some themes to explore -
1) 4GW/5G theory as discussed by Robb, or anybody he cites - you can branch off if you wish
2) The role of globalization as a guerilla enabler
3) The goal of "Caliphate" what is it and why does it matter
4) Economic warfare
5) Decentralized networks
6) Linking terrorism with other criminal activities such as the drug trade, slave trade, counterfitting (of anything), arms trading
7) The concept of the "Bazaar"
8) Destabalization of states as a AA for future Global Guerilla recruiting and operations
9) Rethinking Security - could be structure, problems, etc.
10) the role of technology - good, bad or neutral
As you see nothing is off the table as long as it relates to the book. Enorse an idea or take it to the mat - but please be couteous and respond as soon as you can. If you see something in the news, on a blog or from another author that is relevant - post the link and talk about it.
Our goal is to get smarter - the more we articulate our ideas and put them out there, the more we benefit. PM collaboration is cool, bring it out in the open when you are ready.
Well, I'm going to get back into the book and I'll post a line of thought tomorrow - unles somebody puts someting up I'm more interested in, then I'll respond to that.
Cheers, Rob
A couple of quick thoughts on these pages:
1.) His typology and psychological dissection of warriors V soldiers is parallel to how the Left has at times characterized US military personnel, in particular during the Viet Nam war. The baby killers of Viet Nam are every bit the warriors Peters alludes to and I detect a subtle undercurrent of the same mentality at play towards our forces in Iraq today, though not nearly as strong and outspoken as back then. I attribute some of the spectacular attention given to the crimes committed by military personnel to this mentality, that anyone who engages in war is but a warrior as defined by Peters. Six (6) people were just murdered in Wisconsin and it barely made the news and it will fade away today but let some trooper in Iraq blow away 6 civilians and it stays in the news for a long, long time. In correlation with this is the fact that the Left still touts to a certain extent the notion that today's soliders are pretty much fodder, uneducated, disenfranchised, etc. John Kerry's infamous comment about our forces in Iraq was not mere happenstance.
2.) This passage from Parameters made me think of my own frontier militia ancestor warriors and all the point men and women of the advancing American frontier from the time of Puritans up through the very late 1800s. Back East, those on the edge were always considered uncouth, uncultured, unrefined, barbaric, crude, dangerous, etc. They were every bit Peter's warriors.
His typology presupposes alot of social cohesion and well-oiled stratification in societies that produce soliders rather than spawining warriors. We know that despite the values and Law, the ingrained morality, quality control and ROE, PTSD factors heavily into the lives of soldiers that are in combat. Cohesive and well-oiled societies should not be producing such extreme conditions in the aftermath of war, but that is not the case. It is like the fine meal that produces severe acid indigestion - it shouldn't be happening. My hunch is that by Peter's analogy, warriors for the most part would never really have PTSD, since they originate from dysfunction and nothing else ever changes except lulls in the fighting and aggession. I don't think this is the case IMO and observation of mankind. In short, his classification cannot adequately address the truism that one man's warrior is another man's hero.
Rob, has anybody asked John Robb if he would like to join in?
Goesh,Quote:
Originally Posted by goesh
Much of our thought about how the frontier began and our American version of our own history is written from the perspective of Fredrick Jackson Turner. Writing in the 1880's and 1890's his thesis on the frontier described the effect of "a" frontier on the psyche of American. Our concepts of manifest destiny are currently hot topics as America is attacked for "imperialism".
Turner was promoting the idea of individualism, rugged self reliance, and freedom unassailable by government sanction. The Turneraian thesis is that the American historical experience was devoid of European influence and intensely effected by the frontier experience and separate from the European example. Though currently there is substantial criticism of this point by current historians it a de rigeur example of the current situation. America is not a new generation of Europeans.
This has substantial impact on the psyche of the war fighter and the politician. As homogenization of the cultures occur via shared media perhaps common understanding might become possible. The mistake often made in regards to the current conflict is that we are more culturally like Europeans than Middle Eastern countries. This would be a gross mistake of generalization. The American experience is simply unique.
The issues of liberal and conservative are fairly unique also to America. With the rapid expansion sectionalization occurred also a Turnerarian Thesis subject. The east coast did refer to the western expansionists as uncouth, and sinful in the reveling of freedom while soaking up dime novels about those antics and allowing their children to play act those same uncouth and sinful themes.
The metropolis of the east coast required a homogeneous culture with centralized government to get the welfare, garbage, water, and power to the home. In the expanding west government control was a land grant and a good wishes to survival. After the 1890's the population centers grew up around the coasts and the "mid west" river valleys. The rockies and desert plains of Utah, New Mexico, Texas, Montana (etc.) all became the west and central to the themes of America freedom. California, Oregon, and Washington became the "other" east coast.
Regardless of the perceived validity of the Turner Thesis we can see the proof in politics, war fighting, and the soldier. Whether it is the imposition of a democracy on a culture that refutes that kind of freedom and as a regional culture exists almost exclusively as monarchies, or it is the simple freedom to act as an individual within the rules of engagement denied to other armies we can see effects. As soldiers when we see micro-management of soldier missions from the top we find it an endemic problem to be dealt with. "Tell us what to do not how to do it" is a soldiers homily. Yet in other world armies micro management is the way of command.
Now we have "the new" warfare defined as a war on terrorism. The tactics and strategies are ill defined in a war between cultures. Consider the current Iraq conflict; the strategies are somewhere between traditional land based warfare and COIN; the tactics match more closely with disaster relief and intelligence gathering; the bureaucratic logistics load is mind boggling. The competing tensions create a desolate terrain defying definition. This is the issue of "the new" warfare.
There are issues within "the new" warfare that become obvious for American soldiers that are not so obvious to the generals. If America attempts to bind soldier actions to European constraints that are not culturally obvious to an American soldier then failure is bound to happen. You can act within the scope of a written rule, but the unwritten rule of conduct will escape even the most astute. This is obvious to those at the sharp end of the stick, but never perceived by those holding the other end. The rule of conduct and culture are not shared precepts between Europe and America no matter how closely aligned language or country of origin.
Additional resource: see, rather hear, Robb interview at the Council of Foreign Relations. Blurb:
U.S. forces and the fledgling Iraqi government struggle against the insurgency in Baghdad. Drug gangs in Mexico wrest power from the government. Militias attack oil interests in Nigeria. Armed Software executive and former Air Force counterterrorist operative John Robb tracks them all on his popular blog. In his book, Brave New War, Robb uses the theory of open-source software development to describe modern insurgencies. Collaboration on software produces innovation. “In Iraq, we seem similar levels of innovation,” he says. “And this has radically changed how we fight war.” He concludes that the Defense Department is ill-equipped to face the challenges of this new type of warfare. “The U.S. Defense Department is a huge bureaucracy. Most of its focus is on these large weapons systems that are pretty much useless in modern conflict.”
Also
Seven Pillars of Wisdom - T.E. Lawrence
A write-up in National Geographic on Swarm Theory - emergent intelligence, stigmergic communications, etc. Central to the idea of leaderless action.