A Grim Future For Russia’s Nuclear Sub Fleet
From War Is Boring: http://warisboring.com/a-grim-future...bmarine-fleet/
Introduction:
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In March 2017, Russia’s new Yasen-class nuclear attack submarine Kazan launched at the northern port city of Severodvinsk. Perhaps the quietest Russian submarine ever, the event was further evidence the Kremlin can still build capable and lethal subs capable of a variety of missions, including cruise-missile attack.
But it won’t be enough. The Russian navy — already badly depleted since the collapse of the Soviet Union — can’t quickly replace most of its existing nuclear submarine fleet, which is approaching the end of its collective lifespan. The outcome will likely mean a shrinking of the Russian nuclear submarine force in the years ahead.
Why Russia's Once Superpower Navy Is in Big Trouble
Ambition meets shipyards, a commentary that ends with:
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Long story short, Russia’s navy is in bad shape, and Russia is in no shape to rebuild it. In the foreseeable future, Russia should commit to naval projects that it absolutely requires, and that it does well. This mostly means a nuclear submarine flotilla capable of posing a deterrent threat, and a small surface fleet tasked with managing routine maritime maintenance operations. Anything more is probably too much of a reach.
Link:http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the...trouble-21796?
The Evolving Nature of Russia‘s Way of War
Thanks to a "lurker" for the pointer to this recent article in Military Review, The Evolving Nature of Russia‘s Way of War by Lt. Col. Thomas (which I have not read).
Quote:
This article discusses the three Russian military articles about which most Western military analysts specializing in Russia have focused their attention over the past four years. Unlike other analyses of those articles, this one offers a different perspective in that it compares them side by side, examining the text of the original versions and not merely the press reports about them.
(Later) All three articles focus on developing trends in warfare, the changing character of conflict, and the need for new forms and methods of fighting. Owing to the prominence of the authors, they may be taken as representative of prevailing Russian military thought at the highest levels.
Link:http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journ...as-Way-of-War/
Russia’s Evolving Electronic Warfare Capability: Unlocking Asymmetric Potential
From The Jamestown Foundation: https://jamestown.org/program/russia...ric-potential/
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 58
By: Roger McDermott
Quote:
Since first initiating the reforms of the Russian Armed Forces in the fall of 2008, Moscow has developed a number of complimentary niche capabilities. The unifying themes of these reforms have been asymmetry and the recognition that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed. In large part, this has meant the adoption and integration of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) in the Armed Forces, itself a reflection of the move away from platform-based operations to operating in a networked-informational environment. One critical component of this shift has been in the level of progress in electronic warfare (Radioelektronnaya borba—EW) (see EDM, March 6). While this might appear abstract, Russian military scientists and top brass treat the task of EW development quite seriously, seeing it holistically as part of a greater effort to counter a high-technology adversary. Recent developments in this important field were addressed in an interview by the chief of the EW Forces, Major General Yury Lastochkin. His comments reinforce his published work and that of other Russian EW specialists, as well as shed fresh light on the potential deterrence value of these combined niche capabilities (Krasnaya Zvezda, April 16)...
The End of the Prague Spring – Fifty Years On
A reflective article on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which provides some interesting comparisons with the Ukraine more recently:
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But looking back at Operation Danube there are some quite striking parallels between the processes that led Brezhnev to approve intervention in August 1968, and more recent acts of Russian policy, not least with reference to Ukraine.
(Ends with) Ultimately, Operation Danube served only to delay by two decades the disintegration of a discredited system that could only govern at the point of a bayonet.
Link:https://defenceindepth.co/2018/08/20...ifty-years-on/
