FM 3.07: Stability Operations (Updated With FM Link) at Small Wars Journal. Intro blog by John Nagl.
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FM 3.07: Stability Operations (Updated With FM Link) at Small Wars Journal. Intro blog by John Nagl.
Hooah! Thanks for the link!
Mmmm... Nothing like that new FM smell....
And the Washington Post's take here.
I like Ann Tyson's article.
More so than any other I've seen she captures the many sides (and concerns) to it.
She also captures the realization that although there may be other agencies or offices more culturally suited to doing stability operations by nature of their defined or accepted role(s), none would seem to have the means to do so on a scale approaching that of the military. This seems particularly true in conditions where we've determined we have an interest we must follow through on in a timely and consistent manner, but is also one that is not suited for civilians.
This makes reflecting it in our DOTMLPF considerations important to securing the policy objective in my view. While I know that there is an argument out there that to do so might raise the ease in which policy makers enter a nation building situation, I think that is only true if the policy makers have made the decision to commit military force to a given objective anyway. So, I think I'd rather have the doctrine, and the rest of the tools available, as opposed to making the argument "we don't do those things" and then get told to right face and move out anyway.
Where I think we do owe policy makers advice is the same place we always have. This is in the unequal dialogue between military leaders and civilian leaders where we offer them our best advice on conditions, consequences & risks so that a feasible and suitable strategy of ends/ways/means can be devised between them to secure the policy objective.
The best way I've found to have your advice incorporated is to make the implicit - explicit so that everyone understands the relevance of the advice, and to ensure that the person you are advising is never given reason to suspect your advice is biased on advancing your own agenda, but is in fact (in this case) in the interest of common service, common goals, or the policy you both serve.
Best, Rob
...so let me get this right.
There are now, "Stability Operations," - which are distinct from COIN Operations, and then there is Combat. The choice of the word "Stability" is somewhat interesting. Is this the new "OOTW?"
My perhaps purely emotional reaction is that there is now more doctrine being written and it is being written less clearly. I could be wrong.
I profoundly and respectfully disagree with some of the assertions in this statement.Quote:
Important as these doctrinal manuals are in correctly understanding the nature of conflict in the 21st century - one in which weak states rather than strong ones are the greatest threat to our security and the smooth functioning of the international system - they are but a first step. Doctrine drives the way we organize and train our forces, educate our leaders, and select and promote our people. The Army now faces the difficult task of implementing significant changes in all of those areas to build the military we need for the 21st century.
There is simply no evidence that weak (failed?) states are a greater threat than any other type of state, to US national security.
911 could have been planned in Finland, or within the continental US. The IRA did not need a failed state to flourish and become a highly proficient terrorist organisation.
Conversely, the PLO and Hezbollah needed substantial international support and sponsorship to remain militarily viable from very organised or even totalitarian states, such as Syria or Iran. Weak states are not a threat. States with Anti-US policies are the threat. Afghanistan just happens to be one current playing field.
Yes, poor, badly run countries tend to be subject insurgencies more than affluent first world liberal democracies, but so what? The Congo, Sierra Leone, the Niger Delta and Liberia went up in flames without anyone really noticing.
Doctrine is what is taught. That can, and mostly does, sit entirely separately from organisation, training and promotion. I agree it should not.
More often than not, doctrine is altered to support organisation, training and promotion. Doctrine should be the product of generally correct empirical observation,
- the point being, that history does not show us that weak states are the problem. The problem is the policies of hostile nation STATES! - be they influenced or supportive of non-national actors.
Colin Gray's excellent, Another Bloody Century, makes all these arguments better than I ever could.
All these are the new buzzwords - we have Major Combat Operations and we have everything else which now is being called Irregular Warfare by the OSD community of interest and the Army is calling everything before and after MCO Stability Operations (but I think rightly recognizing that Stability Operations can and must take place during MCO as well). I think IW is the logical follow-on to Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), (low intensity to all perhaps but the one on the receiving end of fire!!) which was followed by operations other than war (OOTW) which logically should have been not only military but whole of government, and then of course Military Operations Other Than Wa (MOOTW). We continue to search for the ultimate theories of war (and non-war!!) but we should ask ourselves are these labels and our attempts to put all the concepts of complex human interaction into nice neat boxes helpful or harmful? We spend more time worrying (and arguing) about correct labeling than we do getting on with the business of national security.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Dave
Hi Will,
I'd agree
"most dangerous" is kind of a fluid thing, in some cases as much dependent upon conditions of your own making as of those external states e.g. if your new policies now bring you into conflict with the interests of other powerful entities, then those states may become the new "most dangerous". This is not to say that a state cannot and should not change its policies since they reflect the direction that state may believe it needs to go, just that doing so changes the status quo. If you are a big state, with lots of interests, you stand to change things more.Quote:
- the point being, that history does not show us that weak states are the problem. The problem is the policies of hostile nation STATES! - be they influenced or supportive of non-national actors.
I think that is another good observation. Often we reach for any one of the DOTMLPF "wheels" without considering them as kind of "gears" in a larger machine. You turn one, and there are consequences. Some are anticipated consequences, and some are not. Some have visible effects, and some are subtle and may go unnoticed or unattributed. Where possible, changes in any one of the DOTMLPF should be considered against the whole. This is not always possible, as conditions have a way of creating an immediate "itch" that needs to be scratched to solve the problem at hand.Quote:
Doctrine is what is taught. That can, and mostly does, sit entirely separately from organisation, training and promotion. I agree it should not.
More often that not, doctrine is altered to support organisation, training and promotion. Doctrine should be the product of generally correct empirical observation
FM 3-24 may a good example of the identification of doctrinal gap that had to be addressed - but consider that since it has gone out it has spawned a large body of refining thought from the field as its principles were implemented. It has also spawned some doctrinally related publications which add to it. Soon, we'll have JP 3-24. This is a case where a piece of doctrine went out and through its application we are working through the permutations to the OTMLPF.
However, I think there is a difference between 3-24 and 3-07. There are changes in the DOTMLPF that are being addressed in a related fashion at the same time, and they are often being considered against one another (not always at first, but once its pointed out it seems to be acknowledged). This includes civilian guidance - which in my view may be one of, if not the critical requirement for us to identify, discuss and consider risk in a way that keeps us able to meet the policy needs.
In my view the given policy toward a state, or organization while drawn from overarching policy imperatives (core values identified by the state from which it derives its identity), or standing physical interests are going to be of two kinds. One one side you have "steady state" policy - which is the kind of persistent (or normal) engagement we'd prefer. An example of this might be assisting a state to integrate under non-crisis conditions into a regional framework (pick a name) so that it benefits our partners and by extension us (either directly or indirectly by reflecting our core values, or furthering some standing interest).
On the other side you have the "crisis" policy objective(s). In a crisis, some event has occurred which may require us to become more involved, more quickly, and without full consideration of the long term consequences (which may be somewhat mute since unless the crisis is addressed the alternative may be worse anyway, the long term objectives may move beyond reach, or it may put at risk other related objectives.)
Within these are a range of conditions. Identifying them and considering them against the policy objective can help you identify the requirements to realize the policy. As conditions and policy changes, so do their requirements. Its interactive. This gets to some of Ann Tyson's article.
Under some steady state (have to be careful here because different folks may define steady state differently) conditions, the conditions may become benign enough that they don't require the use of military forces (as opposed to just military force) to achieve or make progress. In a crisis however, the conditions which have moved it into that category are generally unstable and threatening enough on some level that putting civilians there may put the policy at greater risk (not solve it fast enough, not resolve it well enough, etc.) This is subject to internal and external pressures that don't go away, but may themselves prove fickle as domestic politics take root at home.
There is also the responsiveness aspect to consider, as far as I know there is no other U.S. organization capable of rapidly mobilizing on a large scale and deploying to a crisis with the range of equipment it has, or its capability (and capacity) to operate in austere and threatening conditions other than the U.S. military (even in response to some domestic disasters). This seems to be true for states in general - although the bulk of states can only maintain militaries for use inside their own borders for different reasons. It starts to get tricky here I think as a state has limited choices about how it uses it resources - and how much of a particular resource can it generate and sustain? How much will its population actually be able to support (on a related note Google up the recently publicly released Senate version of the 2009 National Defense Authorization act which supports the establishment of the National Response Corps - which has two components which fall along the lines of small civilian active component, and something we might consider like an IRR.
I could go into why BPC and SFA are being considered as important based on this - but suffice to say that we'd like the option of somebody else we consider as having related and generally congruent interests to be able to respond. This may be more tolerable, sustainable and may further the overarching objective by creating internal or regional solutions. Its may not always be so, but its good to have options.
Sorry for the side bar, but its related, and interesting.
In this case I think 3-07 adds a needed facet to our doctrinal collection. This gets to the subject of your first post. I think the value of stability vs. say OOTW is that it gets to the desire of the immediate policy objective and the rational why DoD may become involved - return the state to a stabilized condition where we (and they) can move from crisis back to steady state. In itself it provides more focus, and as such I believe helps us consider risk better.
Stability is also a term which we can use across the USG with more relevance and understanding (and perhaps also more acceptance given the range of organizational cultures) then say an acronym which by its nature was designed to be vague in a kind of "this is what its not" vs. "this is what it is, or what its for" way. Being able to have a discussion about unity of effort may first need to be built around common understanding of the objective you are trying to build unity to achieve.
Those interested might also Google up NSPD-44, and DoD Directive 3000.05. These are important documents and regardless if they were to get renamed (as presidential directives often do), or incorporated into other documents, the requirements based on some of the unchanging core values, and the ways we have have developed our interests inside and outside the U.S., I believe they will likely remain relevant for the coming future.
Anyway, that is enough on one cup of coffee, I need a second cup and I need to go to work. Will, as always thanks for getting my brain going. Hope I did the same - discussions are good.:D
Best, Rob
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
None of this is new at all, and Stability Operations as a doctrinal term predates OOTW. Rather, it is an updating and fleshing out of old, existing doctrine. For a few on this board, I would hazard a guess that they're experiencing a bit of déjà vu with all this updating/republishing of old doctrine that had been virtually ignored for years.Quote:
Originally Posted by max161
See FM 31-23 Stability Operations, 8 Dec 67 (Updated and reissued 2 Oct 72 - with an added chapter on training requirements for advisors, along with a few other bits). Take a look at FM 31-73 Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations, 18 Oct 67.
The new FM provides the definition of Stability Operations from JP 3-0 Joint Operations, 17 Sep 06 (Change 1, 13 Feb 08)Quote:
Originally Posted by 1967 and 1972
Quote:
Originally Posted by 2008
Gave the new manual a quick read (god bless exciting field TOCEXs).
The manual is basically a what-we-should-have-done in OIF I. Hindsight makes these obvious tasks. The difficulty will be in pushing all of them down to the user level, adding a lot of METL tasks to already filled plates. Necessary, but still difficult.
The most useful parts, in my opinion, were the Agency/NGO Annex and the PRT annex. Annex A should be read by anyone operating overseas, as it lists the main outside elements you will encounter at higher levels. The PRT section also cleared up my understanding of their makeup and function. From the manual, they are at the mercy of the BCTs on the ground for security and support, and by doctrine, they serve no outright defense related mission, which I did not know.
Good for the Army to publish this in one piece, clearly identifying and stating stability tasks. Good luck to the staffs and units that must adequately plan for all of them.
Several of us endured long hours of STABOPS and FID classes, which later fell into disuse.
Link to CAC site includes video w/Dan Roper on linkages between COIN and STABOPS --
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM307.asp
Jedburg you are right. When I was doing my thesis on Special Forces missions in 1994 the next mission after UW and COIN for SF was stability operations (and it applied to the whole Army as well). And so you prove the point I should have tried to make. Some of the best doctrine that we need for dealing with the uncertain environments of the future exist in our historical doctrine. We keep trying to reinvent the wheel with new terms and concepts but there are tried an true terms and doctrine that just might need some minor adjustments to remain useful today and tomorrow.Quote:
Originally Posted by Jedburgh
Dave
Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Eagle
Well said both.Quote:
Originally Posted by max161