Iran vs. Saudi Arabia: Hamas v. Hezbollah

This 2007 Internet reference gives some good background but I am certain someone else on SWJ can post a more current dated citation on the same topic and invite you to do so.

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuse...etails&id=5167

My purpose in making this posting is to create discussion of the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia's extremist elements to keep things agitated and stirred up between Israel and Palestine, competing power centers, Iran & Saudi, as I see them.

Others more current tense info postings and commentary much appreciated.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

My purpose in making this posting is to create discussion of the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia's extremist elements to keep things agitated and stirred up between Israel and Palestine, competing power centers, Iran & Saudi, as I see them.

---

Maybe a rambling comment that I made in another thread is more appropriate here. In regard to the latest Bernard Lewis piece in Foreign Affairs...

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

Starting on page 86, he writes “most Arab regimes belong to one of two categories: those that depend on the people’s loyalty and those that depend on their obedience. Loyalty may be ethnic, tribal, regional, or some combination of these… The regimes that depend on obedience are European-style dictatorships that use techniques of control and enforcement derived from the fascist and communist models. These regimes have little or no claim to the loyalty of their people and depend for survival on diversion and repression: directing the anger of their people toward some external enemy.”

The recent order has been the loyalty regimes like Morocco and Saudi Arabia or the obedience regimes like Egypt or Syria (I presume).

---

While Iran is not Arab, the same dynamic seems to apply. Saudi is the "loyalty" regime, whereas Iran is the "obedience" regime. Saudi Arabia, recognizing that the loyalty is quickly slipping away, in spite of the demographics, responds to the anti-Israeli sentiment of its people with limited help to Hamas. Iran's Mullahs, attempting to justify their rule and probably acting sincerely upon their ideology, cast themselves as the guardians of Islam / defense against enemies of Islam via their support of Hezbollah and activity in Iraq in order to make their repression seem less objectionable.

I wonder if this is not so much a competition for power - merely for power's sake - but rather an attempt to amass power in the region so that the regime in each country can justify its existence. It seems that the Saudi people will soon wonder why they owe loyalty to a regime that, in spite of its oil wealth, doesn't seem to be doing much. The Iranians, sick of the BS from the Mullahs, are likely asking why they should accept repression if their country grows poorer by the day. If people are going to have freedoms denied or opportunities quashed, they need to believe that there is a good reason for it. At the moment, it seems that Saudi Arabia and Iran are scrambling to provide that justification to their people. Lacking the ability to jumpstart their economies or significantly improve future prospects for increases in their standards of living, Israel-bashing is always something that they feel comfortable falling back on.

Good input and many thanks for same.

Interested in other's takes on this theme...my personal agenda is to look for a disruption between Shias and Sunnis...recognizing that we now have two "theocratic" models, Iran, a Shi'a model, and of course Syria and Saudi Arabia, both Sunni models.

I deliberately am not mentioning other nations models there in the Middle East but that does not stop anyone else here on SWJ from doing so.

More discussion here. Understand I see Iran uniquely, to me uniquely, doing a cross over of support for both Hezballah and Hamas, Shi'a and Sunni, while at the same time Iran is an enemy of al Qaida and against them, at least that is what the world has been led to believe...until now???

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

Interested in other's takes on this theme...my personal agenda is to look for a disruption between Shias and Sunnis...recognizing that we now have two "theocratic" models, Iran, a Shi'a model, and of course Syria and Saudi Arabia, both Sunni models.

---

Syria is very far from a Sunni theocracy, given that it is ruled by the (semi-secular, supposedly non-confessional) Ba'th Party, with the (non-Sunni, heterodox Shiite-offshot) Alawi minority exercising disproportionate influence in the Party and Army.

If "theocracy" is understood to be a system where men of religion rule directly, then Saudi Arabia isn't quite one—for all its Wahhabi piety, it is the royal family and not the ulama who rule.

Iran is one, albeit limited by both a written constitution and quasi-elective components (the majlis and the presidency).

If we are to accept that Syria or Saudi Arabia are theocracies - I think Rex makes a good case against it - but, for the sake of argument, Iran seems to be a very different breed of theocracy. I think the Mullahs really believe in their state-sanctioned-twelver-Khomeini-BS and truly feel an obligation to impose it on the country. I think the House of Saud, on the other hand, would grasp for anything that gave them legitimacy. If the Saudi Arabian people suddenly stopped caring about Islam and only cared about soccer, then the House of Saud would be swapping their traditional garb for Manchester United jerseys and turning Mecca into a giant soccer stadium. Divine right is almost always an excuse to rule, not a geniune belief. I think Iran is that rare exception.

Rex and Schmedlap you are both in the ballpark and here is a citation/literal copy of commonly understood meaning of the term "Islamic Republic" which is the terminology I might have better used as found on the Internet at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_republic:

Quote:

---

Islamic Republic is the name given to several states in the Muslim world including the Islamic Republics of Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Mauritania. Pakistan adopted the title under the constitution of 1956. Mauritania adopted it on 28 November 1958. Iran adopted it after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi government. Afghanistan adopted it after the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban. Despite the similar name the countries differ greatly in their governments and laws.

The term "Islamic republic" has come to mean several different things, some contradictory to others. Theoretically, to many religious leaders, it is a state under a particular theocratic form of government advocated by some Muslim religious leaders in the Middle East and Africa. It is seen as a compromise between a purely Islamic Caliphate, and secular nationalism and republicanism. In their conception of the Islamic republic, the penal code of the state is required to be compatible with some laws of Sharia, and not a monarchy as many Middle Eastern states are presently. In other cases, it is merely a symbol of cultural identity, as was the case when Pakistan adopted the title under the constitution of 1956. In fact many argue that an Islamic Republic strikes a middle path between a completely secular and a theocratic (and/or Orthodox Islamic) system of government.

Iran's Islamic republic is in contrast to the semi-secular state of the Republic of Pakistan (proclaimed as an Islamic Republic in 1956) where Islamic laws are technically considered to override laws of the state, though in reality their relative hierarchy is ambiguous.

Pakistan was the first country to adopt Islamic prefix to define its republican status under the otherwise secular constitution of 1956. Interestingly enough, despite this definition, the country did not have state religion until 1973, when a new constitution, more democratic but less secular, was adopted. Pakistan only uses the "Islamic" name on its passports and visas. All government documents are prepared under the name of the Government of Pakistan, however, Islamic republic is specifically mentioned in the Constitution of 1973. As per the Constitution of Pakistan, part IX, article 227 " All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions "[1].

Today, the creation of an Islamic State is the rallying cry for many Muslims, including those described as Islamists, all over the world. However the term itself has different meanings among various people. Many advocate the abolition of the monarchies of the Middle East, regimes which they believe to be overly authoritarian or otherwise repressive to Islam, in some cases, to be replaced with a unified and monolithic Caliphate[2] and in other cases Islamic Republics along national lines.

---

At present the Sunni radicals/terrorists are persecuring/murdering the Shi'as in Northern Pakistan and in Afghanistan. You and others may want to comment on this.

There have long been distinctions/differences origninating from the death of Muhammad and how his sucessor(s) were and are viewed since that time which of course created and cause today the differences between Shi'a and Sunni, and allow for more moderate sub-sects such as that of HRJ the Agha Khan and his followers, which are a Shi'a off shoot sometimes referred to as Islamis.

Other comments, critiques most welcome.

I completly missed this news in early March 2009, that Iran had renewed its claim that Bahrain was a lost province:
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/mal.../iran_e005.htm

Note that Bahrain has long struggled to be unified, with a Shia minority, a factor that may inflience this old claim being renewed and then denied.

Yes, from an Israeli author and a respected institute IMHO.

davidbfpo

David, open thanks for this worthy posting.

Iran is far from negotiable with the non-Muslim world and even within the Muslim world is a questionable process...I still am puzzled that Iran would fund both Hezbullah, Shi'a and Hamas, Sunni,but the amount or value of Hamas funding appears to be less for Hamas, unless someone can correct me on this point.

Cheers.

If we could pay Hezbollah to finish of al-Qaeda, I'm sure that we would. Enemy of our enemy. Likewise for Iran's funding of Hamas and possibly AQI.

Iran has always struggled to be central to Middle East politics -- it's ethnic/national identity is more problematic than its religious. How does Iran make itself compatible with the Arab world without taking up the campaign against Israel? Not sure about how viable an Iranian-AQ relationship would be, given AQ's theological position on Shia's, and the perceived danger of Iran to the Arabian peninsula. There's certainly some competition in the two fundamentalisms of Iran and SA, but it's more about access to the Persian Gulf (and perhaps Iraq?), with some ethnic and religious spice thrown into the mix. Despite the religious veil, Iranian security and economic organization is remarkably similar to that of imperial Iran.

Very astute observation:

Quote:

---

"...Despite the religious veil, Iranian security and economic organization is remarkably similar to that of imperial Iran."

---

No accident that. The Persian Imperial Tradition resonates far more strongly with most Iranians and virtually all ethnic Persians than does their religion. The nation has its share of fanatics but so do all nations. Darius and Cyrus are more important to most than is Mohamed.

Regaining their lost Empire and / or getting the respect due the empire is very important to them and always has been.

Keeping them from doing that has been an Arab goal for a thousand years...

RAND, 17 Mar 09: Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy

Quote:

---

....Saudi Arabia and Iran are divided by long-standing structural tensions. Each has aspirations for Islamic leadership, and each possesses different visions of regional order. Whereas Tehran regards Riyadh as America’s proxy and a buffer against Iran’s rightful primacy in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia worries about Iran’s asymmetric power and regional ambitions, especially its expanding influence in post-Saddam Iraq and its alleged pursuit of a nuclear weapon. A particular concern in Riyadh is Iran’s ability to challenge the legitimacy of the al-Saud before regional and domestic audiences by upstaging them on pan-Arab issues such as Palestine.

The countries are further divided by political ideologies and governance.
The philosophy of the Islamic Republic explicitly rejects the kinds of monarchical regimes seen in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, legitimates the authority of the Iranian clerical elite, and incorporates quasi-democratic institutions. For their part, the rule of the al-Saud rests on their claim to custodianship of the Islamic holy sites in Mecca and Medina, dynastic privilege, a symbiotic but ultimately dominant relationship with the Saudi clerical class, and a celebration of the state-building achievements of Ibn Saud. Energy differences are a third source of tension. Whereas Saudi Arabia can afford to take a long-term view of the global oil market and has incentives to moderate prices, Iran is compelled by its smaller oil reserves and larger population to focus on high prices in the short term.

Together, these factors—along with the well-known sectarian and ethnic fissures that divide the Saudi and Iranian populations—would seem to predispose the two countries toward chronic hostility. Regional and Western commentators have warned of a Saudi-Iranian “proxy” conflict engulfing the region or a return to the ideological “Cold War” that marked the bilateral relationship after the 1979 Iranian Revolution......

---

Complete 158-page paper at the link.

One thing that the Government of Saudi Arabia has in common with the Government of Iran is that neither is well regarded by their own populace.

The thing that the U.S. should be focused on then, is the perception of those populaces in terms of the perceived legitimacy of those governments.

Iran had a government that drew its legitimacy not from the populace, but from the U.S., and that source of legitimacy was attacked in order to change governance. Now I believe the populace of Iran largely believes that the source of legitimacy for their current government is internal, so any future conflict to resolve it would likely be internal as well.

Saudi Arabia has a government that draws its legitimacy from the U.S.; so when Saudi insurgents strike out to seek change of that governance, it is logical that they would also attack that source of legitimacy in order to achieve their goals of good governance at home. Certainly this is a theme encouraged among this populace by bin Laden. When Saudi insurgents drive airplanes into our buildings or travel to Iraq to fight U.S. forces there, it serves us well to consider that they perceive us to be standing between them and a self-determined government at home.

With this in mind, consider then the actions of the Governments of these two states in regards to the U.S.:

Saudi Arabia (more accurately, the King of Saudi Arabia, as the people have no voice) fears (IMO) three things:
1. A rising Iranian Nationalism and regional influence
2. A relative shift of power within the Islamic community in general from Sunni to Shia, and
3. Their own populace.

Given this perspective, there are several logical things that the King would want:
1. To keep the U.S. in Iraq as a buffer between him and Iran; but not for the U.S. to be too successful, because a Shia-dominated democracy with no U.S. presence would be a disaster for him. Consider why the Saudis do so little to stem the flow of Saudi citizens traveling to Iraq. It is simply not in their interest to do so.
2. To keep the Palestinian-Iraeli conflict simmering. Why do the Saudis do nothing to resolve this? Because they know it will draw US interest to the region in support of Israel, and that it will also draw Iranian support to the conflict, which in turn keeps the U.S. thinking in terms of Iran as "bad guys" and Saudi Arabia as "good guys."

The Saudis look down at all of the hired help that keeps their country running; be it the manual laborers that do the dirty jobs, or the engineers that keep the oil flowing, or the militaries that keep them safe. All are considered as lower life forms to be manipulated to serve the King and his family.

I find it interesting that we are so focused on those states that threw off U.S. Cold War influence in the 70s/80s and are now attempting to exert some degree of nationalism as "threats;" while we largely ignore or mischaracterize as "terrorism" the efforts of suppressed populaces seeking self-determination from the "allied" regimes that we either imposed upon them or have supported in power as part of our larger Cold War strategy to contain the Soviets.

If this were Jeopardy, I would tell Alex Trebec: "I'll take a new strategy for $1000, please."

Bob:

One point of contention really.

You said:

Quote:

---

To keep the Palestinian-Iraeli conflict simmering. Why do the Saudis do nothing to resolve this? Because they know it will draw US interest to the region in support of Israel, and that it will also draw Iranian support to the conflict, which in turn keeps the U.S. thinking in terms of Iran as "bad guys" and Saudi Arabia as "good guys."

---

I would argue that it's more about popular legitimacy at home than entrapping the US into conflict with Iran. As the self-proclaimed religious center (and de facto financial voice) in the Arab world, the Saudis cannot unilateraly encourage/endorse/impose a peace on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without inflaming either other Arab governments, their own people, or the Palestinians themselves; and a significant disincentive is that Saudi Arabia really has no leverage over Israel. I'd argue on that basis that SA's policy toward the conflict is a result of its inability to do anything direct or significant about it.