Some Links and a question
In light of bourbon's post above you may enjoy this from 2005 'Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy'
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2005Mar26.html
Which I found as a footnote in this ( http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Iran_102307/...and_Engage.pdf ), which is one of the better reports I have read on the subject. I checked out the footnote as it was the source for the rather surprising claim the US had approved plans for Iranian uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities which I had not previously been aware of.
The best document I have read so far is http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.u...trikeswork.pdf which has an excellent section on all the sites in Iran (hat tip davidbfpo & Jedburgh for that one).
The final link is to the latest IAEA interim report
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/h...iaeareport.pdf
And now for my question. As their is so little hard data and so much speculation when addressing important questions like 'how close is Iran to achieving reliable working centrifuge cascades?' we are often left with 'expert opinions' and in this area that is often from a think tank or similar. My problem is it seems to be getting harder and harder to find any kind of purportedly independent analysis that is really that. I am looking for a simple way to try and check out if the 'XYZ peace and freedom institute', or similar, are for real or a wholly funded by Lockheed's PR company. Can you help? I did find this http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch which is a Wiki trying to do pretty much what I need but when I tried to use it I found it had not yet got much data in it - at least not on the groups I was interested in.
New Report: "Confronting Iran: U.S. Options"
Published by the American Foreign Policy Council and McCormick-Tribune Foundation. I'd be happy to pass along a .pdf to anyone interested (it's too big to upload here).
Executive Summary
Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran looms large on the agenda of policymakers
in Washington. Over the past several years, it has become clear that the Islamic Republic is pursuing a massive, multifaceted endeavor to acquire a nuclear capability—and that it is making rapid progress toward this goal, despite pressure from the world community. Yet Iran’s nuclear program is just part of a larger picture. The Islamic Republic’s enduring support for terrorism, its growing and pernicious regional role, and its radical, uncompromising ideology currently also pose serious challenges to the United States, its allies and American interests in the greater Middle East. So far, policymakers in Washington have failed to muster an adequate response on any of these fronts. As a result, the Islamic Republic has gained precious time to entrench itself in Iraq, expand its support for terrorists and bring added permanence to its nuclear effort. The logical conclusion of the current status quo is a mature Iranian nuclear capability, continued Coalition casualties in Iraq, and emboldened terrorist groups across the region. If it hopes to avoid such an outcome, the United States must harness all the elements of national power into a strategy that focuses on three concrete goals vis-à-vis Iran: counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. This will require:
Diplomatic and informational efforts aimed at:
• educating the American public about the contemporary threat posed by the
Islamic Republic;
• enhancing existing broadcasting into Iran;
• expanding the reach of Western ideas within the Islamic Republic;
• leveraging new sources of media to better communicate with the next
generation of Iranian leaders;
• delegitimizing the current Iranian leadership;
• empowering regime opponents and;
• speaking clearly to the Iranian regime about the costs associated with their
continued rogue behavior.
Intelligence initiatives geared toward:
• reviving human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities within Iran;
• better accessing allied information on Iran;
• restructuring and reforming the existing intelligence bureaucracy to better
respond to—and coordinate against—the Iranian regime and;
• forging a new legal framework for intelligence operations that provides greater latitude for efforts to “get smart” on Iran.
Economic measures such as:
• exerting greater pressure on Iran’s trading partners;
• enforcing unilateral sanctions against countries and companies that continue
to do business with the Islamic Republic;
• considering the imposition of embargos and blockades, particularly on Iran’s
vulnerable energy sector and;
• elevating divestment efforts from the state to the federal government level.
Military measures, among them:
• conducting a comprehensive assessment of Iran’s operational and tactical
vulnerabilities;
• building the capacity for unconventional warfare within Iran;
• targeting Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal as a way of downgrading its offensive
and nuclear capabilities and;
• severing Tehran’s ties to its terrorist proxies—with force, if necessary.
The United States stands at a crossroads. It has become increasingly evident that security and stability in the greater Middle East, as well as American objectives there, hinge upon America’s ability to confront and defuse the strategic challenge posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. And yet, our capacity to do so is rapidly dwindling. Soon, America will be left with just two options: to allow Iran to “go nuclear,” thereby cementing the expansion of its radical revolution, or to use military force to prevent it from doing so. A comprehensive, multifaceted strategy that employs all elements of American power is needed to prevent such a choice. Such an approach is outlined in the pages that follow. Our hope is that American policymakers will use
the limited time that remains to implement it wisely.
The above message was brought to you by the
same folks who five years ago said Saddam DID at the time have WMD... :rolleyes:
I think you need to dig a little deeper. There are
a lot of folks involved with a lot of different agendas. While there are elements of truth in what you said, there are those who have quite different agendas playing in the game. You linked to the old Team B bit -- that's an example of bending one way -- there are also those who bend the other way.
It ain't simple and I look forward to your interface with the intel community at echelons above reality. ;)
Them Straussians again...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
tequila
JeffC - The same people who viewed it as politically advantageous to pimp the Iranian nuclear threat will continue to do so. Casting dark hints of treason, incompetence, and Chamberlain-esque appeasement at the less-alarmist elements of the American intelligence community is old hat to them - they did it over Iraq, and they will now do it over Iran. Some have been doing it since the "
Team B" days. For them facts and intelligence do not really matter - what matters is that our various rotating enemies are irredeemably evil and thus will always have the worst intentions, the worst weapons, and the most dangerous capabilities.
Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence. (By Which We Do Not Mean Nous). Gary J. Schmitt and Abram N. Shulsky, 1999. (PDF)
Let's say that is valid. But it does not appear to have worked out...
Originally posted by JeffC:
Quote:
The bottom line is that when you strip away all the B.S., Tehran's ruling clerics are smarter negotiators then anyone in the West has given them credit for. They don't want a war. They want what we will give them in exchange for not building something that they've managed to convince our "brain-trust" that they've got.
....for Iran. What they have gotten so far out of all of this is a ratcheting up of economic sanctions, along with a concerted effort by the West (US, in the lead) to cripple Iran's economic access to capital (at least through the IRGC).
The real problem is that IF the 2007 NIE is valid in it's conclusions (and again, assume it is valid), there is actually (from a political viewpoint) greater justification for continued, if not increased economic sanctions against Iran, with the goal of further extending out their development cycle in any attempts to develop a nuclear capability.
From a purely political standpoint (if I'm a pol) with the 2007 NIE being out there, I don't want military intervention, but I certainly want to make sure that Iran knows that any path they take toward developing a nuclear capability will be as expensive and drawn out as it can possibly be (with our complements).
And if Iran did in fact reverse their trend toward developing a nuclear capability in 2003, and it can be even partially attributed to the effects of economic sanctions at that time, well, what's the reason for the West to discontinue those?
I mean, if the goal for Iran was to deal something that was mostly all smoke & mirrors for something tangible, well, looks like that deal is blown. The 2007 NIE just blew that type of deal away.
I'm looking at this from a pol standpoint and trying to figure out where all the 80% who are pretty much in the middle of the road are going to go with all of this.
Thoughts?