Agree the with the tough-guy rhetoric, but I think the insurgency had quickened and become so obviously a military challenge by 2004 that withdrawal would have been mooted regardless of an election or not.Quote:
1. I meant if not for the smells-like-AQ dimension of the conflict, we could have disengaged or downgraded our involvement long ago. We've gotten where we are because the administration has to seem "tough on terrorists."
That the 4th ID could have snuffed the insurgency is pretty implausible. 12,000 additional troopers would not have made much of a difference given the capital itself was not secured despite the flood of coalition troops there, much less the countryside or arms depots. They would have been 12,000 additional troops mostly concerned with securing themselves while surrounded by policy confusion as the national infrastructure was looted and burned.Quote:
2. There's lots that could have been done:
--Turkey could have played initially, allowing a more rapid stabilization of the Sunni Triangle by the 4th
--Europe, India, etc could have seen peacekeeping troops when there still was peace to be kept
--The Gulf States could have provided reconstruction assistance
--The whole world, but especially the EU, could have helped with strategic communications
No Indian or EU troops would have been committed without some degree of operational control. This was anathema to the Administration.
Likewise "strategic communications" - how would this have stopped the growth of the insurgency? The primary dynamics of this were domestic Iraqi concerns, not international in scope.
The amount of reconstruction assistance was not material to success or failure. Additional Gulf money would not have helped given the way money was being blown or stolen in 2003-2004 --- it would have disappeared in much the same way.
Again, I feel that the insurgency had ballooned to the point in 2004 that withdrawal would have been withdrawal under fire - politically impossible for any President. Throwing Chalabi the keys was recognized quite early as not even close to viable. He would have been dead or co-opted very shortly thereafter with no indigenous base of support. Sustained U.S. political control under the CPA was attempted by Bremer with his caucus plan, where elections would have been held with only CPA-approved candidates. This was mooted by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani - to go against him at that time risked bringing the religious Shi'i against the occupation.Quote:
3. By the time of the election, we were committed to massive involvement. I'm suggesting that if not for the election, it would have been easier to have begun disengagement earlier. Or, conversely, to have sustained U.S. political control until the Iraqis were truly able to manage it. I believe we had two viable options: throw the keys to Chalabi in the summer of 2003 and beat feet; or run the place for a decade. By splitting the difference, we got the worst of both.
Steve, you are much closer to Beltway types - was El Salvador really bandied about as a reason why we could succeed in Iraq? I don't recall reading any real comparisons in the op-ed or thinktank literature at the time, except for some somewhat specious "voting under fire" comparisons with the Iraqi elections in 2005.