Military Support to SSTRO JOC
I realize I'm a latecomer here and you may have discussed this when it came out, but I was just reading the December 2006 Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept. I was particularly struck by the list of "risks" and "mitigations." I wondered what others thought of them:
•The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTR operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTR campaign. (high risk)
The recommended mitigation strategy focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the MMEs of a major SSTR operation. These capabilities will include strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTR operations. SSTR strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTR operation.
•The U.S. interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts of the kinds of deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct an extended SSTR campaign. (high risk)
The recommended mitigation strategy involves working with the National Security Council, as well as other applicable U.S. departments and agencies, and with the Congress to gain the support needed to build SSTR-related civilian capabilities in the interagency.
•DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTR operations. (medium risk)
The recommended mitigation strategy involves the development and experimentation of innovative concepts that enable the Joint Force to conduct SSTR operations without a dramatic increase in manpower, e.g., the development of niche and surge capabilities within the Total Force, longer tours to maintain force structure, and on-the-ground expertise.
•In the coming years, the U.S. military will abandon the very significant new approaches that have recently been implemented to prepare American military forces to effectively conduct multi-dimensional SSTR operations. (low risk)
The recommended mitigation strategy is to ensure that U.S. military personnel are taught at all levels during their training and Professional Military Education (PME) to understand the importance of SSTR operations for U.S. national security and to recognize these operations as one of their most important and challenging missions.
•Multiple external actors, including the U.S. military and interagency elements, will prove unable to integrate their efforts across the SSTR operation’s multidimensional mission elements with those of the existing or new host nation government during a high end SSTR operation and thus the operation will not succeed in creating the new domestic order or a viable peace. (low risk)
The recommended mitigation strategy is to give priority to developing and exercising integration mechanisms for the planning and conduct of SSTR operations.
Have not seen that JOC, still going through
the IW and JUO JOCs.
Based on the quotes, I think the stated risks are accurate as, mostly, are the levels of risk assigned. However, I believe the proposed mitigation efforts are likely to be only marginally successful if at all.
The "One Third" and "Two Year" rules apply. About a third of Americans will support most efforts, about a third will be opposed for one reason or another (all too frequently for domestic political reasons) and the remaining third will be ambivalent -- they will be supportive if the effort works, object if it appears to be in trouble.
That condition will prevail for about two years; after that the vacillating third will become firmly opposed. This has been true throughout our history from Jenkins Ear forward and is true today. Given the vastly improved ability to communicate, the trends toward societal "liberalization" (not precise but a shorthand word), the current fad of pols hewing to polls as opposed to doing their job, the likelihood of the recommended mitigation for gaining acceptance of an SSTR campaign is slim.
Further, those factors will likely preclude the interagency cooperation desired -- and that is severely exacerbated by the way Congress doles out funds, the budget competition flatly discourages cooperation.
The various parochial fiefs within the Armed forces have proven over and over that they are not prepared to adopt sensible and meaningful personnel and training policies -- and Congress wouldn't let them do so even if they wished to. Congress will fund hardware produced in multiple Districts; it will not adequately fund training, particularly contingency based individual training. Congress has and will continue to also intrude on recruitment and force levels -- they're mildly supportive now but after we draw down in Iraq and as Afghanistan improves, that 'support' will evaporate. Add to that the fact that we are unwilling to routinely screen potential accessions for psychological adapability, unwilling to (and unlikely to convince the American voter of the desirability of) stop paying people a bonus for being married as opposed to a bonus for staying single (ideal) or at least a marriage neutral pay system, unable in peacetime to really train new entrants, enlisted or commissioned, to the levels needed and the Force Structure problem is at best medium risk -- possibly, given the penchant of many today in the target recruitment pool for a life of relative ease, even high risk. Given that the JOC will ikely rule, Troufion has a good suggestion
Longer tours are highly desirable and should have been implemented in 2002 IMO (Yeah, I know, I'm out now so that's easy to say but my son who is in and most of his friends agree. They also agree that the practice of assigning returning units to different AOs or even nations is not terribly smart :o). This too will require a culture change and Congress is likely to intrude unless the case is very well presented.
The last item in the quote, re: the host nation is a probability, it also is likely to be of higher risk than the JOC presumes; the host nation will have a great deal to say about said integration and our history in many nations from the early 20th Century forward in this regard is not conducive to optimism. Unfortunately, we spend big bucks on FAOs and then ignore them and our egos and perceived arrogance coupled with a lack of cultural knowledge continually have done us little good in this respect.
Hopefully we will in fact "ensure that U.S. military personnel are taught at all levels during their training and Professional Military Education (PME) to understand the importance of SSTR operations for U.S. national security and to recognize these operations as one of their most important and challenging missions."
We certainly blew that post Viet Nam (post WW II for that matter) and one can only hope we're a little smarter now.
We should play to our strengths; we are an impatient results oriented bunch. Nation building as a low key, low risk and small commitment operation is acceptable to Congress and the voters. If a larger commitment is required -- and it sometimes will be -- Congress, the voters and the majority of nations in the world who like to see the big guy stumble (and many of whom are willing to throw banana peels on the walk...) are likely to be less than supportive. We should fix our Intel community to better provide early warning so that low key efforts can be undertaken
If a larger commitment short of total war is required, we should design our Forces, in this context, to slam in, remove the problem and/or totally defeat or incapacitate the opposition and then pay someone else to clean up the mess. Not nice, I know; war seldom is.
That, BTW, is not a simplistic solution. It is possibly harder than the JOC proposals but it is also more likely to be achieved. As the guy said, people are the problem...
Strategic communications would include...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
SteveMetz
I was just reading the December 2006 Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept.
[I]•The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTR operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTR campaign. (high risk)
The recommended mitigation strategy focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the MMEs of a major SSTR operation. These capabilities will include strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTR operations. SSTR strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTR operation.
First of all, is there a link to this document? I'd like to hear them expand on these mitigation strategies.
Take the first one. In plain English. They assert that the American public and politicians won't support a long and costly SSTR effort. I guess they are basing this on what has happened in Iraq. I wouldn't say that Americans won't support such a fight, period. You have to include something along the lines of "where they see little chance of victory (however vaguely defined), or their estimation of the likely outcome not being worth the cost of achieving it."
The mitigation strategy says get this thing moving fast. You don't have decades to pull this off, but just a few years to show significant results to the publiic. Well, I guess having a sense of urgency is good. Just about everything else in life works that way. But merely saying that we are going to get this show on the road pronto next time sort of assumes away the problems they have demonstrated to this point. How do they propose to do this better in the future? Just acknowledging you are battling an insurgency seems to be a big hurdle to overcome based on what we've seen
They talk about strategic communication strategies and the need to keep the public well informed. If you think you aren't communicating to the public well, I'd suggest they rethink their communications style, first of all. They seem to want to walk a general out on a podium to speak to reporters who speaks in an emotionless robotic manner, using some military lingo. Do they not understand that in these press conferences they have an opportunity to speak to the American public? This communications style isn't connecting with the public, if that is indeed their goal. More of the same will not suffice.
Contrast these with how General Eisenhower met with the press, for example. Ike seemed like a regular guy that the public could relate to. When I see old clips of him on the History Channel talking with reporters or the troops, I still stop to hear what he had to say. What works in some staff meeting back at Ft.Riley may not be what works with the folks back home. Monty, Ike, Patton (not so sure about McArthur), these guys were actually popular with the public, people connected with them.
I'll have to think more about how to articulate my point on this. I just realize that when I am flipping through the channels and some general is speaking on C-Span to some reporters or Congress, it feels like I've just had a double dose of Nyquil. Gen. Schwarzkopf had a knack for talking to Americans, too. When he was talking, I remember people in a bar or airport lounge actually listening. Can't say I have noticed that lately in any bars or airports.
