Are We Ready For an Interagency Combatant Command?

Are We Ready For an Interagency Combatant Command? by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Naler, US Marine Corps. Joint Force Quarterly article, Issue # 41.

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As the United States conducts the war on terror, it is evident from experience, doctrine, and strategy that the conflict will not be resolved solely through either military strength or diplomatic maneuvering. The combination of all instruments of national power allows the United States and its allies the full spectrum of options to respond to and deter terrorist and conventional threats. Is the Nation agile enough to respond globally, short of a major theater war? The operations conducted after September 11, 2001, in the Philippines and Central and Southwest Asia prove that we can respond, but are we postured to sustain this war and, at the same time, prepare for future conflicts? This article argues that an integrated civil-military combatant command is the model for the United States to deter and defeat adversaries and engage regional partners in the 21st century. Properly structured to include interagency representation, a combatant commander’s headquarters and associated staff would provide the nucleus for interagency reorganization...

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The Joint Interagency Coordination Group: The Operationalization of DIME - Lieutenant Colonel Harold Van Opdorp, USMC. Small Wars Journal article, July 2005.

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Current United States National Security policy documents and future global trends drive the requirement to create and maintain an operational level organization to integrate the four elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). From the policy perspective, one can trace the requirement to operationalize DIME to National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1), released 13 March 2001 and the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America. NSPD-1 lays down the organization of the National Security Council System to accomplish this task. The national security policy infrastructure turns to the National Security Strategy of the United States for overall direction. Last published in September, 2002, the NSS describes a world where, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.”

The desire to avoid another attack against the United States like the September 11 attacks serves as the largest catalyst for United States intervention abroad. However, the ever-present crisis related to basic humanitarian failures throughout the world will continue to lead to increased U.S. involvement globally that will require the need to integrate the elements of national power at the operational level. In the 1990s, the United States experienced a three-fold increase in the number of ‘complex emergencies’. Future trends identified in the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project indicate that the number of complex emergencies will continue to increase, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and significant parts of Southeast Asia. These trends lead one to believe that the United States will become more involved in regional crises around the world in the interests of its national security. Critical to the success of the United States in this regard will be its ability to operationalize the elements of its national power in order to meet its national security needs? By establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group focused on integrating the elements of national power at the operational level, the United States can better prepare itself for successful execution of complex emergencies and stabilization and reconstruction operations in the coming decades...

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In the Interagency Operations section of the SWJ Reference Library....

June 2006 issue of National Defense - Special Operators Gain Civilian Assistance by Harold Kennedy.

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As it plans for an extended struggle against terrorism, the U.S. Special Operations Command is realizing that it is going to need a lot of outside help, and it is reaching out to civilian agencies, allied nations and private contractors.

While special operators now are deploying in larger numbers than they ever have before, the State Department is emerging as a key civilian partner to SOCOM, said Thomas W. O’Connell, assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

The office of the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, or S/CRS, was created in 2005 to facilitate the work of a wide range of non-military agencies, including the State, Justice and Treasury Departments...

The State Department lacks the facilities to train and equip a response corps, but the Defense Department does not. Recognizing this, Congress included in the 2006 defense appropriation a provision permitting the Pentagon to spend up to $200 million a year over two years for that purpose, O’Connell noted. In addition, the State Department requested $75 million in its 2007 budget to build its civilian response capabilities, Wong said.

As part of that effort, the Defense and State Departments are cooperating with other U.S. and international agencies in a series of training exercises. In March, for example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command partnered with the State Department to launch Multinational Experiment 4, involving eight countries and NATO to practice interagency and coalition planning...

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Very interesting idea. I would think it would help solve many left hand dosen't know what the right hand is doing situations.

I think this is a fantastic idea. But sadly, I don't think it is anything we could accomplish until we have a new generation of general officers leading the services. Even with so much emphasis in jointness these days there is still an awful lot of backstabbing going on between the services. Protecting one's turf is still the top priority.

The Generals have an obligation to take care of their services, and they have an even greater obligation to win our nation's wars. In our system that has always been a balancing act, and for the most part I think they do a fine job at it. That isn't to say the system is ideal, far from it, but it is the budgeting process that is the weak link, not our Generals.

I have seen other papers arguing for a Grahm-Rudman type act to facilitate a Joint-Interagency Command like structure. Although some argue have that already, I don't concur, and I think this idea needs to be implemented immediately. We all know there are limits to what the military can achieve with military force alone. If we want to stamp out terrorism around the world, then we need to strengthen governments, build sound economies, and assorted other tasks that others should be able to do better than the military. Of course this is only effective if it is coordinated and we're all working hand in glove with one another. I admit this sounds overly idealist, but our National Security depends on getting this right if we're going to be able to wage war effectively in this 4th GW era.

If you think the services are resistant to change (I don't) wait until you see the State Department, Commerce, etc. can an order to transform. You can already see an example of how one organization is resisting change (the CIA) by trying to work a number of backroom deals, leaking selective information, etc. Unfortunately not all our government workers live by an oath like we do and it shows. I agree this needs to be done, but have no illusions that this will be an easy fight.

"If you think the services are resistant to change (I don't) wait until you see the State Department, Commerce, etc. can an order to transform. You can already see an example of how one organization is resisting change (the CIA) by trying to work a number of backroom deals, leaking selective information, etc. Unfortunately not all our government workers live by an oath like we do and it shows. I agree this needs to be done, but have no illusions that this will be an easy fight."

Touche' very good point.