Tequila's link is interesting
Quote:
Originally Posted by
tequila
Maybe it's not a purely cultural clash at all:
Looking at the numbers, is the rate any different or is the total number of these incidents increased because of more contact between trainer and trainee in a volatile and idiosyncratic environment, depending on the particular situation?
What I mean to say is that I know the numerator of these incidents. What's the denominator? Anyway, the overall rate being the same may not matter in the war-of-narratives, where everyone is probably correct in one way or another. We have a mix of things going on, I'd bet, but I'd only be betting. I have no idea.
BTW, how does one grade such an incident? Is the Taliban ringtone incidental, is this purely a personal matter, how does one determine a metric based on the story told in Tequila's linked article?
This is an interesting link, too (from 2010):
Quote:
The Taliban have infiltrated the Afghan army and police, a recently-retired United Nations official has warned.
Dr Antonio Maria Costa, former head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said Taliban sleeper cells had been set up inside the security forces.
They had already carried out a number of attacks and were planning further attacks on Nato-led troops, he said.
A spokesman for the coalition forces said infiltration was a rare problem and most Afghan troops were loyal.
Dr Costa's comments come as the coalition is preparing to hand over control of the country's security to Afghan forces by 2014, the BBC's Gerry Northam reports.
Meeting the handover target in four years requires 141,000 new recruits to be found within a year - more than the current size of the Afghan army.
There are fears that the Taliban are taking the opportunity to enlist insurgents into the ranks.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11464175
The standard Western punditry argues a lot about timelines and endates. I see less punditry about others reacting to our signaled plans to build up the Afghan security forces. For every signal we send to stay, we get local and, shall we say, regional, signals to go. I think. Well, I don't know. Thinking aloud here....
1. Did we go too big, too fast?
2. Is our signaling to stay, instead of keeping mum on our plans and having some element of surprise and initiative, the real problem,and not our signaling to go?
3. How do lone wolf incidents play into the Taliban narrative - and how do they relate to what we do? What should be considered a lone wolf incident?
4. How does one tell a lone wolf incident from a personal and individual "culture" clash between two individuals?
5. Are we interpreting a certain level of local violence as something new and different and relating to "us", when it's simply the environment and our place in it?
6. What does "infiltration" mean, and what constitutes infiltration in an environment such as Afghanistan?
And so on....
Does JMA have a point? These incidents were bound to happen? Even if we predicted it, could we realistically have done things differently, like slowing recruitment, educating the larger public, better counterintelligence? I don't know. Wonder what you all think.
British Army adviser with ANA in Helmand
The author of this commentary is:
Quote:
.. the British Army adviser to Brigadier Shirin Shah, Commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in central Helmand...Lt Col Charlie Maconochie is the Commanding Officer of 3/215 Brigade Advisory Group and 3rd Battalion The Rifles..
Much of the article will be familiar to readers, this paragraph with my emphasis is of note:
Quote:
The catalyst for the majority of insider attacks appears to be a mix of personal grievances, cultural disparities and psychological distress. The largely unreported number of attacks by Afghan soldiers on their own forces bears this out. Insurgent involvement in some attacks should be seen as a desperate act by an enemy that is under growing pressure from increasingly confident and capable Afghan security forces. There is simply no evidence of any widespread insurgent infiltration of the Afghan forces.
He ends with the official mantra:
Quote:
Our campaign plan is on track, but we still have much work to do as advisers. At this vital stage, we must not let anything knock us off course.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html