Nagl and Yingling: Restructuring the U.S. Military
Nagl and Yingling: Restructuring the U.S. Military - Council on Foreign Relations podcast interview with Greg Burno, 13 February 2008.
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Lieutenant Colonel
John Nagl, Commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment at Fort Riley, Kansas and Lieutenant Colonel
Paul Yingling, Commander, 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas.
With the U.S. military engaged in what experts consider a state of “persistent conflict,” the long-term stability and structure of the armed forces has become a topic of intense debate. While some see a need to keep an eye on conventional threats, others have pushed more radical ideas—like retooling the military to specialize on stabilization and training of foreign security forces.
LTC John Nagl and LTC Paul Yingling are among those advocating change. Both men have served with distinction in Iraq, and both currently command an army battalion. But they’ve also gone somewhere most uniformed officers seldom tread: They’ve taken their gripes with army doctrine public. In this podcast interview with CFR.org, Nagl argues the U.S. military must shift from a traditional combat force to one focused on advisory and stability missions. Yingling says a greater burden for war fighting and reconstruction must be carried by others branches of the U.S. government.
Their observations, which have won both supporters and detractors, were first raised in their professional writings. Nagl, who recently announced his retirement from the army (
Washington Post), explored lessons from past counterinsurgencies in his acclaimed 2002 book,
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Yingling made waves in May 2007 when he directly challenged the army’s officer corps with an
Armed Forces Journal article blaming the failings in Iraq, like Vietnam, on the shortsightedness of a generation of generals.
The iceberg under the water
I think fundamentally war has changed us – and moreover in a good way. War has offered a means for us to challenge ourselves, our leadership and our profession in ways that do not fit into the context of a largely peacetime Army. In this case the proportion of those effected by the war has grown to a point whereas to provide a bow wave upon which to consider our core beliefs.
I remember reading MG Bolger’s books on the CTCs as a Platoon Leader, then rereading them as a CO CDR – there was not much out there like that at the time – the kind of introspection that challenged the conventional wisdom about our profession. Few were the leaders who either had the means, or felt compelled to explore not only for themselves, but to write it down for others in such a way that it allowed them to challenge things. War has changed that.
How much traction and reflection would a LTC’s thoughts on generalship have generated in 2000, even 2002 when only a small percentage of units had gone to war? How much of what we have experienced now has empowered us up to this point to challenge the status quo? War changes us – it makes us more pragmatic, and it compels us to ask why? LTC Yingling’s article is now part of the CGSC/ILE POI – it gets introduced and discussed in small group forums – would that have happened in 2001? I raise that question because its reflects to me that not only are CO grade and FG officers challenging the status quo, but even some 06s and above are. I was talking with a buddy last night about his first week in the ILE course here – he said their first GO speaker came and the audience wasted no time in asking him about COL McMasters, and why LTC Nagl is leaving.
I guess my point is that while you have some very visible guys they are the well knowns – the top of the iceberg. The reality I feel is that there is a great deal of mass below the water that many on the outside don’t see. It manifests itself in different ways – but the compelling need to question conventional wisdom is there – consider SWC member Gian Gentile, who is an active duty officer, prior BN CDR. He raises some valid questions about the dangers of accepting new ideas on their face value alone – he disagrees – and this is healthy – it provides tension – that tension produces further dialogue which teases out the underpinnings of arguments and often forces us to look in uncomfortable directions. It helps us understand our need to produce “a solution” and move on to other things vs. understanding that some things are not simple mathematical equations that can be added or subtracted to produce a definitive answer – some things must be continuously interacted with, treated, stayed on top of, inter-acted with, managed or what have you, or they will revert to the path of least resistance and cause far more trouble down the road.
Its undeniable in my mind that we benefit from the Nagls, the Yinglings, the Gentiles, and some of the other well knowns who overtly challenge the system. However, I think it would also be wise not to see them as an oddity, or to try and divorce them from the conditions which allowed their arguments to gain traction and spark reaction. These conditions have created an Army that thinks of itself differently. You could be talking about the way some cringe when they see a soldier on a cold day wearing a black fleece jacket and a fleece cap inside the garrison area as part of an authorized duty uniform (the pragmatic reaction to protecting oneself from the cold), or you could be talking about a LTG who writes and encourages others to blog. Hats off to the those above the water – the public needs to see it, and I think those below the water do too, however, don’t discount the mass of the iceberg below the water – it lasts longer, and it provides the real inertia.
Best, Rob
Rob, while I generally agree
with you, I think you may be too hard on the Army of an earlier period. Dan Bolger was writing and challenging the conventional wisdom as a LTC, Bob Leonhardt and H. R. McMaster wrote as Majors back when I was teaching at CGSC. As a general rule, our Marine brothers beat themselves up in lively debate on the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette - it is a hallowed tradition in the Corps. For example, see Evans Carlson and Sam Griffith's early writing.
So, I would modify your argument to read that the tradition of debate engendered by junior and Field Grade officers should be nourished and encouraged by the institutional services and DOD.Despite some backsliding on occasion we have a pretty good record over the years.
Cheers
JohnT
Plus que ca change, plus que c'est la meme chose
Hi Tom--
After Wass de Czege Don Holder ran SAMS. He returned to Leavenworth as the 3 star CAC commander/CGSC Cmdt/DEPTRADOC Cdr. Don was the guy responsible for FM 100-5 (1986 version). So, we did get an army intellectual to the higher echelons. Of course, there was also Jack Galvin (3 books) with 4 stars as CINCSO and SACEUR.
Rob, your story about the flesh peddlers reminds me of all the tales I heard at Leavenworth during my tenure on the faculty. That said, I kept noting all the "good guys' who were being promoted to BG who should never have made it if the flesh peddlers were right. (Most of them made 2 star, of course.)
Cheers
JohnT
True. Possibly a bit of both...
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
Hi Ken,
We might be talking about two different things
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Then again, we might have been talking about the same thing, but from different angles.
:wry:
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What I was trying to get at was our cultural aversion to looking beyond the low hanging fruit, the aversion to considering things beyond their immediate value - either their past in terms of considering "why" they might be that way, or their future, in terms of "what" it might mean. Its our attention deficit, and inability to recognize that somethings can't just be switched on and off, or that they require continued interaction in order to perform the way we want them. Earlier I'd mentioned our reaching fo rthe "O" in DOTMLPF, our other quick reach is the "M" - although the "M" is something we've now become conscious of - so we reach for the "O" - we need much more attention on the "L" and the "P" - and those are harder - but are just as, if not more important.
That is true, no question. I understand the rationale for placement of the items in the list but always thought it should be in the order; Leadership and Education, Doctrine, Training, Organization, Materiel, Personnel, Facilities. Simply because that first item in my list really drives the train for Doctrine -- and Training will provide clues for the rest...
I think we pay a fair amount of attention to the 'P' but I also think our priorities in that regard are highly skewed -- as the comments on the branch rep show.
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- hard to tell sometimes.
That too -- it isn't a great communication medium in all respects...:(
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Earlier I mentioned the "branch rep". I thought about this - worth considering how that discussion between him and his audience might have occurred. It could be that they all wanted to know "How do you get an MTO&E BN CMD? Could be he just told them what he'd seen go down on the most recent board - he just told the truth. There are (at least) three points to this - the first is that the truth is what it is, and reflects some of the same problems we've brought up before. The second is that we have created and fostered the "asking of the question". The last is that we have guys who accept it.
We are again penalized by a WW II personnel system that has not adapted to reality. I recall in the early 90s that Inf Branch sent out a questionnaire to all CPT and MAJ that asked them to check the appropriate box "particiapted in: 'Urgent fury,' 'Just cause,' 'Desert Shield/Desert Storm.' " What a pathetic message to send to people who were not at the 'right place at the right time' due to simple luck of the draw.
We're still trying to select the DSC winners from WW II as GOs -- and there ain't too many Field Grade DSC holders out there nowadays. Talk about failure to adapt and NOT consider the aspects of DOT or even reality in the 'P' business...
Interesting point of perhaps some minor relevance. My green suit time is too long past to be relevant, totally different Army. However, my DAC time flows into this one. In 18 years as a mid or senior level DAC, I worked directly for 14 Colonels. The first seven were all Year Groups in the 50s. They paid lip service, more or less to what their Boss wanted but essentially did their own thing and were willing to challenge anything including that boss (needless to say I got along great with all of 'em :D ).
The next four were early 60s guys. They tended to try to do what the boss wanted but were willing in the face of hard evidence to mount a reclama or just cheat and do it their way. The next to last last one did, IMO, overuse the word 'prudent' overmuch but he was absolutely NOT a sycophant (and effectively got fired -- lateral transfer, no relief OER -- because he was not. :mad: Sorry way to do business...).
The last three were all very late 60s or 70s Year Group -- all put the Boss's desires at the top of their to-do list and got very nervous at some of my antics and bluntness (though I owe them all thanks for putting up with me and I think they'll agree we done pretty good).
In fairness to all of them, the respective Generals of the time showed a decreasing LACK of willingness to tolerate selective compliance and / or initiative. The last two were pretty much bad micromanagers.
We have a far better Army now than in my day. However, some of the improvements have come at the cost of trust, initiative and innovation -- and those things win wars. Being excessively hidebound, particularly at the top -- does not win them. Au contraire...
Heh. The 1950 solution was to turn off the radio...
That worked up until the late 80s. However, even with hi tech stuff, the troops will always find a way. My serving kid was in an LRS Company when they got issued digital cameras and modems in the mid 90s, the idea being to send pictures back so the Elephants could determine that what the Scouts reported was actually true *. Like many 'good' ideas, that foundered on the shoals of hard headed Troop reality -- in the form of 'damage to the equipment on the jump' that rendered it inoperable. Pity... :D
Not that I approve of such subterfuge or would ever encourage such actions. ;)
* That became an issue because many on the ground reports were being denied by the MI Bdes as their 'technical means' couldn't validate it; since they were briefing the CGs, their version won but the CGs knew the kids wouldn't make up everything they reported...
The two most annoying and stupid radio calls in the world are "What is your present location?" That's just dumb. Either you know where I am; I can't tell you because something else happened and I'm busy and will get back to you when I can; or I'm on the way to somewhere you told me to go and haven't arrived yet. Sheesh. That and the famous "Are you sure?" Nah, I'm not sure, I'm just making this up from a place I could get killed to see if you're paying attention... :mad:
The good news is that the plotting board and
land nav are still taught according to folks I know, albeit in reduced form. They are cognitive skills and once decently absorbed will return for most recipients fairly quickly if needed.
The bad news is that both are cognitive skills -- so it'll take a few hours practice to get them back up to speed. Can't speak to the fire direction side but the land nav side is generally marginally taught.
The worse news is that black boxes tend to fail at inopportune times and practice time may not be available... :o
The most important thing one can do with a map (and that GPS cannot do or even aid too much); conduct a map reconnaissance for purposes of terrain appreciation and tactical decision was not taught in BNCOC, ANCOC, OBC or OAC last time I checked. Hopefully, that has changed. Mayhap someone more current can tell us.
