Bush-Petraeus and US civ-mil relations
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2008040502476
Today's WP story on the close relation between Bush and Petraeus raises a number of important questions for students of civil-military relations, a number of which have been debated on this forum on other occasions. Of particular importance to me it seems to discuss whether there is anything wrong, as some people quoted in this piece imply, with civilian leaders going down the chain of command and relying more on the advice a particular military leader as opposed to a more formal decision-making process. My gut feeling is that the president ought to be able to select among competing advice from various military leaders to the best of his judgement. As long as all parties have a chance to make their case, I don't see a big problem with it. But I look forward to hearing good counter-arguments...
Here are a few good paragraphs from the piece:
Quote:
In the waning months of his administration, Bush has hitched his fortunes to those of his bookish four-star general, bypassing several levels of the military chain of command to give Petraeus a privileged voice in White House deliberations over Iraq, according to current and former administration officials and retired officers. In so doing, Bush's working relationship with his field commander has taken on an intensity that is rare in the history of the nation's wartime presidents...
Bush's reliance on Petraeus has made other military officials uneasy, has rankled congressional Democrats and has created friction that helped spur the departure last month of Adm. William J. "Fox" Fallon, who, while Petraeus's boss as chief of U.S. Central Command, found his voice eclipsed on Iraq...
Bush's relationship with Petraeus marks a departure for modern war presidencies. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton left it largely to their military advisers in Washington to communicate with field commanders, according to scholars of civilian-military relations...
Technically, there's no one in the chain of command
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
...It'll be interesting to see if those who are passed over in the chain of command want a little payback against Petraeus when the president's term is over.
between Bush and Petraeus who could do that. Petraeus outranks Dempsey... ;)
Lincoln bypassed his COS of the Army routinely
[QUOTE=ipopescu;44110]http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2008040502476
Today's WP story on the close relation between Bush and Petraeus raises a number of important questions for students of civil-military relations, a number of which have been debated on this forum on other occasions. Of particular importance to me it seems to discuss whether there is anything wrong, as some people quoted in this piece imply, with civilian leaders going down the chain of command and relying more on the advice a particular military leader as opposed to a more formal decision-making process. My gut feeling is that the president ought to be able to select among competing advice from various military leaders to the best of his judgement. As long as all parties have a chance to make their case, I don't see a big problem with it. But I look forward to hearing good counter-arguments...
Here are some reactions from/by Colonel George Singleton, USAF, a veteran of the 1965 Indo-Paksitan War and of Desert Storm (I) when he volunteered from the active reserve back onto active duty to hep run that war's airlift from Charleston AFB as Assistant Deputy Commander for Airlift starting January 1, 1991:
I think if our Duke University Political Science Professor reads US Civil War History he finds more often than not that President Lincoln delt directly with various field commanding Generals who he fired, sometimes rehired, but delt with directly to keep his finger on the literal pulse of field and battle field ops.
Considering that any Private on up can be interviewed and quoted in the world news media these days, which violates all past norms of at war information control and censorship, I see nothing wrong in and do not object to the President's style of dealing directly for information with folks like General Petraeus.
One has to assume, which the Professor overlooks innocently I'm sure, that General Petraeus most likely vets his ideas that are written down through his chain of command in advance of meetings with the President or hearings before the Congress.
George L. Singleton, Colonel, USAF, Ret.
History major, University of Alabama, College of A&S, 1962
US Embassy, Karachi, Pakistan, 1963-1965 (U-2 Base @ Peshawar Liaison Officer inside the US Embassy then in Karachi, W. Pak.); retired reserve 06, at the Assistant Chief of Staff levels (J-1 and J-4), HQUSSOCOM, retired 1994); retired US Civil Service and former Area Manager, NDMS (National Disaster Medical System, then made up of VA, FEMA, USPHS, & DOD).
Evolution of the general case
While Gray is correct in his analysis of the historical general case of the US Army as generally divorced from policy, he doesn't take account to the evolution that began with the National Security Act of 1947 and accellerated with Goldwater-Nichols. The former made the JCS the military advisors to the President while the latter made the CJCS the PRINCIPAL military advisor to the President and placed him in the position of statutory advisor to the NSC. In practice, this has made the CJCS a full participant in the Principals Committee, the VCJCS a full participant in the Deputies Commmittee, and the JS full participants in the PCCs. In effect, since at least 1986 and perhaps 1947 the military have been fully integrated into the policy making process.
Cheers
JohnT
Thanks to Duke student on Bush-Petraeus
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ipopescu
Sir, I am merely a grad student at Duke. As for your substantive point, I agree with it. I think Eliot Cohen in his analysis of Lincoln in Supreme Command persuasively makes the case that Lincoln's "hands-on" approach to civ-mil relations is one that deserves careful study by our present leaders.
I am glad to be corrected that you are a Duke graduate student vs. a Duke Professor. I hope you continue your studies and completge a PhD and teach college level history.
My wife and I have just completed putting three daughters through two degrees each, and it is expensive, as it is expensive at Duke. Oldest earned two architecture degrees, concurrently, at Auburn. One twin did a combined undergraduate/MEd two degrees at Vanderbilt where senior year was all graduate courses counted dually for undergrad and graduate school first year, so the MEd then only required one actual additional grad school year. Second twin did a BA in Spanish and Sociology at Furman University, then a two year Masters in Teaching English as a Second Language in the Graduate School of The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa.
Keep up your good studies and don't pay much attention to us old 68 year old back bencher retired Air Force 06s.
"Military" vs. "political" objectives
Rob,
Excellent post; I'm happy you brought Colin Gray's passages into discussion, in particular these two:
Quote:
Confusing military with strategic success - meaning the former is about defeating enemy forces, the latter is about using the defeat to advance policy goals, and in this case our interests in the region, with regard to the Long War, and with our long range interests.
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This last one war is about peace, not about itself, goes back to another observation made by Gray regarding the end of "securing a better peace, as opposed to trying to achieve a "victory"" paraphrased
As a "dogmatic" follower of Clausewitz in believing that wars are ultimately judged by the quality of the peace that they bring, i.e. the accomplishment of what people often refer to as the "political" objectives, I often have had some sympathy for those who argue that it's somewhat illogical to talk about "success" on the military side while the political goals are unmet. If wars are about obtaining political results from he application of military force, than I think it's rather unhelpful to separate between "military" vs. "political" objectives. Having said that, I fully agree that members of Congress ought to realistically appraise what's the most likely political outcome that we can get in Iraq from this point on, regardless of initial expectations, and compare the costs of continuing our presence with the likely costs of withdrawal.
For a good discussion of what "victory" and "success" should be thought off at this point, this recent memo from my previous boss Tony Cordesman makes some fine "real-world" arguments.
On a larger point, I believe Dr. Gray's critique of the American way of war, in particular its separation of military and political spheres, is unfortunately illustrated in a way even by the very form in which we hold these upcoming hearings: Petraeus is there to talk about the military side, and Crocker about the political side, as if they are separate things. Clearly in the operational conduct of these operations we have a much better (if far from ideal) symbiosis between the civilian and military components in the field, but I seriously wonder if most decision-makers in Washington conceptualize of war and strategy in a way that Gray (or Clausewitz) would approve. And considering that current warfare seems to require an ever higher level of strategic acuity in obtaining political goals through the use of force, that's all the more unfortunate...
Best,
Ionut
Some considerations on your good post, Ipopescu.
One minor problem with Gray's construct -- and to a lesser extent, yours and Cordesman's, IMO, is that all three envision a political and military convergence that has never existed in this country. The British do it very well as do most Commonwealth countries but it is alien to historical practice here. I cannot say it will never happen but believe it is unlikely given our current structure of government. The frequent (if not constant) tension caused by domestic politics between Congress and the Executive branch has and will generally serve to disrupt any meaningful effort to get significant cooperation. Cooperation and unity of effort can be and probably will be improved but integration on the European model is highly unlikely.
I'm pretty well convinced that in any counterinsurgency effort, any talk of victory or defeat, of winning or losing is specious. Those words shouldn't be used to talk of possible outcomes. Not only the politicians but the Armed forces need to stop using them. The best that has been since WW II or can ever be achieved, short of scorched earth -- which we aren't going to do -- is an acceptable outcome; the worst is abandoning the effort and the possibility of an undesirable but usually not crippling outcome to us as an assister, for the host nation it can be a disaster. This particular effort is subject to those parameters but also has an added consideration. Perception of 'defeat.' In the case of Iraq and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, our precipitous departure would trigger the perception, not the reality, that AQ et.al. had 'won.' They would of course tout this view loudly even though it would be incorrect and it would do them some good for a while. It would likely embolden them to attempt other attacks in order to attain their goals. In short, it would not be a disaster to us but it most likely would be the source of more and more grave long term trouble than would staying in both nations for quite some time. Obviously it would be far more dangerous for Iraq.
Al Qaeda in Iraq is problematic, no question and they aren't going away soon; in Zawahiri's latest Q&A session videotape, he acknowledges Iraq is their principal concern. However, both he and Cordesman rely on the long term viability of AQ for their assessments -- possibly they're correct. However, there are a number of other efforts than those readily visible addressing AQ as an entity. We'll see.
Thats just the problem isn't it
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
You can't believe lies about the breeding ground. You need to find it and neutralize it: even if you need to ask for help.
One can't always isolate exactly where the breeding ground is because it is generally hidden within the environment. And one can't just neutralize anything within a given area because the neighbors might get upset when their pets are harmed. So generally you just have to be patient and when the eggs hatch you make sure and get them as soon as they show;)