Is the United States learning from prior attempts at nation-building?
The following blog was a project for a college course on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and nation-building:
The Afghanistan surge and AFPAK plan suggests that policymakers in Washington have, at the very least, cracked a history textbook or two. When we take into account every major attempt the U.S. has made at nation-building since World War II, a few trends become strikingly obvious.
First, the amount of security (military and/or police) present in the country correlates with the speed and durability of the nation-building. Generally speaking, a greater security personnel-to-indigenous population ratio results in a more successful operation. For example, post-WWII rebuilding in Germany and post-intervention Kosovo and Bosnia (each considered successful nation-building operations) had security-population ratios of 100, 20, and 18.6 military personnel to 1,000 civilians (respectively). On the other hand, failed attempts in Haiti and Somalia only netted 3.5: 1000 and 5: 1000 ratios at their peaks (Dobbins, 2009).
At the end of 2007, the total U.S. deployments in Afghanistan (combat and non-combat) fell just under .9 personnel per 1000 Afghans—the lowest of any U.S. nation-building attempt since World War II. In 2008, the Bush administration shifted focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. By June of that year, security-population ratios jumped to 1.5: 1000 (O’Bryant, 2008). Under the Obama administration’s strategy, initial estimated troop increases in Afghanistan would grow the ratio to at least 2: 1000. While these numbers still fall short of the historical ideal, bolstering U.S. troop presence should carry a notable effect on security over the next year.
The second major historical trend expanded on under the AFPAK plan is external assistance per capita. U.S. nation-building assistance to Bosnia (1996-1997) totaled $1400 and Kosovo (2000-2001) totaled $800 per capita. Both countries held democratic elections within three years, and Kosovo witnessed the quickest GDP recovery following conflict of any nation-building operation since World War II (Dobbins, 2009). U.S. nation-building assistance in Haiti (1995-1996) fell below $200 per capita, and Haitian GDP experienced little growth since intervention. Based on these examples, assistance per capita directly correlates with the level of success of nation-building. In 2002, approximate assistance to Afghanistan ranked below Haiti at $100 per capita (Dobbins, 2009). This year, $1.5 billion in development assistance under the Obama administration’s AFPAK strategy is already pledged to tribal regions of Afghanistan. The package alone will increase assistance by $45 per capita.
Obviously, there are countless other factors (geography, socio-political differences, sources of conflict, history, etc.) to consider when engaging in and measuring the success of nation-building-- and all vary on a case-by-case basis. Thus, a “one size fits all” nation-building strategy built around security and assistance per capita ratios is no assurance of success. I believe that at the end of the day, more is certainly better—but the biggest guarantee of success is how effectively security personnel is used and development assistance is spent rather than the actual quantities dumped into a given country.
Sources:
Dobbins, James. America's Role in Nation-Building; From German to Iraq. RAND. 2009.
O’Bryant, JoAnne. CRS Report to Congress; U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. 15 July, 2008.
White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. March 2009.
A wider view reveals more?
I appreciate you've written from an American viewpoint. Is there no mileage or any lessons learnt from other places in recent times, particularly where the UN has played a major role?
Particularly thinking of countries that have emerged from a troubled past, just a few examples: Mozambique, Cambodia and Namibia. Would your principles apply just as well there?
Why have some former colonies made progress and others not?
Another thread has reminded me that at a non-policy level Americans have served in troubled places, e.g. Darfur and returned to the USA to impart their experience. SWC has two prominient members who were in Zaire and Rwanda, who regularly impart their wisdom.
From this "armchair" it is sometimes not the lessons learned that matter, but who brings the lessons to attention.
davidbfpo
Sociology mixed with Anthropology...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ridek
The focus on this particular entry for my class was on the United States' role in nation-building. Even within these limitations, post-WWII Japan stands out as a bit of an enigma. I omitted it from the first post because it was a major outlier from the rest of the examples I had available (and my post was running a bit long). U.S. troop deployments in 1945 Japan were roughly the same proportion to the intervention in Somalia, and per capita assistance was half of what was spent in Haiti.
There is a major factor to consider with Japan's success though-- Japanese as a whole no longer had the political will to keep fighting. Nation-building efforts were certainly aided by the extra stability.
RideK, in regards to japan, you may want to consider Roosevelt's great white fleet impact on Japan society and the eventually submital to western thought.
v/r
Mike
Marc, what did you have in
mind regarding Afghanistan? My sense is that we got off to a pretty good start there with the Loya Jerga creating a govt and choosing a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, as president ratifying the choice in a more institutionalized manner later. The choices were legitimated by the King who participated in the process with significant support from the international community - at the beginning. Failure, to my mind was in follow-through.
Cheers
JohnT
