Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan
10 April Foreign Policy Research Institute E-note - Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan by Greg Mills.
Quote:
From Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, Colombia to Kashmir, Congo to Iraq, the question of how to deal with insurgency is being asked. Finding the answer has so far involved scrutinizing past campaigns from Algeria to Zimbabwe, and especially Malaya and Vietnam.
These have produced a set of lessons, centering at their most creative on the importance of public diplomacy in winning hearts and minds, and the need to slowly extend governance and prosperity through “ink spots” of relative stability, employing unity of effort by nations and institutions. In Afghanistan, during the tenure of the ninth International Security Assistance Force (ISAF IX) deployed between May 2006 and February 2007, this evolved into Afghan Development Zones (ADZs), providing a focus of development spending and security effort.
But scrutinizing the past has limited benefit in dealing with the modern, complex insurgency. The nature of the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan has changed from the time of Malaya and Vietnam, for example, from two dimensional (national/colonial government vs. the insurgent) to three dimensions, where the insurgent faces a national government but with a complex range of multinational governmental and nongovernmental actors involved in the security and development effort. Additionally, the globalized, media-savvy nature of today’s insurgents contrasts with their bottom-up, cellular organizational structure. The former allows them unparalleled access to sources of support, recruits and marketing, while their operational structure both provides security and assists it in replicating itself and its actions without active leadership oversight. Thus domestic insurgencies have to be confronted internationally and in many dimensions with unprecedented demands for intelligence gathering and analysis, interoperability and flexibility, and cultural sensitivity and understanding.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, security, governance and development instruments are unlikely by themselves to offer the solution to end the ongoing violence. Both countries increasingly serve as a magnet and spark for radical Islamists. While there is a need to employ such instruments towards wider objectives, it has not been made clear what those objectives are beyond winning the war on terror...
More at the link.
There is a name that more folks should read.
Finally, someone mentions Beaufre!
No surprise that it was a South African, the Apartheid era white minority government based their Grand Strategy (The 'Total Strategy') on his theories. The other text that he wrote, that I think is actually better than An Introduction to Strategy for COIN, is Strategy of Action.
I found the rest of the article to be statements of the obvious pretending to be insight.
Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan
From a 2007 FPRI article on Afghanistan by Greg Mills
Quote:
Finding the means to “outbid” insurgents and gain the support of the society in which they operate and find succor requires understanding the difference between their and your means and ends.
Among the military there is confusion between short-term tactical actions and the wider strategic counterinsurgency aim. Development, governance and security “effects” must be linked to a political objective, and there has been little clarity in this. This is the reason why, for example, officers in the Afghan theater are increasingly frustrated by talk of “anti-coalition forces” and the global “war on terror”. Historically, insurgencies are countered through political deals that military means have helped to cut. Seldom, if ever, are they defeated militarily. A coalition of anti-Western forces is a rhetorical expediency waiting to be exploited. These shifting alliances are often little more than marriages of convenience. In Afghanistan, while the Taliban have loyalty predominantly to the Pashtun ethnic cause, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar’s Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin movement seems geared less to its purported brand of radical Islam than gaining power for its veteran mujahiddin leader. For both, Al Qaeda is likely less of an ideological soul mate than a cash-rich friend of convenience, not least given the lack of Afghan love for Arabs. Just as Afghanistan itself is riven by ethnic divisions, there are additional layers of complexity and fidelity within each group. Each of the groups has different, sometimes competing loyalties at the tribe, sub-tribe, clan and family level. Hence to counter insurgency, one must fundamentally split and coopt these groups, all the time denying them sanctuary in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Reaching a political accommodation rests not only on a clear understanding of all these levels through bottom-up intelligence, but also on sophisticated political engagement by local and external leadership. Erudite statesmanship would envision and articulate a common good, and unpick the ties that bind the insurgents rather than conveniently lump them together as “terrorists.”
Of course, political accommodation is much more difficult in an environment where violence is a condition of society and a way of life. Where the bearing of arms is not only commonplace but considered a sign of manhood and disarmament contrary to a way of life, security means different things.
Over a scotch instead of coffee...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
His commandments make sense, a lot of sense -- BUT...
1. X - This is the US, our governing and electoral cycle is not conducive to long termism.
2. X - Sounds good. Now, if we can just figure out how to do that in very large, populous but still sparsely populated nation that has no economic viability in the western sense. There is little doubt he's correct but the difficulty of accomplishing that should be cause for considerable concern.
7. Totally true on that one; hopefully we understand that. 'Metrics' are a trap and a waste. Or, more correctly, the way the US Army tends to apply them is not helpful... :eek:
10. X - Well said but more difficult to do. The resources will become problematic, patience will run out...
I make it 3 we are doing or can or will do; 3 we can't or likely won't do ; and 4 that we may or may not get right. I do believe that's what the Doctors call a mixed prognosis...
Ken,
Let's hit the tough ones that you rightly highlight.
1. Political half lives are driven by polls and say that Mr. Mill's number one point is certainly problematic one for politicians, US or otherwise.
Quote:
First, do not confuse short-term tactical imperatives and process with longer-term goals. The difference is between tools (military, media, diplomatic, governance, and development) and the overall objective (political accommodation).
Perhaps the tools exist to meet realistic objectives? Lets look at Proxies and Government Organizations in particular. Proxies (liked the quote about poetry & mountains, don't know about the 'goodness' of the website) seem to be used (I am familiar with Latin America & Iraq and wish our Africa hands would hit the high points on this as well for additional clarity) when the political going gets tough. In terms of Government Organizations, are not the CINC's DOD organizations by which we gain some level of continuity in the administration of policy? DOS also crafts Regional Plans (not necessarily synched with DOD as noted in the Map posted by CAVGUY) which are followed across administrations. We have discussed previously the corrosive effects of politicization on technocratic posts in government. Long term policy can be carried out by professionals and perhaps it's time to get back to that approach...
2. Free markets are a predictive indicator of the interests and efforts of populations. My marketing class professor (Army Vet type) impressed upon me the importance of understanding market segementation in order to be successful in a variety of venues (William Gibson's Pattern Recognition is another interesting read) and you again rightly point out the practical difficulties of Mr. Mill's second point
Quote:
Second, focus on dealing with constraints to economic growth—not humanitarian assistance or the provision of security—as the essential condition for development. Thus, the military and other allied agencies always have to consider what the basis of growth in particular regions could be—what can be made and sold and how to remove constraints to realizing this. Countering insurgency means separating ordinary people from the warlords, drug lords and insurgents and giving them a viable economic choice.
In addition to noting that we need an integrated plan which takes into account the countries which surround Afghanistan, I am going to take this opportunity to beat my agricultural and road infrastructure drum again. I think that a realistic plan would take into account the existing economy and that a 51-70% solution is good enough. I do understand the concerns about empowering the 'wrong folks' but a sloppy gray (ie not black and white) solution is better than where we stand today. I am looking forward to seeing and thinking about GEN P's solution, it's my observation that he is an unconventional thinker.
7. Metrics! :p You know where I stand on this one my friend, and it is firmly in the metrics corner. I earn a living in that corner and metrics have practical applications. As an aside here is a FPRI article on risk management and the military that I found interesting (thanks to Westhawk for the link). We need to do a much better job with metrics in the Army, and stop being so stovepiped as well.
Quote:
Seventh, never confuse numbers with effects. Beware of the body-count trap, the mismatch between aid commitments and expenditure, and especially the difference between numbers of troops and police and those available for operations. The latter example applies notably to the Afghan security forces, which suffer from poor pay, a ghost payroll, and dubious methods of training, personnel recruitment and allegiance. As Robert Cassidy has argued, “There are no magic and inherently quantifiable metrics that we can slap on a PowerPoint matrix … ones that might precisely measure our path to victory in counterinsurgency.”[3]
10. Mr. Mill's last point certainly is a tough one and speaks to the importance of Unity of Command.
Quote:
Tenth, integrate but calibrate. Learn the lesson offered by officers such as AndrĂ© Beaufre and David Galula—don’t try to do everything at once.[4] The footprint of security presence, along with governance and development activity, should match the resources available. Be prepared to let some areas go while concentrating on those things and places you choose to. A “Clear, Hold, Build and Engage” strategy demands focus of effort and consolidation of gains, without which the insurgent “balloon” will simply distort and not, as intended, deflate.
How do we craft a strategy which motivates enough of the participants to accomplish it? Is it really that far out of the box to think about teaming up with the countries which surround Afghanistan to come up with a 51-70% solution which includes Afghanistan? I am currently moving through the section on The Thirty Years War in my 2nd Edition of Mary Fulbrook's 'A Concise History of Germany' and there are some ugly parallels to our supposedly unipolar world. Many of us in the west may not want to see religion as an issue but our opponents have been able to frame it and sell it as a religious issue. Perhaps it's time to get realistic and see what is possible.
Regards,
Steve
Good summations. Some minor points of quibbleism...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
1...Perhaps the tools exist to meet realistic objectives? In terms of Government Organizations, are not the DOD organizations by which we gain some level of continuity in the administration of policy?
In theory if somewhat wrongly (it isn't their job but they sort of do it by default), major problem there is that the CinCs rotate every 2-3 years due to our flawed personnel system so there's a strong possibility of a loss of continuity there. Let's face it, we're on a two to four year cycle where we shuffle massive egos into positions of power.
Quote:
Long term policy can be carried out by professionals and perhaps it's time to get back to that approach...
I agree but since the 80s, we've been on on massive ideological differences and abrupt major shifts. I'm not sure we can get back to steady professionals who stay long enough to effect policies, not in the near future anyway. I suspect it will take a major shock to the US system to cause that to happen. We haven't really had on since 1941-2 so we're probably overdue...
Quote:
2. Free markets are a predictive indicator of the interests and efforts of populations.
True.
Quote:
In addition to noting that we need an integrated plan which takes into account the countries which surround Afghanistan, I am going to take this opportunity to beat my agricultural and road infrastructure drum again... I am looking forward to seeing and thinking about GEN P's solution, it's my observation that he is an unconventional thinker.
Agree however whether we have enough sense to do that is problematical. We'll see what the new CinC Cent comes up with
Quote:
7. Metrics! :p You know where I stand on this one my friend, and it is firmly in the metrics corner. I earn a living in that corner ... We need to do a much better job with metrics in the Army, and stop being so stovepiped as well.
Heh. Thought I'd get you with that one... :D Seriously though, I fully appreciate the need for numbers in engineering, in risk management and indeed in a great many things -- even in things military. My concern, however is great and is two fold -- first and foremost, the Army severely misuses 'metrics' to produce a smokescreen of 'empirical data' and 'objective assessments.' They really need to quit that and, as you say do a better job. However, that leads to the second significant problem with metrics -- many military activities flat do not lend themselves to metrics. Few combat actions do and, in COIN operations, since people are involved, particularly people that we don't understand all that well, metrics can be very misleading. That problem is compounded by the fact that some will insist on using metrics for decision making purposes even though their metrics are flagrantly inappropriate or incorrect.
Metrics have uses but in combat, COIN and general military use -- particularly if flexible, volatile inconsistent humans are involved -- they should be used very sparingly and extremely cautiously. They can send a very incorrect message...
Quote:
10. Mr. Mill's last point certainly is a tough one and speaks to the importance of Unity of Command...How do we craft a strategy which motivates enough of the participants to accomplish it?
Not being a smart ass but define 'participants.' Then determine which are willing, forced, happy to be there, not so happy and so forth. That may truly be, militarily, in the too hard arena.
Quote:
I am currently moving through the section on in my 2nd Edition of Mary Fulbrook's 'A Concise History of Germany' and there are some ugly parallels to our supposedly unipolar world.
Anyone who truly thinks this world is unipolar is not thinking clearly.
Quote:
Many of us in the west may not want to see religion as an issue but our opponents have been able to frame it and sell it as a religious issue. Perhaps it's time to get realistic and see what is possible.
Past time I'd say -- but I see no evidence yet that anyone is doing that. Hard to say what the next few months will bring but unless they bring a clarity of vision and reasonable, realistic expectations, I foresee some disappointments. Big ones..
Language capabilities & time in the AOR...
Quote:
IOW, their use is frequently an effort by those without experience -- or, more frequently, importantly and more dangerously, those who do not have a gift for intuitive combat command to survive in the combat command arena. It is my observation over many years that intuitive commanders do well most of the time and that those who are not so gifted do poorly most of the time. That is true generally and is particularly true in hot and fast combat; most non-intuitive guys will not -- cannot -- react rapidly enough. They look to their metrics for an answer and find none.
Ken,
Language capabilities & 'quality' time in the AOR also trumps metrics in most cases on the boots on the ground side of things. Having to rely on a translator for my daily work in Iraq blunted many of my abilities and was a jarring contrast to my abilities to get things done in areas where I speak the language. I am in agreement with your point on intuition, listening to your 'inner animal' (as opposed to your 'inner beancounter' :wry:) will keep you alive so that you can return the favor to your opponent.
Metrics are needed for resource justification to echelons above reality however and obtaining sufficient resources for our AO was a lifeblood issue. I lived through being attached to two units in my AO in Iraq; changes in force ratios and population centric programs due to changes in resources upped the chaos and danger levels exponentially.
Best,
Steve
Do recall that some metrics are important and many are needed
in my opinion -- I just advise a lot of caution particuarly with respect to combat and ANYTHING to do with people and their attitudes, capabilities and potential reactions. I do strongly object to the tendency to adopt the mantra of metrics as a solution to sloppy thinking.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
Language capabilities & 'quality' time in the AOR also trumps metrics in most cases on the boots on the ground side of things. Having to rely on a translator for my daily work in Iraq blunted many of my abilities and was a jarring contrast to my abilities to get things done in areas where I speak the language.
True but there is a plus; use of a needed translator slows us impatient Americans down a bit. That's a beneficial unintended consequence. ;)
Quote:
I am in agreement with your point on intuition, listening to your 'inner animal' (as opposed to your 'inner beancounter' :wry:) will keep you alive so that you can return the favor to your opponent.
Yea, verily -- trust your instincts.
Quote:
Metrics are needed for resource justification to echelons above reality ... changes in resources upped the chaos and danger levels exponentially.
Understood and again will say that some are necessary -- however, too many are smoke and mirrors used to baffle with BS and those are the ones that need to go. Use common sense, realize the inherent limitations and do not let them become a crutch; that's all I advocate.
Surferbeetle, just for thee
See, Steve, even I use metrics -- occasionally and when appropriate...:D
A quote, cross posted from a comment I wrote on the SWJ Blog:
"" From the article commented upon:
Quote:
”Persistent presence—living among the population in small groups, staying in villages overnight for months at a time—is dangerous, and it will mean more casualties, but it’s the only way to protect the population effectively. And it will make U.S. troops more secure in the long run.”
begin quote ""I totally agree with the thought and would espouse any effort to lessen our tendency to micromanage and to not delegate authority to the lowest possible level. The prescription is totally valid. I do not doubt that we and NATO can provide troops well enough trained to do just that.
However, I do wonder where the number of well trained troops to do what’s recommended will be obtained. We don’t have enough; NATO could possibly scrape together and deploy another three to five Brigades, of our soon to be 48 on a one-in-three rotation and allowing for other contingencies, we could possibly provide a total of 10 to 12; thus with the British and other NATO and coalition Forces in Afghanistan right now, say three Brigades, one could have a theoretical total of 16 to 20 Brigades plus the ANA of say 10 Brigades for a gross of roughly 30 Brigades at about 3,000 men each; 90-100,000 nominal combat troops.
So a coalition strength of about 100 to 200 (or even 250) thousand is about the best we can expect and is likely a quite optimistic number. South Viet Nam in 1967-69 had over 1 Million Allied troops in a nation of about 16M people in an area of around 115,000 square kilometers and with about 2,400km of porous border.
Comparison with Afghanistan: Say 180K troops in a nation of about 32M people in an area of around 647,000 square kilometers and about 5,500km of even more porous border. Something is wrong with that picture…"" end quote
While I think I agree with you
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Bigger question prior to calculating the number of troops for the mission, is mission to do what? (Ken, realize you know this and are working up numbers based on doing the current mission more effectively).
One great metric of if we have the mission right or not is how quickly and enthusiastically the HN security forces ramp up to take that mission away from us...
Based on that metic, my assessment is we might have it wrong. Mission didn't creep on us in Afghanistan, it got up and started running. Would love to see a step all the way back to ground zero and assess the entire nature of the mission, and then develop a campaign plan to execute it; and not just figure out a way to do what appears to be the wrong thing better.
Isn't the bigger problem that most of what seem to have become the WHAT in mission requirements there relate to (Clausewitzian:D) political influence and as such the force requirements and adjustments simply reflect trying to fulfill those. If as you state it "might" be wrong seems like there some serious discussions on the hill which need to be happening before we get too far down the path.(If we're not already)
As to what the focuses are right now what do you percieve as the greatest risks to current actions and are there effective ways to minimize long-term pitfalls while still accomplishing short term gains?
