Refinement of the Question
All -
Thank you for the comments thus far. I am looking at the tactical level wargame, not unlike the MDMP that we currently use. My questioning is not based on a "game" or "sim", but the thought process required to understand competitors, tribes, etc. Further, I am not convinced, based on personal experience, that one can completely understand every effect on the battlefield. Nor am I attempting to develop a product to predict the future. However, I do propose that TTPs, good practices, in conjunction with current business models can provide an estimate of actions, reactions and counteractions.
I envision input from HTTs, PRTs, and others that provide insight and perspective to a unit's battlespace.
I understand John Nagle's comments that humans are involved and we cannot completely predict their actions. I concur, but submit we can do a better job of understanding trends, causes, and effects.
Regards
John
Pay attention to Eden. He's got it right
Also add a couple of sharp SFC/MSG types to your Red Team -- go for SFCs at a minimum because most have no problem speaking truth to power. Stop at MSG because they have not yet learned to make all their answers politically palatable. The NCOs will play dirty, even most CPTs will not. ;)
Another Two Cents from Another Person
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Warfare has never been linear, and the number of variable is quantifiable. This is just irregular warfare as opposed to regular warfare. You merely have to replicate the Ends, Ways and Means in a form that delivers the product you want. FIGHTING Irregulars is not very different from Fighting Regulars. War gaming really only works at the tactical level, so I suggest that is the limit of your enquiry.
Do you mean "gaming" or simulation? What is the exam question? ( see REX ) Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner. Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = loosing points.
Irregular warfare generally requires greater discrimination in order to support the Policy = do not kill civilians.
I admit that I am new to this blog; however, I would like to respectfully disagree with Mr. Owen. I will start by saying that I am a current Army field-grade officer and CGSC student. Also, I have read many posts by Mr. Owen, and I find his comments to be largely lucid, intelligent, and well-said. Nonetheless, I feel obligated to disagree on many points in his post.
At first glance, there is nothing shocking (or shockingly wrong) with Mr. Owen's comments. However, as I read them more deeply, I think those comments are made without an appreciation for the complexity of a counter-insurgency.
First of all, he contends that
Quote:
Warfare has never been linear.
Many historians argue that linear warfare was the norm until 1939, when the German blitzkrieg defeated Poland and essentially altered the nature of combat. This strategy (coined "third generation warfare" by the United States in 1989) focused on maneuver, speed, surprise, and synchronization to overwhelm the enemy. So, historically speaking, warfare was ENTIRELY linear before 1939.
When Mr. Owen states that
Quote:
"Killing bad folks = gets points. Killing civilians = lossing [sic] points
I can't help but cringe a little. Clearly, killing civilians on a regular basis is not going to win any friends among the local population. However, "killing bad folks" is an oversimplification that borders on intellectual arrogance. First of all, how does one define "bad?" While this seems like an absurd question, there are countless levels of "bad," and not all of them should be solved with lethal fire. In many cases, it is actually preferrable to leverage lower-level criminals, insurgents, etc., as a way to glean more information about the higher-tier individuals. This is a fairly common practice in poorly-acted crime shows, but the fact is that it works on the ground in places like Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. So, no..."killing bad folks" does not necessarily get points. In some cases, the losses grotesquely outweigh the gains.
Finally, I take issue with the claim that
Quote:
Warfare today is no more complex than it was 3,000 years ago. If you assume it is, you've just backed yourself into a corner.
I'm certain that every generation of veterans believe -and justifiably so, in my opinion- that they are fighting a different kind of war. But at no other time in history have the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic warfare been so blurred. The actions of a few Soldiers on the ground can produce second and third-order effects that immediately impact upon national strategy. A good, albeit overused example, is the Abu Graib scandal. The level of complexity that young men and women deal with while deployed is significant, as are the repurcussions of their actions. The slightest mistake is leveraged in the information age by insugents looking to capitalize from the fog of war. As the first conflict since the explosion of the Internet, the War on Terror makes headlines, across the globe, within minutes. That burden is heaped on the shoulders of young officers, NCOs, and enlisted personel. I think, in response to Mr. Owen's claims, that if you assume warfare today is the same as it was for the Doughboys of WWI, then you have, in fact, backed yourself into a corner.
I apologize for rambling. Again, I respect 99% of what Mr. Owen says. However, I did feel the need to voice a different opinion on this one post. Thank you for listening.