U.S. Military Is Split on Insurgency Strategy
13 May Los Angeles Times - U.S. Military Is Split on Insurgency Strategy by Solomon Moore and Peter Spiegel.
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... The troops have set up 19 small base camps throughout the area and begun routinely patrolling insurgent hot spots north of the Euphrates River. The deployment follows a strategy favored by a new generation of counterinsurgency experts: disperse, mingle with the population and stay put.
But the shift comes as the Pentagon appears to be moving the overall U.S. military effort in the opposite direction across much of the country. Army units are being concentrated in "super bases" that line the spine of central Iraq, away from the urban centers where counterinsurgency operations take place.
The two approaches underscore an increasingly high-profile divergence — some say contradiction — on how best to use U.S. forces in Iraq, and are evidence of a growing debate in the upper ranks about the wisest course of action.
The contrast also reflects the complicated mix of military goals and concerns as U.S. troops begin their fourth summer in Iraq. Top commanders are eager to begin shrinking the U.S. footprint, an implicit step toward a gradual withdrawal of American forces. At the same time, some field commanders are determined to break an endless cycle that allows insurgents to move back into key areas as soon as U.S. forces move on. That requires large investments of manpower...
Abizaid's small foot print strategy
This paragraph is in the same story:
Quote:
But current and former military leaders said it was misleading to attribute the push solely to politics. Central Command officers, including Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, the Centcom commander, have argued that the large presence fosters a "dependency syndrome" within the Iraqi military, which continues to rely on Americans to do the heavy lifting.
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As I point out in my blog:
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This is the nut of the debate over troop levels and explains for better than Cobra II why Abizaid went with the lower troop levels. His approach will work if the Iraqis take up the slack. The approach of the Marines at Qaim is the approach that defeats insurgencies. You have to have the force to space ratio sufficient to stop the enemy from being able to move. The enemy is defeated when he cannot easily move from a sanctuary to an area of operation. Contesting every town denies the sanctuary and cuts off routes of movement. An enemy using a raiding strategy is always most vulnerable while moving. Troops in a big base do little to stop that movement. Until the Iraqis can get out there and do the patroling the Marines and other troops have to do the job.