Brother can you spare a penny, or why no I in DME

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11-19-2009
Tukhachevskii

Brother can you spare a penny, or why no I in DME

While perusing through the UK Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (UK JDP-01, 2nd Ed.) I noticed that our (UK) government describes the basis of national power as residing in the Diplomatic, Military and Economic spheres and thus DME. As far as I recall US doctrine, OTOH, includes an I for Informational Power and thus; DIME. Is this a mere stylistic ommision (given the existence of UK 15 PSYOPS Group I would have thought Informational power was part and parcel of our warfighting doctrine especially given our past heritage, i.e., PWE)? Or is it something much more fundamental doctrinally speaking and if it is I can't for the life of me figure out why other than to differentiate our doctrine from that of the US (...sort of like the French habit of creating new words for existing English ones to preserve the purity of the French language...ordinator anyone)? Has the (Neu) Labour regime currently in power have something against information operations or political propaganda (perhaps its not up to their ethical standards)? Your learned views would be very much appreciated as per usual.
11-19-2009
marct

Being at times somewhat cynical (and sarcastic), one does have to wonder if the omission relates to the incredibly archaic state of MoD's IT structure.
11-19-2009
Rex Brynen

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii

While perusing through the UK Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (UK JDP-01, 2nd Ed.) I noticed that our (UK) government describes the basis of national power as residing in the Diplomatic, Military and Economic spheres and thus DME. As far as I recall US doctrine, OTOH, includes an I for Informational Power and thus; DIME.

Perhaps, if one understands "diplomatic" as meaning "political," it is presumed to be already embedded in the D.
11-20-2009
Tukhachevskii

Oooops

Yesterday, the nineteenth day of November in the year of our lord two-thousand and nine a young man, let’s call him Tukhachevskii, returned home from his local library, where he had been using the internet for free, with some evident (i.e., smug) satisfaction (due to the recession the internet was one of a long list of luxuries he could no longer afford). Having read a UK doctrinal publication and found it (in his “learned” eyes) wanting with regards to its definition of national power he had opened a new thread to canvass the opinions of his betters on the SWC. Such is the arrogance of the improperly employed, or in his case, just plain unemployed (what is they say about the Devil ... idle hands ... work?).

Later that evening, and still basking in the glow of self-importance that the internet affords to such people, he poured himself a large Southern Comfort (straight) and settled in for a long night of reading before bed. Yet he would find no comfort that night, Southern or otherwise. As he opened his recently downloaded file containing UK doctrinal publications he selected file 2....UK JDP 01 (2nd Ed.) UK Defence Doctrine. As he read through the eloquently written publication he came to a section defining national power. Informational power, it stated, was not an adjunct of but rather integral to Diplomatic, Military and Economic power. “Here, here”, he thought to himself smugly. And then it hit him.

He paused.

Downed his Whisky in one go and, as it took (rapid) effect, realised his monumental (‘world historical’ is what Hegel would have called it) mistake as the shivers reverberated down his spine and the hairs on the back of his neck (and also perhaps elsewhere) stood firmly to attention.

“Bugger”, he said to himself.

You see, he had made the mistake of not correctly ordering his pdf files at the point of download so that instead of reading file 2 (Defence Doctrine) first he had instead read file 1 (as you do) which was ]UK JDP 01 (2nd Ed.) Campaigning. If that wasn’t bad enough he had posted a thread to his peers while only half cocked which he now realised, much to his shame, would be a real cock up especially diplomatically given his gratuitous and very dishonourable mention of the French (how could he forget the Entente Cordiale, tsk tsk). Luckily for him he had no reputation to tarnish ... although, perhaps unfortunately, he may now have firmly acquired one.

There were now only two CoA to take;

1) A firm and rapid retrograde operation entailing his complete and utter disbarment from ever posting (or “threading”) on the SWC again until such a time as he was able to write posts worthy of the time of the SWC membership or,

2) fall on his sword (which was a plastic pirates sword he had acquired in dubious circumstances for an even more dubious fancy-dress party) and admit his mistake.

He chose the latter, and more honourable in his eyes, CoA. He also decided that finishing the bottle of Southern Comfort would form part of his penance. Half way down the bottle and in the midst of some kind of evident delirium he was reminded of something Stendhal had written in Scarlet and Black ... “To excuse oneself is to accuse oneself”.

Mea culpa.

Fade to black.

Fin ...... (?)
11-20-2009
marct

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii

As he read through the eloquently written publication he came to a section defining national power. Informational power, it stated, was not an adjunct of but rather integral to Diplomatic, Military and Economic power.

Quote:

Information
126. Information enables the application of all 3 instruments. It is fundamental to the Government’s approach to crisis management, although the British position is that information does not form a separate instrument per se.[3] The dissemination of information, in accordance with a cross-Government information strategy, enables diplomatic, economic and military influence to be exerted in an effective and comprehensive way. At the same time, intelligence and information received across Government shapes planning and execution at all levels. Moreover, efficient management of information promotes unity of effort and understanding, and provides the opportunity to influence a range of audiences and activities in a coherent manner.
Page I-6
Note 3: Some other nations, such as the United States, treat information as a discrete instrument of power.

There is an interesting assumption implicit in this statement which, IMO, is unwarranted: it assumes that such an horizontal arrangement and management of "information" will actually be effective. While I certainly agree that "efficient management of information promotes unity of effort and understanding", the way it is stated ascribes efficient management of information without placing the responsibility for it in any one location. Having done a lot of reading about organizations (and worked with too many of them) this, IMO, is a recipe for disaster as each organization scrambles to lay blame for failures (and there will be many) on other organizations.

One other point about this is that by dispersing responsibility for "Information" across organizations, the individual organization is more likely to retain control over "important" pieces rather than let the "real enemy" (i.e. their bureaucratic counterparts in other organizations) get ahold of it.
11-21-2009
Tukhachevskii

Quote:

Originally Posted by marct

While I certainly agree that "efficient management of information promotes unity of effort and understanding", the way it is stated ascribes efficient management of information without placing the responsibility for it in any one location.

One other point about this is that by dispersing responsibility for "Information" across organizations, the individual organization is more likely to retain control over "important" pieces rather than let the "real enemy" (i.e. their bureaucratic counterparts in other organizations) get ahold of it.

I agree with a great many of your reservations. However, I can also see how treating information as the "property" of "stake-holders" (some New Labour speak there for you!) makes sense. Having a separate department or entity in charge of "Information" would divest those entites with intimate knowledge of their various fields with the ability to use such "knowledge" in a timely, appropriate and contextual manner. OTOH I agree with your proposition that doing so reduces the net or holistic power of "Information" weilded distinctly from D, M or E at the Grand Strategic/Foreign Policy level (of analysis). But I think the very notion of "Information" is what is problematic here not only sematically, but more fundamentally, ontologically. Does "Information" refer to the entire sum total of the knowledge contained in a (learning) organisation like the State or is it a very specific circumscribed region of activity (akin to that allotted to the PWE during the last World War)? The question, though banal to those better informed than myself, really calls into question how we define the relationship between Ideas, Structures and Processes (or Ideational vs Material power). It is an interesting and, IMO, particularly important question given the ideological/ideational component of the Long War which remains a (virtual) theatre of operations that remains under-exploited (at least in the open source media).
11-22-2009
marct
Quote:

Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii

I agree with a great many of your reservations. However, I can also see how treating information as the "property" of "stake-holders" (some New Labour speak there for you!) makes sense. Having a separate department or entity in charge of "Information" would divest those entites with intimate knowledge of their various fields with the ability to use such "knowledge" in a timely, appropriate and contextual manner. OTOH I agree with your proposition that doing so reduces the net or holistic power of "Information" weilded distinctly from D, M or E at the Grand Strategic/Foreign Policy level (of analysis).

Agreed - there are problems either way. I also agree with your next observation....

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii

But I think the very notion of "Information" is what is problematic here not only sematically, but more fundamentally, ontologically. Does "Information" refer to the entire sum total of the knowledge contained in a (learning) organisation like the State or is it a very specific circumscribed region of activity (akin to that allotted to the PWE during the last World War)? The question, though banal to those better informed than myself, really calls into question how we define the relationship between Ideas, Structures and Processes (or Ideational vs Material power). It is an interesting and, IMO, particularly important question given the ideological/ideational component of the Long War which remains a (virtual) theatre of operations that remains under-exploited (at least in the open source media).

I'm one of those people who uses Bateson's definition of information as "a difference that makes a difference". That's actually a very subtle definition when you get down to reading what he meant by it, and it has some very interesting organizational implications. Let me pull a couple of these out.....

Information: "a difference that makes a difference". This is based on three main concepts; stance based epistemology, sensory input and interpretive frameworks.
- stance based epistemology: epistemology is "how do we know what we know", and a stance based epistemology is one that is based in an assumed / implied and (sometimes) stated ontology that defines "differences" and ascribes relative importance to them (i.e. whether or not they make a difference).
- sensory input: think of this as the sum total of sensory input coming in from all sources; the raw "data" out of which people try to make some kind of "sense".
- interpretive frameworks: this is how you parse the sensory input, assign values to it and abstract patterns from it; a form of "data processing" that produces results that are often reflections of the process rather than the data.
Okay, let's play with some of the organizational instantiations of this....

1. Given that different organizations have different foci, different "stances", they will develop different epistemological tools and different ontologies to analyze the same sensory data. At first glance, this would support the diffusion of "information" in a horizontal manner. However, there is a problem with that in that what is communicated between the silos will be value and stance laden "knowledge" rather than "information" or sensory data.

2. In an ideal information environment, and we never really have that :wry:, sensory data would be available to all organizations that have a "need to know". This is totally different from making knowledge products available (i.e. the processed sensory data). This would serve two functions. First, it allows analysts to apply their own stance point epistemologies to the "raw data" and, at the same time, apply their own values and stances. I would view this as one of the core functions of an "I" - based organization; collation of all available sensory data. The second function it would serve is as a quality check on the information processing tools in the sense of moving away from "Truth" with a capital T, and towards a set of topological boundaries on processing efficacy (i.e. this type of processing works really well [80%+] in this instance, but only 20% in this other type). This helps to guard against the "if you only have a hammer, everything looks like a nail" syndrome.

3. "information", at least in the sense of processed information aka knowledge products, is always aimed at an audience: it is "rhetoric" in the sense of attempting to produce changes in perception and action in the audience in accordance with the design wishes of the producer. This is a freakin' tricky skill set that goes far beyond the simplistic understandings of many IO, PSYOPs and marketing people, mainly because of the ethical requirements inherent in it.

"How", I can hear a mumble, "did ethics get into this?"

Simple, "ethics" in this case has jack to do with IRBs or disciplinary based ethical codes and everything to do with the long term survival and prosperity of the larger group (society) involved in the production of knowledge products. It is, really, the study of 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th order, long term, social and individual effects - think History and Moral Philosophy a la Heinlein.

Unfortunately, you just can't trust an organization of any type to be "ethical" in this manner. Organizational ethics are based on organizational survival and prosperity at best; at worst, they are based on maximizing the resource acquisition of the individuals controlling the organization at the expense of the rest of the organization (think Bernie Madoff).

This means that to give us at least some of the safeguards required, we would need at least three, separate, "I" organizations: one for collating sensory data, one for QCing epistemological tools and ontologies, and one for producing specialized knowledge products at the grand strategic level.

Well, and we might want to add in one or two floating QC check organizations as well, just to try and keep everyone honest and ethical as well :D. Now I know I'm in fantasy land.....
11-22-2009
Tukhachevskii

Quote:

Originally Posted by marct

I'm one of those people who uses Bateson's definition of information as "a difference that makes a difference".

Would you be able to provide a reference for Bateson?
11-22-2009
Tukhachevskii

Further thoughts...Principles of war for the Rider and the Horse (a la Bismarck)

My reading of JDP 01 (2nd Ed) British Defence Doctrine continues apace following the debacle of the past few days. But it has come to my attention that, for obvious reasons (culture, history, experience, et al), the British and US “Principles of War” for all their common foundations differ in some very important respects. Aside from the fact that UK doctrine stresses ten principles over the US espousal of nine it was the lack/absence of the principle of “unity of command” in the British Doctrinal Publication that really caught my eye. In JDP 01 we find “Cooperation” (2-6) instead of “Unity of Command”. The differences in wording and subtext of both “unity of command” and “cooperation” are telling if only as indicators of the strategic culture (and self-image) of each state- the one a Superpower and the other a former Great Power (now perhaps a fair to middling Power)- and their differing understandings of the meaning of alliance;

“Cooperation
222. Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers,burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.
223. It is based on team spirit and training and relies on 3 inter-related elements:mutual trust and goodwill; a common aim (or at least unity of purpose); and a cleardivision of responsibilities, including understanding of, and compensation for, the capabilities and limitations of others. Within alliances or coalitions, potentially disparate goals and interests need to be harmonized, and political and military cohesion promoted and protected, to ensure solidarity in the face of difficulties or dangers, and to preserve overall unity of effort.”

“Unity of Command.
The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority. It’s an old adage that whenever two people get together, one of them must take charge.” [From USMC Tactical Fundamentals, MCI-7510B from www. marines.cc, p. 7)

It was that last sentence that reminded me of Bismarck’s famous statement that “in an alliance there is always a rider and a horse”.

OTOH the British principle of “Cooperation” may also point to the continued problems of “Jointery” (an unwieldy neologism if ever there was one) as defined in Joint Doctrine Note 1/09 “The Significance of Culture to the Military” where it states that

“d. Jointery. While ‘Jointery’ has greatly increased the interoperability of the front line commands, the single-Service cultural differences continue to create a demand for mutual understanding based on a more honest and open acknowledgement of respective strengths and weaknesses.” (3-2)

But it may also point to “friction” (linguistic or otherwise) in the smooth operation of the (mythical) “Anglo-American Special Relationship”...or, alternatively, to the very different traditions of (Continental warfare- coalitions, alliances, etc. versus that of an essentially isolatoinist tradition which still sees the US ultimately as the lone sherrif acting with or without the aid of deputies)...

“310. Alliances and Coalitions. Welding together the elements of an alliance or coalition into an effective team, in addition to political acumen, patience and tact, requires cultural sensitivity. The effect of previous wars and operations on different nations’ military cultures may be manifest in differing attitudes to risk and decisionmaking. Language and cultural differences may result in the incorrect interpretation of intent. It is also easy for native speakers to use their superior grasp of the language to confuse or patronise non-native speakers[!], even inadvertently. Individuals should consider their speed of delivery, choice of vocabulary, and use of potentially hard to translate metaphors or humour, when in multi-lingual environments. NATO provides good examples of the value of relationships over time, as organisational/cultural familiarity has done much to overcome language and cultural differences. However, individuals within even long-established organisations should continue to develop the necessary communications skills. It is not simply a matter of language; the US and UK armed forces share the same language [!; which see George Bernard Shaw] but have differences in operating cultures, often revealed through a different use of vocabulary”. (3-5)

Of course, it may also be the case that I have far too much time on my hands! (Hic).

What think the honourable members of the SWC?
11-22-2009
marct

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii

Would you be able to provide a reference for Bateson?

Sure thing....

The definition is on page 309 of Gregory Bateson, A Sacred Unity. See also Angels Fear and Mind and Nature for more on his thinking.