Printable View
SWJ's 7th weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Afghan troop request? Approved. Afghan strategy? “Not pre-determined.” - Preparing for hybrid warfare - Will the U.S. receive a nasty “postcard from Mumbai”?
I vividly recall a conversation about two or three days prior to the news of a plot being uncovered to blow up civilian airliners with liquid explosives. I was walking to a lunch with an 18C. He was noting how surprised he was that nobody had attempted to create such a bomb. After the news broke, he marveled at how stupid you'd have to be to not be able to pull it off. How difficult is it to purchase the ingredients, buy a plane ticket, and then go into the restroom and do a jihadist imitation of Dr. Wizard?
Likewise, I've been wondering for years why nobody has attempted these "swarming" techniques here in the US or - even scarier, in my opinion - why just one or two individuals have not attempted some kind of mass casualty attack. I can think of about a dozen completely different ways that a lone individual, with a fairly short planning and preparation time and some fairly inexpensive purchases that would not likely raise any eyebrows, could slaughter hundreds of people and it would be virtually undetectable until the moment of execution. Granted, a SWAT team would eventually gun him down, but not until the entire country is freaking out, the markets crash further, and the country is pushed to the brink of turning into something resembling New Orleans during the flood.
The commentary on "swarming" and Schmedlap's comment reminded me of the lengthy article by ex-US CT czar, Richard Clarke, on what was possible. Worth checking back to 2005: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200501/clarke
davidbfpo
We may also want to reconsider the role of our National Guard forces. They’ve long been a source of immediate manpower and logistical coordination for natural disasters. They may need to be ready to serve as a support force for law enforcement.
If something similar to the Mumbai attacks were to occur in a major city, it seems that the SWAT teams are going to be a tad overstretched and every LE officer is going to be on duty for longer hours than normal, for quite a while, followed by a lengthy period of continued longer hours spent searching/clearing to ensure that no buildings have bombs in them, to gather evidence, to treat and evacuate casualties, and other tasks associated with restoring order and re-establishing security. Imagine 6 or 8 teams of 3 to 4 terrorists in different locations of a major city. Are there generally enough SWAT assets for that many separate, simultaneous events? I’m envisioning lots of ambulances, lots of overwhelmed emergency rooms, lots of department needing to ignore neighborhoods where there is no crisis occurring so that they can focus on the events unfolding, and thus lots of neighborhoods going un-policed during the crisis. And if Katrina taught us nothing else, it is that disasters do not always bring out the best in everyone and cause them to become more civil and cooperative. When the police vanished in New Orleans, people took advantage of the situation to engage in looting, mass rape, vandalism, murder (and in the most impressive display of IO capability that I’ve ever seen, they managed to blame their unlawful and unnecessary actions on George Bush). Would people behave a little better in a Mumbai-like incident? I hope so, but I wouldn’t count on it.
In the aftermath of Katrina, most accounts that I’ve read suggest that the National Guard was the critical stabilizing force and possibly the only major organization that was not using it’s thumbs, head, or any other body part as a butt-plug. That fiasco seemed to demonstrate that National Guard units are adequately suited for the most basic law and order tasks, such as shutting down roads, re-routing traffic, maintaining some kind of government security presence outside of the areas of concern, providing additional lift for the ambulances, possibly establishing field triage clinics for non-critical casualties, et cetera. It seems logical that they could be handling the lower-skill, lower-priority, mundane tasks of law enforcement and emergency medical care, so that the professional law enforcement and EMS personnel can take care of the more specialized, high-skill tasks, nearer to the critical events.
Anyone know of a good study of National Guard support to the LAPD during the LA Riots?
Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
It goes back further than that. This is similar to what Colonel Warden calls Parallel Warfare. He spoke about it in the early to mid 1990's. The example was power plants and how if say 50 where attacked across the country by small units the total effect could be catastrophic even though there was no major damage done to the power plants. Terroist understand Targeting a lot better than we do IMHO.
at little costs to the bad guys:
Have done the same imagining myself (great minds, etc. :D).Quote:
from Schmedlap
Granted, a SWAT team would eventually gun him down, but not until the entire country is freaking out, the markets crash further, and the country is pushed to the brink of turning into something resembling New Orleans during the flood.
How a nation reacts to pain is a measure of its greatness - and the greatness of its leaders. Unfortunately, the consequences outlined above are what I also see as a result of such incidents.
Since 9/11, we (civilians) have been told to go shopping by our leaders. None of them (that I recall) have made any real attempt to educate the US public that losses are going to be sustained - but that they can be tolerated without reducing this nation to chaos.
I am not saying accept those losses like a herd of prey animals. What I am suggesting is an attitude similar to that in the match scene in the initial scenes of Lawrence of Arabia: "The trick is not to notice it." So, the pain will be there - get even. Let us not act like a herd of frightened sheep.
Schmed, are you talking about the 2006 incident, or the Bojinka plot?Quote:
Originally Posted by Schmedlap
Bojinka plot was in 1995. They did a test run that ended up killing one man but didn't bring the plane down, change one variable and it would have. Plan was to hit 11 airliners near simultaneously. Seems like there is a lineage from Bojinka to the Shoebomb to the 2006 plot.
Seriously, some 11-20 bad folks, with AK's kill 300+ civilians in New York. Very tragic, horrible to contemplate, but so what?
If it doesn't break the will of the US Government it's irrelevant. The IRA bombed the UK got its self nowhere. What has the Mumbai attacks achieved? Did 911 lead to any US withdrawal or any breaking of the will of the US Government?
Israel endured a huge civilian loss from suicide bombings and it made no difference to the map, or the countries will to survive. The major negative impact was on Palestinians.
Killing US/UK/IDF soldiers while deployed has arguably far more effect, than killing civilians in the home base. The idea that the "Madrid Effect," is repeatable or worth the effort, is short on evidence.
What is more, defining these attacks as "swarming," adds to the mischaracterisation. I don't know who came up with it, but in my opinion, it feeds an error, not corrects it.
The UK Police - as Davidbfpo might confirm - has always had a justified fear (Hungerford and Dumblaine) and has internally discussed in detail, the type of attack that occurred in Mumbia for well over 20 years. I am sure all US and European police forces have done the same.
The 2006 incident.Quote:
Originally Posted by bourbon
I was thinking more along the lines of the economic impact that would result as the countries reacts to the "new" security threat. Depending upon where it occurs (for example, a shopping center), you can expect sales at those types of establishments to plummet further. In 2005, that wouldn't have hurt us quite so bad. In today's economy, that would be a very unwelcome kick while the economy is down.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I agree that it would not be a significant event in terms of our foreign policy. But it would be a devious bit of economic warfare. And it would likely cause significant changes in how we live.Quote:
The idea that the "Madrid Effect," is repeatable or worth the effort, is short on evidence.
Of course such attacks could be pulled off quite easily, and while tragic at a local level, would only be relevant if we made them relevant.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
This is not to trivialize the impact of such attacks on a local populace. I was living in the happy hunting grounds of the DC sniper during their little rampage, and it was an added stress for everyone. Scenes of middle aged, middle class women with their faces etched with fear to simply walk from the checkout at Food Lion to cross the parking lot to their car at night. Little kids doing three second rushes to get from their car to the mini-mart at the gas station to buy a soda. It was new for everyone, and a small event had a big effect. Locally. Nationally? An interesting story.
We should prepare the populace for the eventuallity of such attacks. They will happen, our top notch responders will do their typical magnificent job, and we'll clean up and get on with our lives. Such attacks can only hurt us as a nation if blow them totally out of proportion and over react.
More importantly we need to make sure that we do not allow our irrational fear of such attacks ever happening (they will, its a matter of managing frequency and intensity) drive us to a course of pre-emptive activities around the world that may very well produce a temporary effect of denying opportunity to attack us, but by their very nature build an enduring motivation among those very populaces to launch such attacks.
Our Ends are sound; Preserve the American Way of life, protect the homeland, ensure access to resources and markets. Its our Ways and Means that need a major recalibration.
It depends, to some extent, which Palestinians you are talking about.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
The February-March 1996 Hamas suicide bombings in Tel Aviv were designed to damage the Oslo process by encouraging Israelis to shift right and vote Likud. That is indeed what happened in May, and we ended up with three years of Bibi. From Hamas' perspective, Israel's strategic "will" to carry forward the peace process (which Hamas opposed) was "broken."
The 2000-05 Hamas suicide bombings were aimed, in part, at destabilizing the peace process and out-bidding Fateh. This too was largely successful, as evidenced by the growth of Hamas popularity during this period. In 2006 they won the PLC elections, and a year later took over Gaza.
In short, while I have always thought that suicide bombings were a strategic disaster for the Palestinian people, its not at all clear they have been dysfunctional from the perspective of the bombers.