I said this before somewhere...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Geronimo53
Future of the Army MRAP Force
I propose that the future Army MRAP allocations be limited to:
1. CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
2. Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
3. National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
4. Combat Training Centers [/B]
There is no need to distribute MRAPs down to every Army BCT or even form specialized MRAP units within those BCTs.
I would suggest expanding your unit profile beyond just BCTs. Route Clearance Engineer Companies and Combat Support MP Companies who patrol MSRs are two obvious canidates for MRAPs as organic systems as opposed to for deployment only.
Each of the National Guard Maneuver Enhancement Brigades will inlcude a combat arms bn (Infantry, CAB or Cav/Recon) as a rear area combat force. I think that should be another canidate.
There is also a need/requirement to train the system mantainers/mechanics.
Couple of interesting arguments there ...
Since I am a participant in a NATO C-IED Train-the-trainer course in Croatia, some of the points made are of immediate interest to me.
The principles and techniques we are taught here all stress on the importance of literally having "boots on the ground" when patrolling in an AOO with IEDs as a main threat.
I have no problem with that - even more - I fully concur with that.
The best "weapon" against an IED-network in my view is infantry doing foot patrols, showing presence, not only observing but controlling an AOO ...
But I still have the following question: what is from your point of view the ideal vehicle for supporting those infantry guys doing foot patrols?
x Is it the MRAP? - from what I've read so far, the majority disaggrees
x Is it an uparmored HUMMWV? (i hope i spelled that right) - from what I've heard from our instructors (all retired US Army with multiple tours as adivsors/trainers in Afghanistan and Iraq), because of its small size etc it is not.
Addendum: if the best weapon against IEDs is "boots on the ground", you need more than 2-3 dismounts per vehicle.
x Is it some kind of wheeled APC? Stryker, Fuchs, Pandur to name a few.
x Or is it just some kind of armored truck, like a MAN or UNIMOG with additional armor
I would be interested in your comments and maybe further information, especially since it is my job at home to train soldiers to be squad or platoon leaders at the Austrian Infantry School.
Johannes
Everyone is entitled to my opinion, Johannes U...
In order of your list, I'd vote for:
No -- MRAPs are the worst choice. Logistically, tactically and mobility-wise unsound in all aspects
No -- Poor vehicle; tries to be all things to all people and fails. Number of troops issue is secondary but does have the benefit of fewer casualties in event of a catastrophic hit.
Yes -- best choice, multi-task capable and designed as a combat vehicle for ANYTHING less than high intensity armored combat. Pandur or the Patria AMV would be my current choices as both offer many advantages over the Stryker.
No -- MRAP by another name; only saving grace is logistic commonality which the MRAP doesn't have.
And Wilf is right, the old METT-TC factors rule. Ignoring those factors is always perilous and the MRAP problems are that Troops Available will misuse them and the Enemy will find way to negate their already limited value.
As long as I'm here...
M.L.
I don't think that's what he wrote...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
M.L.
There are a couple of assumptions in this argument. The first is that "intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, proper patrolling techniques, and deployments" and MRAPs are mutually exclusive...While I see your point that MRAPs provide an opportunity for Soldiers to avoid engaging with the local populace, staying on the FOB does the same thing. It is a leadership issue, not a force protection issue...On the other hand, suggesting that no force protection is warranted simply because too much may inhibit mission accomplishment seems wrong...While casualties are a part of war,
the idea that we shouldn't do anything to mitigate risk is nonsense...
I think his point was that balance should be sought between the competing demands of mission and protection and the MRAP stacks the deck toward the latter at possibly excessive cost to the former. He also addressed the fact that we consistently and IMO wrongly downplay the harsh and unforgiving aspects of the job that is soldiering for some unfathomable reason. Among other flaws, that leads (or allows...) politicians to think wars can be successfully waged and concluded on the cheap. They cannot. Such an approach also deludes prospective entrants to the Armed Forces. A better approach is that old Marine recruiting poster below.
Poor leaders will not do what you correctly say is required and the presence of the MRAP provides not only an excuse but an incentive to do wrong. Good leaders won't have the problem but not all leaders are good -- some are atrocious -- and the poor can be encouraged to do better by tactically sound and sensible equipment choices rather than reacting to media hype and political spin. No one has a problem with force protection, the question is how to best balance that with mission parameters. The MRAP was a poor solution, politically forced and does not merit defense -- or retention in the inventory.