... according to your cloth
IMHO the Brits must use this opportunity to become realistic about what they will be able to achieve and afford militarily in the future.
The days of preparing for all possible scenarios is no longer possible or intelligent.
First, decommission Trident and associated navy infrastructure. It is noted with horror that Trident has been specifically excluded from the Defence Review.
I did speak about the value IMO of having 5 platoon companies and the same for rifle companies in a battalion with a corresponding increase in the Support Company strength. Worth consideration.
Then the Army Air Corps chopper strength must be radically increased for both attack and lift.
The problem is that there are insiders going to carry this out and the final decision will probably be taken on the basis of a compromise to keep sailors, soldiers and airmen least unhappy.
As has been discussed here (by me) is that the war productivity of the Brit army is very poor what with 18 month R&Rs between mere 6 month war tours. Change that and you can get a lot more bang for the buck.
Difficult choices lie ahead.
the truth is coming out... slowly
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
Gen Mackay is quoted as saying:
Quote:
The issue is whether or not our politicians, diplomats, intelligence services, civil servants and senior military have done enough, adapted enough, been innovative enough or courageous enough to make tough, and more often than not, unpalatable choices.
I don't think (and I say this once again) that all the blame should be laid at the feet of the above mentioned and let the battalion commanders and below get off Scott free. It is too easy for the more junior officers to try to deflect blame for a poor campaign in the direction of the generals and the politicos.
This is a better quote from Admiral Parry I suggest:
Quote:
...that those in charge of the mission had based their strategy on memories of missions in Borneo, Malaya and Northern Ireland and senior figures showed "considerable" resistance to "ditching the lessons from the past" rather than adopting the "radical and progressive ideas" which were needed.
This is why the military top structure needs a full overhaul.
Helmand: Anatomy of a Disaster
I am sure these articles have been missed, so Hat tip to KoW.
First on Afpak, with an opening line:
Quote:
Britain's Conservative-led government of David Cameron is busy in London wrestling with the question: just what has been going wrong?
Link:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...f+War-Reading)
The article has a link to a series of articles in The Times (now behind a pay wall), so just a hint from this available link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle7146449.ece
Plus a link to an earlier article, with a ten point strategy, note with retired General Mackay as interviewee: http://www.stephengrey.com/2010/06/a...n-afghanistan/
Lots to read, enjoy.
Defenceoftherealm is back
The UK-based blogsite is back, it has been for a few weeks after a long break and I missed its return:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/
Worth dipping into and has some interesting links, including a few now behind The Times pay wall.
This link is rather controversial and concerns UK defence, not in Afg.:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...antasy-enemies
UK death toll in Afghanistan conflict reaches 300
Not unexpected:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10360705.stm
Note:
Quote:
Some 34 of the 300 deaths have been from accidents, illness or non-combat injuries....Another 1,282 UK military and civilian personnel have been wounded in action since 2006, including about 388 who suffered serious or life-threatening injuries. Of those, 120 lost limbs.
I have shortened the BBC's Security Correspondent's accompanying column:
Quote:
Put simply, Nato doesn't have years to play with, it has months... What it means is that the Nato-led coalition will need to show demonstrable progress in the south - and soon - if the generals wish to retain their countries' political backing.
Sorry, that time has passed.
Another viewpoint and note the emphasis on Sangin before Kandahar: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...h-solider-dies
How much defence can we afford?
A long article by Max Hastings on the UK defence review and added here as it contains a previously unheard of "insider" report. The link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...e-afford.thtml
The report:
Quote:
A few months ago, for instance, Captain John Bethell of the Welsh Guards produced a formidably sceptical report, after serving as an intelligence officer in Helmand.
‘As an army,’ he wrote, ‘and as armed forces more generally, we have come to place increasing confidence in technological solutions — sensors and platforms — yet we have only begun to grapple with the task of engaging with the civilian population...
‘British forces, without an effective doctrine, rotate rapidly through six-month tours, with limited continuity, and pay lip-service to Northern Ireland experience without examining it in depth... Our forces today are “accidental counter-insurgents” — neither purpose-made for, nor ideologically committed to, the operations in which we find ourselves embroiled.’
Bethell’s strictures, whether justified or not, reflect a belief within the army that there is plenty of scope for doing things better. It was generals, not politicians, who in 2006 decreed the rash emphasis on holding fixed positions in Afghanistan such as Sangin at high cost.
Google refuses to locate the cited report and I suspect it appeared in a 'leak'. Note the author served with the Welsh Guards in 2009, when their C.O. was killed by an IED.