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Russia's ambassador to Sweden, Viktor Tatarintsev, recently warned Sweden that if it joined NATO, Russia would respond with "counter measures." Unfortunately, this was not an isolated threat. It is part of a pattern of earlier threats issued by senior Russian leaders to Sweden and Finland to bully them to comply with Moscow's wishes over their alliance choices. Stockholm and Helsinki must not underestimate these threats and should make more of an effort to deter Russia from carrying them out. Deterring Russia will require greater political attention to this problem and more defense capabilities against this unconventional military threat.
Tatarintsev made it clear that these threats come directly from Russian President Vladimir Putin. The ambassador specifically warned that "Putin [himself] pointed out that there will be consequences," if Sweden or Finland try to join NATO. What kind of consequences are the Russians threatening? According to Tatarintsev, Russia's response will be "of the military kind." These threats are very troubling because Russia is being very explicit that if Sweden and Finland move closer to NATO membership, Russia's response will be a lot more dangerous than simple diplomatic criticism. Moscow has already demonstrated it is willing to overreact to misperceived threats to Russia's security.
Just as Russia warned Georgia and Ukraine not to draw closer to NATO, senior Russian leaders have made several explicit and dangerous statements about the relationships between Finland and Sweden with NATO. During a visit to Helsinki in 2012, then Chief of the Russian General Staff General Nikolai Makarov issued the stark warning that "cooperation between Finland and NATO threatens Russia's security."
Last year, one of Putin's advisors, Sergei Markov, made even more provocative comments. According to Markov, "Finland should think of the consequences, if it ponders joining NATO. It must ask could joining start World War III." Russian leaders want to let Finland know that if they choose NATO, they should not omit the possibility of another world war.
It is tempting to hope that this negative behavior is limited to exaggerated rhetoric from Russian leaders, but unfortunately, it is also being manifested through a more aggressive and interventionist Russian military policy against Sweden and Finland. The simulated attack trajectory of Russian bombers against Stockholm during the Easter weekend of 2013 was not an isolated case. According to Swedish defense minister Peter Hultqvist, "It's a general fact that Russia is carrying out bigger, more complex, and in some cases more provocative and defiant, exercises."
There are also the recent cases of mysterious submarines violating both Swedish and Finnish territorial waters. In addition, Russia announced in January a large expansion of a military base 50 kilometers from the Finnish border. Moscow says it is turning this into a major base for its operations in the area and plans to build 14 airfields in this facility. It is hard to see how building so much military infrastructure can serve a defensive purpose.
Regrettably, the leaders of Sweden, Finland, and NATO have chosen to downplay all this evidence, even though the Russian foreign ministry has stated explicitly that its "greatest concern is over the increasingly strong convergence of Finland and Sweden with NATO."
As occurred in Crimea and Donbas, Russia will probably not wage a conventional war of conquest against Sweden or Finland. Putin is more likely to combine hybrid warfare backed by conventional military superiority to seize just enough Swedish or Finnish territory to create a new frozen conflict and make it politically impossible for either to gain NATO membership. Also, the smaller the amount of territory taken by Russia, the harder it will be for the Swedish and Finnish governments to justify full scale warfare to regain them.
Just as it did when it invaded Ukraine, Russia will unleash its propaganda tsunami to confuse international opinion with fabricated tales of how it was wronged by the target country, of lies by the West, and ludicrous denials of the full extent of its military aggression. This new campaign will not only misinform the public and the media, but also give sufficient excuse to delay a response and to divide decision makers in Stockholm, Helsinki and the NATO capitals.
Putin's willingness to cross lines and take unnecessary risks has already surprised Western leaders multiple times; take, for instance, the cyberattack against Estonia in 2007, the war against Georgia in 2008 and last year's invasion of Ukraine. Finland and Sweden must not be surprised if Putin intervenes to stop them from joining NATO membership. The leaders in Helsinki and Stockholm must increase their national deterrence against this contingency. Some important steps have been taken (such as incremental increases in defense spending, assignments to reserve forces and acquisition of new military capabilities), but they are not sufficient and fall short of the defense capabilities requested by Swedish and Finnish military leaders. Finland's recently announced plans to reform its Army rapid response units and to re-examine the defense of the Aland islands are a good examples of the type of steps that need to be taken to improve operational readiness and deterrence.
The decision to apply for NATO membership belongs solely to the people of Finland and Sweden. They should be able to make that decision without military threats from Russia. As popular support grows in Finland and Sweden to discuss the merits of joining NATO, Helsinki and Stockholm should also take precautions to deter Russia from trying to take that choice away from them.