Clerics losing influence in Iraq?

The New York Times has an interesting article about young Iraqis rejecting religion. The research that comprises the article was qualitative, and perhaps not representative, but interesting nonetheless.

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“I hate Islam and all the clerics because they limit our freedom every day and their instruction became heavy over us,” said Sara, a high school student in Basra. “Most of the girls in my high school hate that Islamic people control the authority because they don’t deserve to be rulers.”

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http://http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0...html?ref=world

when any article comes out claiming that a majority of people are doing anything. Chances are they talked to 15-20 people and used "numeric black magic" to change it into a trend.

Still...it's an interesting observation. And if you combine that with the recently-announced Turkish initiatives it's even more interesting.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/wo...4youth.html?hp

Interesting article. I'd like to see the full report and analysis if there is one.

Interesting is the correct word but not surprising. The cycle between religion and secular forces in the region is long standing. On a macro-level, in the Cold War it was Arab Nationalism as defined by the Pan-Arab Movement. The 1967 War unhinged those Pan-Arab ties prettty effectively and 1973 cut them. Still the movement toward a Palestinian identity remained secular for the most part until the 1979 Iranian Revolution and events in Lebanon with the rise of Hizballah, later matched by Hamas in the course of the 2nd Intifade.

Iraq as a country has for the most part been fairly secular because it had to be in order to survive. Saddam essentially had a monoply on which religious cards could be played and he dealt them. At the same time he used tribal and religious lines to make sure he retained control. With his removal, the surge of religion as a directive and disruptive force (at least towards a national identity) was to be expected; certainly we predicted that in 1990 and to a certain degree the Shia uprisings in the south confirmed those predictions.

Looking at these suggested "findings" I would assign two more words. First is fatigue with the idea that this slice of Iraqi life is tired of the religious conflict and wants something else. To that I would add the word hopeful because if this proves to be something more than a passing journalistic fancy, then it does offer hope for Iraq.

Tom

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Originally Posted by Menning

The New York Times has an interesting article about young Iraqis rejecting religion. The research that comprises the article was qualitative, and perhaps not representative, but interesting nonetheless.



http://http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0...html?ref=world

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Young being able to choose if to believe, what to believe, if they want!

Who'da thunk it :eek:

Sample size = 40, from 5 different locations. That basically makes it anecdotal. I'm not about to run the numbers, however.

There are serious, wise and adaptive, innovative clerics in Iraq, too. The recent meetings in Denmark represent a serious stride forward in the humanizing of Iraqi interreligious activity and the committment to finding ways to establish peace. As turned off as many of the young Iraqis are (justifiably so), no long term political solutions are possible in Iraq without the support of Iraq's influential clerics.

"In short, there are signs of hope here. The very fact that so many authoritative Iraqis were willing to come here and participate in a very public event bespeaks confidence in the future of the country, and a determination to speed up the process."

Tom Odom's history lesson forced me to reflect on the relationship between secular and theocratic states in the Middle East. In the 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad ruthlessly destroyed Muslim Brotherhood sanctuaries in Syria. From 1992-1998, Mubarak initiated the reconquista where he reasserted government control by cracking down on dissidents including radical Islamic groups. In 1979 the Saudis crushed the Mecca uprising.

As a result, extremists and terrorists found it almost impossible to overthrow governments in their native countries. The United States become more of an attractive target because of the aid we provided to secular regimes in the region and the plethora of U.S. targets available.

My question is this: Do theocratic Islamic governments provide a sort of a safety value for Islamic extremism? Meaning, if a government embraces sharia and Islamic custom, are Islamic extremists relatively placated and less willing to export violence against the U.S.? If a government is more secular, yet a virtual police state, will the extremists continue to see the U.S. as the most viable target for their anger as opposed to their native country?

Finally, how does Iraq's current mix of government and religion favor or disfavor possible Iraq-born violence against U.S. territory?

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Interesting is the correct word but not surprising. The cycle between religion and secular forces in the region is long standing. On a macro-level, in the Cold War it was Arab Nationalism as defined by the Pan-Arab Movement. The 1967 War unhinged those Pan-Arab ties prettty effectively and 1973 cut them. Still the movement toward a Palestinian identity remained secular for the most part until the 1979 Iranian Revolution and events in Lebanon with the rise of Hizballah, later matched by Hamas in the course of the 2nd Intifada.

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"Second, under the leadership of its politically shrewd leader, JaM was successful in combining its populist ideology with social programs aimed at supporting the lower-income strata of the Shiite population. The Sadrists are avid advocates of social justice and try to represent the more economically disenfranchised Shiite Iraqis, who make up a considerable portion of the southern urban regions and parts of the capital city. The Sadrist militants are inspired by the apocalyptic teachings of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father-in-law, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, whose execution by Saddam in 1999 elevated his prestige to a cultic figure of immortal status. The core of these teachings is a belief in the millenarian notion of the return of a messianic figure, in this case the twelfth Imam and Mahdi, Muhammad ibn Hassan (born in 868 C.E.), whose reappearance—as he is already on earth but concealed from view—will establish justice in a world infected by sin and oppression. The spiritual mission of the militia is to hasten the Imam’s return through various heroic enactments of self-sacrifice, though at times these acts may merely mean offering selfless service to the Shiite public. In this ideological spirit, JaM is known to operate both as a military unit and a charity group."

Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr