I'd like to answer, but ...
...I cannot relate your reply to what I said.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jcustis
:wry:Are you negating the socio-economic, internal political, and information operations (at a national policy level) effects that factor heavily into lost COIN efforts? That seems to be the thrust of what you are saying when you literally discount COIN manuals as somehow unecessary because the "institutions that wrote them" did not win.
I'll take a shot at this anyway. I am not negating anything, just making a statement of historical fact (not gospel, history being a slippery thing). Whatever the social-political-info factors, the folks who write these manuals write from an institutional background of losing at 4GW. Nor did I say that COIN manuals are unnecessary. I have written dozens of articles saying just the opposite. But we do need a realistic perspective in order to see our peril. Harsh truths of 4GW.
As for the discussion of winners at the game of foreign occupiers vs. local insurgents, I was summarizing two articles I wrote about this, based on several chapters in van Creveld’s book. Things get dropped in this process of abstraction. Here’s a summary of an upcoming article of mine. I apologize for the length.
Consider only wars since WWII. Many things changed at that time, including Mao’s development of 4GW into a mature form.
For analytical purposes, we can say that since WWII 4GW’s come in two types, reflecting the degree of involvement of outside states (obviously there are many other ways to characterize 4GW’s).
1. Violence between a government and insurgents (both sides can comprise any number of factions; there can be more than 2 sides). Governments often beat insurgents, even insurgents with foreign assistance (although this improves their odds). The local government leads in such areas as making political reforms, setting tactics – and casualties, although it may have important or even decisive foreign aid.
2. Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners. We’ll call these wars of national liberation, locals vs. foreign occupiers (however well-intended, if foreigners lead they’re likely seen as occupiers by the insurgents). Insurgents almost always win these, with three special cases which should not obscure this key point.
First, many 4GW’s are still in progress, such as in Israel (Jewish immigrants taking and holding land, with quasi-cooperation of the colonial ruler) and Palestine (Israel still holds a few pieces). Iraq and Afghanistan.
Second, as always there are borderline cases. Like Northern Ireland -- how foreign are the English? Third, what is the minimum threshold? At what point does it become an insurgency? Do you consider as insurgents the violent leftist groups in Europe and America that operated 1970-2000?
The question frequently occurs of who is the “winner”: the locals or the western power giving assistance (e.g., the Malaysian Emergency). As an example, to help us to see both sides of the question, consider the American Revolution. Lincoln did not say “Four score and seven years ago France brought forth on this…” We could not have done it without France’s aid, but it was our victory.
There is no such thing as an original idea!
slapout9, do you have a name, title, or other reference? I would like to see (and cite) this.
One of my early descriptions of this is in a January 2007 article.
Part four of a series about the US expedition to the Middle East
if that's too complex, here's the short version...
Things changed in mid-20th century. Since then..
a. If there is a "real" government, insurgents probably lose -- unless they have significant help from outside, and esp if they have nearby sanctuaries.
b. If there is not a "real" government -- per the usual pol sci list of attributes of gov't to measure legitimacy -- and foreigners lead the war, then the insurgents will probably win (if they can work up to a reasonable size).
Foreigners never lead the war when there is a "real" government. Sometimes insurgencies take generations to resolve.