Pentagon Worries Lead to Command Change

This story comes from the Washington Post today and was also listed in the SWJ news roundup today: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...081602304.html

Summary: Concerns by Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen about General McKiernan's ability to deliver the results they needed in Afghanistan led to his replacement. This article tells the story of the events preceding his removal, as told by those who had direct knowledge of the events described in the article.

I first learned of McKiernan from the Pentagon briefings he gave from Iraq in Fall 2006. Most of the content, as I recall, was about the tenuous stability in Diyala Province and the numbers from EOD operations and raids.

This article highlights something that is probably obvious to many in the defense community but is only vaguely understood (if at all) by those outside it.

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"Blame General Petraeus," a senior Defense Department official said. "He redefined during his tour in Iraq what it means to be a commanding general. He broke the mold. The traditional responsibilities were not enough anymore. You had to be adroit at international politics. You had to be a skilled diplomat. You had to be savvy with the press, and you had to be a really sophisticated leader of a large organization. When you judge McKiernan by Petraeus's standards, he looked old-school by comparison."

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(Page 2)

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And he [McKiernan] acknowledged that he should have "done a better job of feeding the beast in Washington," even though he believed that "an operational commander needs to spend the vast majority of his energy and time and efforts focused inside the theater of operations and not on trips to Washington."

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(Page 5)

The above excerpts from the article struck me as the real weakness of McKiernan that led to his removal. I was immediately reminded of the issues Patton had during his campaigns in North Africa and Europe. Anymore, a general must be a technically and tactically proficient warfighter, statesman, AND advocate for his operational choices in Washington. The amount of work involved there seems overwhelming, even with a headquarters staff...

My question is this: do the command and staff colleges instruct officers on how to deal with "feeding the beast in Washington," or do they have to learn it on the job? Are the frequency of meetings between top commanders and Washington (e.g. Congress and the President) a phenomenon of the Afghan and Iraq wars or something that has existed for several decades? Has a new precedent been set by the current wars for a closer relationship between top commanders and Washington? Will Congress and the President expect a closer relationship in the future?

I have no beef with Gen. McKiernan, and he is probably a good guy, and maybe even a very good leader. However, just yesterday I received a briefing on AF which made me despair as to the direction with AF surge. It was all more of the same, and reflected none of the innovative thinking that GEN Petraeus brought to the surge in Iraq. More troops are necessary, but I believe it is abundantly apparent about the Iraqi surge is that its success hinged not on an increase in troops, but on the change in strategy.

That said, simply relieving someone who otherwise seemed to be an able commander is not necessarily a step forward, either. Indeed, it seems to reflect a "Tinker Toys" vision of planning. (e.g. the plan is a result of having the right pieces in the right places.) If the next commander in AF is no more innovative, then all we have done is throw a good soldier under the bus for little to no gains.

I'm sure they teach what reports are required, and when. As well as during turnover the out going General gives a run down of what reports are in the pipeline. That's simple SOP. However, there is no way to adequately prepaid one in a classroom setting for all demands a senior command can demand, especially when what should be tactical in nature takes on a political accent. Unless he was utterly inept at turrning in reports, I don't see why that would become an issue to dismiss him.

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He broke the mold. The traditional responsibilities were not enough anymore. You had to be adroit at international politics. You had to be a skilled diplomat. You had to be savvy with the press, and you had to be a really sophisticated leader of a large organization. When you judge McKiernan by Petraeus's standards, he looked old-school by comparison."

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So basically the mould breaking was being like the majority of successful wartime leaders anywhere on the planet in the last 3,000 years.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

So basically the mould breaking was being like the majority of successful wartime leaders anywhere on the planet in the last 3,000 years.

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Machiavelli also cautioned that Princes should choose Generals on their strengths and temperaments in correlation to the nature of the war being fought at the time. He cited Rome's approach to the second Punic War as a prime example, where a more cautious and defensive General was pivotal in the initial stages of the war and applauded Rome's decision to replace that General with a more offensive risk taking orientated one (Scipious) after Hannibal's foray into Rome was held in check. Mach's point being that strategy and war is always a dynamic and fluid phenomenon, hence the need for flexibility, and as with CvC, avoiding a dogmatic approach to the development of strategy and operations over the total duration of the war being fought.

In terms of the above mentioned replacement, I was under the impression that it was a result of a disagreement over the use of air power in Afghanistan? A conversation I had with Maj. Gen. (ret.) Molan, in regards to General McKiernan, was that he was very competent in conducting offensive operations, especially with the use of air power. I'm not sure whether it is very healthy to attach any type of stigma with a replacement, especially if we take Mach's advise to hand. Some Generals are more suited to defensive operations while others at offensive operations. Each has an important role to play in the development and conduct of strategy over a war's entire duration.

Neither, in the modern sense, did the Romans. Generals in the US Army are assigned with the advice and counsel of the Senate -- and the House -- and the WH...

The SecDef and the Chief of Staff Army have some say. Not the final say, though...

Wars the US becomes involved are frequently not well thought out by the politicians that thought going to war was necessary. Viet Nam is one example. I've long contended that Westmoreland knew he had a no-win situation and he stalled to keep US and Allied casualties as low as possible.

McKiernan is not defensively inclined -- this is the guy that okayed the Thunder Runs into Baghdad -- he's a good solid commander who was told to go to Afghanistan and keep a lid on it while everyone concentrated on Iraq. He did what he was told to do and was doing it well.

Then we had an election and the new crew wanted to be seen doing something. Anything -- just so long as it was a rejection of the previous administration. So the rules changed. That's not a political (in the sense of taking sides in US domestic politics) statement, Bush 43 did the same thing when he came in, as did Clinton before him. So did Jefferson when he replaced Adams. Way the system works.

McKiernan was wrongly removed to establish that a new crew was in town (and coincidentally, lay down a new pecking order in the upper echelons of the Army). No more than that, no grand operational or strategic issue, just politics.

Also no question that the civilian masters had and have every right to do that -- but as someone else said, it could have been done with a lot more class...

Oh, well. Better than old China where those who did not kowtow to Washingto.. er, the Emperor, lost their heads...:wry:

Agreed on all points, although I'm going to split hairs on this one

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Mach did not have to deal with a democracy, neither, in the modern sense, did the Romans. Generals in the US Army are assigned with the advice and counsel of the Senate -- and the House -- and the WH...

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Fabius became unpopular in Rome, since his tactics did not lead to a quick end to the war. The Roman populace derided the Cunctator, and at the elections of 216 BC elected as consuls Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, both of whom advocated pursuing a much more aggressive war strategy. They were subsequently defeated by Hannibal. As an aside, the Second Punic War is very interesting considering the 'Fabius Strategy' is very similar to the asymmetric/irregular ones of our times, specifically the harassment of Hannibal via guerrilla 'hit and run' tactics and refusing to engage with Hannibal's main forces. The more things change the more they stay the same. Also of interest, Hannibal's use of indigenous forces to fight the Roman's, and the political machinations of the Roman Senate, again the more things change... For example, in 205 BC, Scipio was unanimously elected to the consulship at the age of 31. Scipio wanted to go to Africa, but his jealous enemies in the Roman senate only allowed him to go as far as Sicily and did not grant him an army. (All sourced from wiki).

One of the many dysfunctional aspects of the C2 setup in Afghanistan is the double-hatting of the US commander. As ISAF commander he is the operational-level coordinator of multi-national tactical forces. Though commander de jure, the caveats placed on his employment of assigned forces means that he has great difficulty imposing his will or sustaining any sort of operational coherency. He is not able to dictate strategy, though he is expected to carry out selected strategic tasks; he has no control and very little influence over the various civil programs being carried out by selected nations. As commander of USFOR-A, he is responsible to the CENTCOM commander for achieving US policy in Afghanistan - at least in theory.

The dilemma that both former and new commander will face is that achieving US policy will require greater and greater infusions of US tactical forces, and US assumption of a growing role in executing the operational plan. This is going to reduce NATO support to a few select allies, as the rest will either refuse to follow our lead or will happily allow us to shoulder the burden. In other words, the two roles he is forced to play are sometimes diametrically opposed to each other.

By the way, we proposed an intermediate headquarters (similar to MNC-I) in Afghanistan in 2005 to the NATO staff. It was not adopted, mostly because the Europeans feared being dragged into a US-style COIN operation. I'm not sure that fear has gone away.

And lastly, how come Petraeus doesn't share more of the blame for problems in Afghanistan? Wasn't he McKiernan's boss? And why should McKiernan be blamed for not properly engaging the Pentagon? Isn't that what your higher headquarters (in this case CENTCOM) is for? What ever happened to top cover? Have we forgotten how to run a war?

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Originally Posted by Eden

And lastly, how come Petraeus doesn't share more of the blame for problems in Afghanistan? Wasn't he McKiernan's boss? And why should McKiernan be blamed for not properly engaging the Pentagon? Isn't that what your higher headquarters (in this case CENTCOM) is for? What ever happened to top cover? Have we forgotten how to run a war?

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Last question in particular...:mad: :eek:

Excellent post. Thank you.