One of my rare disagreements with Wilf and Entropy...
Entropy:
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Waiting 90 minutes to receive air support has nothing to do with Gen. McChrystal's directive restricting use of kinetic air operations. The restrictions are meant to caution against the use of ordnance, not the use of aircraft. If it takes the Marines 90 minutes to receive Cobra support (an organic asset) then that means they were probably supporting another unit or were delayed because of some operational factor. As I understand it, there's nothing in the guidance that restricts getting an aircraft overhead - in fact that is typically encouraged because aircraft provide additional situational awareness for the ground forces in addition to being ready to employ munitions if needed.
Perhaps true but I suspect the lack of trust factor plays into it quite strongly -- someone in the chain decides unilaterally that the Troops on the Ground are being over reactive and deliberatley slows the process by asking "Are you sure you need Air..." Add the FSC into the mix with FA assets or even the parent unit's Mortars and you get a rather bureaucratic process that all revolves around a certain lack of trust of the unit in contact to do what the observers (and if they aren't involved, directly and on the ground, in the contact that's what they are -- observers and not helpful ones at that...) think should be done...
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The author is assuming, wrongly, that aircraft are performing shows of force because they were denied authority to drop ordnance, which is almost never the case.
Just as a point of discussion, the so-called show of force is a bad technique. It is a bluff, pure and simple, a smart opponent will figure that out and will call it or, more likely, subvert it. It, IMO, should not be allowed if for no other reason than it builds very bad habits for a real war.
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One of the author's supporting anecdotes is wrong. There's now nothing in the op-ed to support the author's claims.
I believe that article, if accurate, supports my contention that a lot of second guessing by people who should not be doing that -- indeed, have no right or actually responsibility to do that -- is a significant problem in providing support. I'd be willing to bet big bucks it is THE significant problem. From that linked article:
"One of the majors told the investigators that he denied further requests for fire support “for various reasons including: lack of situational awareness of locations of friendly elements; proximity to the village; garbled communications; or inaccurate or incomplete calls for fire.”
Some of my best friends are Majors. However, I submit that a request from a Commander in contact got effectively turned down by a Staff Officer who had absolutely no business doing that based on his perceptions. I wasn't there and he may have been correct in doing so but I'd be willing to bet even more money that he erred. I've seen that kind of ill informed, over zealous and extremely risk averse second guessing from the rear occur way too many times..
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
More troops should equal less need for stand-off fires, because you should have greater freedom of action (more resources) in planning operations...Moreover stupid ROE poorly applied will always lead to trouble.
The latter statement is true and I totally agree. The former statement is correct but does not allow for the extremely risk averse US Army. While what you say is true, we as a Force are entirely too dependent on supporting fires and are reluctant to let Infantry do its job without the availability of massive supporting fires of some or all types. Totally dumb, tactically incompetent and will not hold up in war of more but it's reality...
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...while I think saying "hearts and minds" in baby talk, this kid comprehensively undermines, all the argument against the H&M policy by saying stupid stuff... if you do not study warfare or have never been taught about, do not comment on it.
Perhaps. However, I see a lot of people who have ostensibly studied warfare and who have in theory been taught about it make a lot of even far more ignorant statements... :mad:
This quote provided by SethB from the author of the originally linked article makes up for any ignorance shown elsewhere:
"...Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will."
Exactly.
Fire Support Coordination
The purpose of fire support coordination measures and fire support officers is to prevent friendly fire incidents from happening when artillery engages targets in an adjacent unit's area of operations. I believe the coordination measures came into being during the First World War and are based on the assumption of a linear battlefield in which friendly forces are usually on one's flanks. During the Meuse-Argonne offensive in 1918 Captain Harry Truman of the 35th Infantry Division was threatened with relief by his regimental commander for ordering his battery of 75s to fire into the 28th Division's sector when he saw a German battery setting up there only a few hundred yards from his position.
I agree with both of you.
She's saying what we're doing doesn't work but gets the details wrong. You're saying the system works. Not the same thing. :wry:
No way of knowing the specifics for cases of presumed or alleged lack of support. My point was that the system does work but that over caution and people problems intrude too often. IIRC, you also elsewhere have acknowledged what we're doing isn't working...
Our tendency for ill informed, over zealous and extremely risk averse second guessing from the rear has been around for years; it long pre-dates ROE in general and certainly the Afghan theater ROE of today. I experienced it in two long ago wars -- it is not a new phenomenon. My son has a couple of classics from Desert Storm as well as more from his current tours. :eek:
I do suggest the more restrictive ROE probably poorly interpreted encourage even more ill informed further over zealous and totally extreme risk aversion (and add that today's technology allows even more second guessing from further in the rear -- not a good thing). :rolleyes:
Both points based on long observation... :D
Oh -- and you're correct, they certainly are leadership issues. They're also even more so very much training and policy / doctrine issues...
Perhaps from the beginning
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Originally Posted by
Van
The article is fallacious from the beginning.
However, it is absolutely correct at the ending...
" Of course, all this is not to say that we should be oblivious to civilian deaths, or wage “total” war in Afghanistan. Clearly, however, the pendulum has swung too far in favor of avoiding the death of innocents at all cost. General McChrystal’s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.
Wars are always ugly, and always monstrous, and best avoided. Once begun, however, the goal of even a “long war” should be victory in as short a time as possible, using every advantage you have."
Truer words were never spake...
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With regards to firepower; yes, risk aversion is an issue, but in COIN strategy, it is more important to avoid inflicted collateral damage (thereby creating more insurgents) than it is to merely kill insurgents. The author clearly fails to grasp the underlying nature of COIN and is trying to apply an attrition mindset to a problem where classic attrition is irrelevant. To compound this, she also fails to grasp the scope of what Airpower brings to the fight.
Perhaps true. Also perhaps like me she simply does not believe a COIN strategy is at all wise, effective or efficient (in my case, most anywhere at most anytime and particularly now and in Afghanistan). She may even share my belief and that of others that COIN theory is fallacious and was predicated on wars of choice most of which were in the end proven to be a huge waste and that it evolved as a practice mostly due to lack of perceived options. That COIN efforts are not wise and to be avoided if at all possible is true for any nation and it is particularly true for the US -- we have historical examples out the ying yang of not doing it at all well.
I repeated an earlier quote of hers but it occurs to me it bears yet another repetition -- this time emphasizing the key point:"...Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will."
Emphasis added / KW. My point, perhaps hers also, is that we are excessively dependent on 'support' and are unwilling to trust most of our units to operate without massive backup -- which will almost certainly not be available at all times. Nor should it be. We are doing ourselves and many units a significant disservice and are using hardware to compensate for poor training and education.
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And why the heck is an Army guy defending Airpower like this? :rolleyes:
Well, somebody's gotta do it... :D
I'll defend it also and your comments on what it brings to the fight are of course quite accurate. The real question, to me, is should we be in such a fight? If so, why?
Time again for my Stonewall Jackson quote:
"War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end."
Thomas J. Jackson quoted by G. F. R. Henderson
Maybe the article authoress read that somewhere... ;)
Didn't read the article or comments, only selected it for the pictures.
Check the LINK. Note IFV friendly terrain. :D
Those mountains are why there's infantry, walking infantry, there. IFVs are useful but they also impose limitations... :eek:
As for Infantry in future wars -- METT-TC. Depends on where and who among other things. Always use the right tool for the job. ;)
True on both counts. But...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
The people mostly live in valleys and flat ground, not on mountains. The mountains make good photos, but the maps and satellite imagery is quite devoid of houses or even settlements on mountains.
Yep -- but those mountains are where the opposition frequently goes to hang out. Don't know about you but I'd prefer to not let them have any safe areas... :wry:
Many Armies have experienced a foe who fights among the people on level ground or outside the jungle and then retires to the hills or trees to recoup. Those who have allowed their enemy to develop sanctuaries elsewhere have suffered.
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Besides; I know people who would prefer IFVs even in such terrains (not my opinion).
So do I. Know some who'd prefer to use all mech, that is. As I said, time and place; METT-TC. There's a place for the mech force and for walking infantry. What has been proven to not work so well is to rely on mech forces to do walking work -- they won't do it, won't leave their vehicles if they can avoid it -- only if they have no vehicles will they work as foot mobile troops. The skills are not totally transferable (even if the US Army foolishly thinks they are... :mad:).