Iraq - the Modern Equivalent of the Spanish Civil War

The part that has intrigued me so far are the sections on bad guy lessons learned in Chapter 3 beginning on page 42. Regardless of whether you buy in to the future as proposed by BNW, the lessons learned from Iraq (what Robb calls the modern equivalent of the Spanish Civil War) will likely be studied, used and improved upon by a wide-assortment of guerrillas, terrorists and criminals.

What concerns me is that we have a hard time learning our own lessons (though I think we are doing a much better job now in at least capturing lessons) - so who is capturing enemy lessons learned into a relevant and accessible form for use by the good guys?

I imagine the IC (to include the Service Intel centers and activities) may be doing some of this – but is it readily accessible to those that need it to include future planners and concept writers?

I was briefed twice in Afghanistan on evolving IED tactics and technologies - all on the SIPR/high side. So yes, there is a significant amount of collection and dissemination going on within the military. Plus you have the JIEDD guys, the Assymetric Warfare group, etc...working to develop new TTP's against IED's.

The thing I haven't seen - other than John's book and some research I've been doing for my Master's degree - is how the enemy is targeting infrastructure in order to produce chaos. Most of this is open source available, and it's very interesting to see what is being targeted, why it's being targeted and how certain targets actually help fund the insurgency - such as oil trucks being hijacked and power line stantions being melted down into ingots and then resold as scrap.

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Originally Posted by SWJED

so who is capturing enemy lessons learned into a relevant and accessible form for use by the good guys?

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Ski is right the IC and the military are capturing everything and putting it out on SIPR. Reams of data. On the OSINT side I will be coming out with a book by the end of the summer which is the cumination of four years study of insurgent TTPs reported in the press and declas reporting. Its a field manual ... ask and ye shall receive! :D

Love the handle "Abu Buckwheat".

If I can step back a moment from the technical details of insurgent tactical operations, important as they are on a practical level, to discuss the historical metaphor used here by Robb.

The Spanish Civil War has often been referred to by historians as " the dress rehearsal for WWII". If you take a bigger picture approach,1914 -1991 was a " long war" between liberal democracy and authoritarianism-totalitarianism or perhaps a "European civil war" that goes global. As I read BNW, Robb seems to mean that Spain's Civil War was the precedent for a new paradigm of warfare and that Iraq too is setting such a precedent, not merely on the tactical level but on the strategic level as well.

It is useful to recall that the Spanish Civil War, as bitter as it was ideologically speaking, appears somewhat quaint in form next to what unfolded after 1939. Unlike Spain, Iraq has been significant enough a conflict in military and economic terms that it *may* alter how Western statesmen and generals approach future wars. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin found in the the Spanish experience, confirmation of that which they already wished to believe, whether it was the efficacy of terror bombing at Guernica or the softness of Western democracies or the need to enforce ideological purity with homicidal zeal.

Iraq, by contrast, has caused at least *some* reconsideration of the strategic assumptions under which the United States originally decided to invade in 2003. In terms of decision-tree consequences, the U.S. has been, to a degree, bumped toward a somewhat different chain of subsequent events than if the U.S. military had an easy occupation or simply had gone home from Baghdad almost immediately.

"The modern equivalent of the Spanish Civil War" is an effective metaphor for indicating the precedent and magnitude of Iraq as well as numerous logical consequences flowing from that war. It is however, far from an exact analogy for the same reasons that make Iraq such a powerful metaphor in the first place.

Also - the SCW was a conflict where lots of outsiders went for a fight. The Abraham Lincoln brigade, the Russians, Italians, Germans, etc..all had a role to play. The same is happening to an extent in Iraq on the AQ side and the "coalition of the willing (puke)" for nation-states.

My only problem with Robb's analogy is that the lessons of the Spanish Civil War were by no means self-evident. Some smart people, Liddell Hart comes to mind, drew completely the wrong lesson about the future of armored warfare. Be interesting to see if the same applies to Iraq, on either our side or theirs.

Hasn’t that been the case of most wars? In fact been able to learn the right lessons from earlier wars seems to be a surefire way to being labeled a “great” general.

I don't know - the analysis BNW uses to draw conclusions may give more credit to the AIF then they deserve. While I do believe that one problem often creates multiple problems -

ex. insufficient electrical power generation - say the electric company has to generate more because there is a lack of benzine (mogas) or DF2 (diesel) which in turn drives up the price of the black marketers of benzine, DF2 and propane which in turn outrages the people which in turn leads to violence and retribution, or the appearance of ineffective govt - which in turn overwhelms the 1950s electrical grid - with the whole thing made worse by graft, extortion and corruption and then effects countless other systems in an attritional cycle. However, is this really AIF intelligent design, or is it just the AIF being able to take advantage of the home court "perfect storm" conditions that exist because the infrastructure is outdated, a lack or breakdown of services is likely, population growth over the years with no commensurate investment in public works, and the other conditions that are just 50 years of dictatorship and going on 30 years of sustained and conflcit that is Iraq?

The conditions in Iraq that make it so advantagous to the AIF/Global Guerillas are not present everywhere in the world - you'd have to be talking Somalia or somewhere that is not only impoverished, but war torn at least close to the degree Iraq is. I guess my point is that part of the AIF's success is due to the conditions they inherit inside of Iraq. Iraq is a kind of Petri dish for creating or maybe attracting "global guerillas", but to export their destabilization 100% I think they'll either have to adapt it to less generous conditions to compensate for effective government, or take it on the road to war torn, failed states with Iraq like conditions. To me this also explains where we are likely to see these AQ like groups appear with some degree of success next – and also may help us allocate resources (DIME) to combat those conditions.

So the question is can you extract the "global guerilla" success in Iraq and lay it over any state you want to bring down, or are there conditions that must be met first.

Rob

Again, some excellent points, and you are 100% correct that not all areas of the world can support a "global guerilla" movement.

Because Iraq has a good deal of infrastructure (and some it actually worked/works) it is possible to target various nodes. Most of the world falls into this category.

I spoke with John after I returned from Afghanistan, and told him the global guerilla tactics used in Iraq would not be nearly as successful in the Ghan because there was literally no infrastructure to target. There are no pipelines, no electrical facilities, no sewage plants or water filtration factories. Hell, paved roads are a luxury.

To answer your last question - yes, I do believe that the global guerilla model from Iraq can be used in other places, but there has to be a minimum living standard that includes most of the modern amenities the West takes for granted. This includes but is not limited to:
1. Power generation facilities
2. Pipelines
3. Sewage and water filtration facilities
4. Electrical lines
5. Telephone lines
6. Gas stations
7. Mass transportation systems

If any of these exist within a state, it is possible for the GG theory to be implemented - it might not be successful, but it can be started.

Rob wrote:

"Iraq is a kind of Petri dish for creating or maybe attracting "global guerillas", but to export their destabilization 100% I think they'll either have to adapt it to less generous conditions to compensate for effective government, or take it on the road to war torn, failed states with Iraq like conditions"

Ski wrote:

"yes, I do believe that the global guerilla model from Iraq can be used in other places, but there has to be a minimum living standard that includes most of the modern amenities the West takes for granted"

We have a dichotomy here - what is the most hospitiable environment for Global Guerillas ? Failed States without effective governance and little development or Core states with strong national governments where they have " target-rich" zones to practice system disruption ?

Actually, I think a blend is necessary for the rise of GG's.

There has to be a weak central government, with limited military/police/intelligence capabilites, but with a standard of living that includes the amenities of life I mentioned before. It also helps to have militia's, or other strong paramilitary groups.

I see Columbia as another potential GG scenario.

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Originally Posted by Stu-6

Hasn’t that been the case of most wars? In fact been able to learn the right lessons from earlier wars seems to be a surefire way to being labeled a “great” general.

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Absolutely, but I think Rob makes my point better than I could have. The lessons of Iraq for "GGs" may not be applicable everywhere, and may lead to far fewer rewards in other theaters.

I find Robb's stuff on MEND and Nigeria to be his most interesting real-world scenario, but that is what I've gotten from his website, I'm just starting the book.

Hey Zen, Ski, and everyone else

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We have a dichotomy here - what is the most hospitiable environment for Global Guerillas ? Failed States without effective governance and little development or Core states with strong national governments where they have " target-rich" zones to practice system disruption ?

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Let's table "hospitable" for just a moment and consider why the global guerilla needs both from his perspective to accomplish his goals

Perhaps he uses failed states for basing, large scale recruiting, to keep his enemy bleeding (we deploy and he gets targets, we counter with greater deployments) and to diffuse his enemy (the more failed states he infests, the more we react). This also allows him a greater degree of freedom of movement. This feels offensive, but is it really?

Perhaps for large scale economy effects he tries to "go spectacular" on his enemy's home turf. Even if he doesn't succeed, or the attack is less than spectacular, he still causes partisanship in his enemy's political apparatus and a call for thicker armor. This is offensive

What is interesting to me is the effect it has - Dichotomy. It has us looking both ways as to where to focus resources, and to create and pursue a focused and coherent strategy because the ends, ways and means are perceived differently by the Executive and Legislative branches. We pour time and effort over CoG analysis to find critical capabilities and vulnerabilities, but can't come up with answers we find rational and can employ force or power against in a manner that provides incremental proof of results. That is why when I read the Peter's article it gave me that knot in my gut.

Is this truly a dichotomy (a division) or more of a sweet spot (a convergence)? It seem our most striking example, Iraq, is neither a fully failed state nor a fully industrialized one.

It seems to me that the Bunker & Sullivan piece on gangs is relevant to the 'hospitable environment' discussion. I would think that gangs in the US--especially gangs such as MS 13, if they gain a significant foothold--represent a potential ally for any GG. Therefore, making the US as inhospitable for GG as possible may involve addressing a domestic problem we have largely ignored for decades.

- it seems then they need the failed states for cannon fodder, foot soldiers, bombers, mules and non-failed states for their media war, drama, propoganda, press coverage, their video footage - front stage, back stage from another perspective. When one end of the dichotomy is attacked/weakened, the other end gathers strength for lack of attention. COIN appears from a theoretical perspective to always apply equal force in both directions, though in so doing, it is never quite enough for immediate and easily quantified gains that a full scale effort in one direction can provide to the Public and politicians back home. The 'footage' end of the dichotomy feeds off any and all attacks on either end of the dichotomy. All the more reason then to stand our ground in Iraq.