"Who are you arguing with?" - Carl
The voices in my head, apparently.
There is more than one conversation going on:
1. If we had intervened in Syria earlier could we have prevented a jihadist infiltration? I doubt it but here we can agree to disagree.
2. The process of writing FM 3-24 and the political battles behind the scenes in the military is very interesting to me and has been documented now in books, some papers, certainly here at SWJ. The reflection and documentation will be argued forever, I suppose, given the nature of the subject.
Yes, small was have certain practices that are generally accepted but if you look at the behind the scenes arguments different scholars and practitioners of small wars wanted to focus on different aspects and objected to the focus of Army counterinsurgency doctrine as it was being written (for instance Bing West).
Reportedly, during the conference for that doctrinal manual he mentioned that what he was talking about in the Village was intrinsically different than population centric counterinsurgency, that his patrolling was at night killing insurgents. It wasn't focusing on building wells and schools as a first step to draw out insurgents. Those books that you talk about that detail small wars good practices? The practices were different, in, well, practice.
That's the argument, that Army doctrine has made it a one size fits all situation. The counterargument is that people don't really follow doctrine but if that is the case, then the whole thing is messed up either way.
It is the focus and emphasis of one tactical example over the other that is the argument, they are not all equally emphasized in the different COIN strategies. This is what I believe Colonel Gentile means when he says the enemy is absent in the current doctrine. You are saying the same thing too, actually.
3. By evidence I mean historical evidence, intelligence, sociological evidence, psychological evidence, terrain as evidence, etc.
For instance, on the art, there is good art and bad art. Good art realizes that a heavy logistical train through insurgent territory might be a bad idea; bad art thinks it can rescue this problem with better well and school building and patrolling. Good art vs. bad art.
I need to do a better job referring to the different things I've read to make my points. Upon reflection, I can see how confusing my comments are because I'm thinking of specific papers and books and how can you know if I don't tell you? I will try and do better.
The better part of valor is for me to track down those papers and perhaps discuss them on a thread here but I am shy to do this because I understand the tremendous pressure under which the papers are written. I also have no military experience. I do believe that they need to be discussed and "close read" carefully. The military folks can correct me if I'm wrong on certain things.
I mentioned the novel because it was a formative experience for Petraeus and lead to an interest in small wars and an interest in Galula, apparently. I think there is a paper in Salon about this and the reissue of the novel.
Douglas Porch is the scholar that has written on the French in Algeria and in his opinion Galula's impressions didn't match up with what actually happened when examining other sources.
Remember, there are lots and lots of sources and some evidence was probably never collected right? This is the situation in India where my poorer illiterate ancestors never left any record of their experience under the Raj.
By the way, the colonial government in India did do some good things (well, they were the government, they were supposed to do that) but the fantasy versions that are very popular in books and the historical reality based on historical evidence are different. I know that reality changes with interpretation but that evidence paints a very different picture than romanticized novels.
For instance, people call the Indian Mutiny the First Indian War of Independence. They never thought they were pacified, carl. Some never thought they were pacified. How's that for a trip?
Studying the diaries of, say, a British officer is great but to have a full picture you need to examine the stories of more than one person and try and match up the stories to evidence from the ground.
No, it's not science as hard science is understood but Military Science exists or we wouldn't be having this conversation.
This is what I meant by evidence. Artists, really good artists, research plenty.
Aargh, you people always draw me in when I tell myself, "that's it, I'm not commenting here anymore!"
I guess it's a compliment to all of you!
How We Lost The Syrian Revolution
Patrick Cockburn's article, cited by 'Red Rat' is good, but I also found this anonymous article by a Syrian in Aleppo of value. It starts with:[QUOTE]So what went wrong? Or to be more accurate, where did we go wrong? How did a once inspirational and noble popular uprising calling for freedom and basic human rights degenerate into an orgy of bloodthirsty sectarian violence, with depravity unfit for even animals? Was it inevitable and wholly unavoidable, or did it not have to be this way?[/QUOTE
Needless to say the answer is not optimistic.
Link:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...ppo-assad.html