A very short reading list
Taken from a WoTR column by Shashank Joshi.
History of resistance in the hills
By coincidence I caught up with my reading pile today, amongst the pile is a small journal 'Durbar' by the Indian Military History Society and an article 'Fighting The Nagas, 1832-1880'. In summary the hill tribes resisted Imperial encroachment into their land, fighting ended in 1880 and during WW2 the Naga tribe was stauchly loyal (Kohima is nearby). Their website:http://imhs.org.uk/
One hill town, Khonoma, has a famous fort and it has a plaque showing its history and rebuilding last in 1990 (not clear why) and in 1956 when Indian rule was resisted (as below).
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-X...2/DSC00419.JPG
The image is from one of the first tourist films of the area (at 1.47):http://sadanandsafar.blogspot.co.uk/...d-village.html
Fighting Insurgency With Politics: The Case of Bihar
A long Carnegie report. From the introduction:
Quote:
Poor and weak countries plagued by violence seem to face a chicken-and-egg problem: a lack of resources appears to constrain their ability to fight violence, while violence itself exacerbates poverty. Yet under Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, Bihar, one of India’s poorest states, was able to significantly reduce an insurgency that has plagued the region for over forty years. Bihar shows how particular political conditions cause states to be poor, weak, and violent—and how careful application of political tactics can reduce violence even in places with few resources and low state capacity.
Link:http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06...-of-bihar/j1n0
Maoists are slow to change their strategy
After the Bihar post above a "lurker" points to an October 2009 article by an Indian SME on the Naxalite / Maoist adversary, as they are slow to change their strategy it is helpful:http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2...cal-adversary/
Red Salute: India’s Maoist Maelstrom and Evolving Counterinsurgency Doctrines
A Journal article: Red Salute: India’s Maoist Maelstrom and Evolving Counterinsurgency Doctrines
The author is:
Quote:
Sajid Farid Shapoo is a highly decorated Indian Police Service officer with 18 years of progressively senior experience in sensitive and high profile assignments across India. His areas of expertise include ideologies driving various Jihadi organizations, ideological contours of Jihadi groups established at the national and international level and the early Islamic Period and the Shia Sunni divide.
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ.
Armed Forces (Special Powers Act), 1958, or AFSPA
The legal position of India's armed forces when engaged in internal security operations are governed by the AFSPA; not without controversy as this article explains:http://thewire.in/51089/way-applied-...es-need-afspa/
Accountability before the civil courts is well illustrated by this passage, with an incredible period in military detention:
Quote:
Another big difference is the production of an arrested person before a magistrate, which is the origin of most complaints. According to the CrPC, an arrested person to be produced within 24 hours of arrest. However, the AFSPA permits a longer delay if the situation warrants so.
Section 5 of the Act says the arrested person should be “made over to the officer-in charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay”. Several cases have been quoted in which the army failed to produce the arrested persons for several days, sometimes even months, taking advantage of the “least possible delay” clause. In one instance, the person presented before the magistrate had been (
in custody for) five years before. There is zero transparency in this procedure and it should be amended keeping in mind human rights angle.
Keeping India Safe : The Dilemma of Internal Security
Thanks to a "lurker" for the pointer to this new book and the precis cited in part states:
Quote:
Security and intelligence specialist Vappala Balachandran analyses the shortcomings of India's security system in Keeping India Safe. He traces the origins of the problem, makes a case for reducing the burden on the police to make them more efficient, and offers solutions to fix the system.
The author:
Quote:
Vappala Balachandran is a former IPS officer and a security and intelligence specialist. He retired as Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, in 1995. He was also a member of the high-level committee which looked into the police performance in response to the terror attacks in Mumbai on 26 November 2008.
Link:https://www.amazon.com/Keeping-India.../dp/9352644751
Reviews for 'Keeping India Safe: The Dilemma of Internal Security'
Via the author two reviews from India of his book (Post 196 refers).
From a former paramilitary police officer:
Quote:
a valuable addition to the literature on the subject.
Link: http://indianexpress.com/article/lif...-safe-4772030/
One passage from the second:
Quote:
The importance of ....Keeping India Safe.... is that it drives home the point that infirmities in our national security apparatus have long been in the making and it would take a long time to fix this leaking ship, and that partisanship or ultra-nationalistic rhetoric would not do the trick. The fault-lines that we choose to incur today will come to haunt us years later.
(Later) A useful book to have on the shelf.
Link: http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sun...ra/437249.html
Indian COIN: neither conciliates or coerces effectively
Two reports, first an Indian newspaper with official statistics after this headline and sub-title:
Quote:
More security personnel were killed in Maoist-hit areas than in Kashmir: Govt; The ministry said 2017 witnessed 504 incidents of Maoist violence, which is more than double the number of militant attacks in J-K where 194 such incidents were reported until July.
Link:http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-...Mb0lz873K.html
Then a commentary by a SME @ CSIS via Lawfare, whose Editor's introduction is:
Quote:
Insurgencies have plagued India throughout its modern history, and several remain active today. Until recently, it seemed that the Indian government was making progress, however fitfully, in reducing the scope and scale of the violence. Sarah Watson of CSIS argues that today Modi's government is dropping the ball. After significant gains, India's counterinsurgency campaigns are stalling, and the government appears unable to either conciliate or coerce effectively.
Link:https://www.lawfareblog.com/indias-c...-warning-signs
Terrorism and Succesful CT strategies
Within this large document is a "gem", an article by Lt General (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia, former Commander in Chief, Indian Army’s Central Command; it tackles insurgency and terrorism.
Link:http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uplo...Index-2017.pdf