young men and young states have similar motivations
Quote:
Originally Posted by
TheLapsedPacifist
Sorry Bob, I may have missed your point - hotel room still not available - so still no sleep and so my thoughts are as fragged as they were earlier!
I think that the state - non-state deter thing was my point. Yet, I thought that you were writing a paper on how to deter non-state-actors. Your last comment seems to suggest to me that deter is a reasonable COA against a state - because they make a cost-benefit decision and hopefully we have stacked the odds in our favour.
Whereas a NSA has a different worldview and therefore unresponsive - either because they are deluded or immune (e.g. different value set). And even if they are responsive - we have to demonstrate the lesson frequently because of the myriad of NSAs - which leads to my attritional point.
So what’s the secret?
And if I might modify your elephant metaphor - what we are doing is swinging at the balls, sometimes we hit them, but mostly we don't – when we miss we sometimes kick the elephant – which is big and strong. I mean there's no real evidence that places AQ at the centre of Muslim interest - whereas being male, my balls are most definitely at the centre of my interest – especially if someone is trying to kick them.
You will have to be willing to step away from what you believe to be true and attempt to see things from my perspective if you hope to understand. Actually, I see that a lot on here, people talking past each other because they are not curious about differing positions, so much as challenged by them. So they seek to defend what they already "know" rather than seek to understand something that does not fit within that comfortable circle.
I could take this elephant things several directions, but I will try to focus a bit myself. The balls by themselves won't cause much trouble, nor frankly, will the elephant without the balls. They are a team. We should not be trying to separate them from each other, nor should we be trying to help the rider (government) control the elephant, particularly if the rider was placed in his position by us.
But as you said, the elephant is getting powerful motivational messages from the balls and is likely to listen if not constrained by a steady hand on the reins by a caring rider, and a set of fair rules enforced by just rewards and punishment.
To deter the balls then, I do not target them directly except in a worse case situation where all else has failed. I focus on periphery. First the rider. Ensure the elephant knows that he is a rider of their choosing and work with the rider to ensure that he cares well for his charge, has just rewards and punishments and fair rules of law. Then the elephant himself. Treat him with respect and give him the space he needs and the opportunity to do those things that bring a sense of accomplishment to an elephant. For the most part, ignore his damn balls. They'll always be there, but he will not act out inappropriately often if these other factors are in place; and as the elephant matures and the rider becomes more comfortable and experienced in his role, the elephant will listen to the balls less and less every day.
So don't worry about trying to deter Bin Laden himself. Waste of time, kill the bastard. Don't try to rationalize with AQ directly either, they will think you are weak and pathetic and draw strength from your efforts. Seek to understand why the organization really exists (and to spread Islamism around the world and create a mighty Caliphate is NOT IT). This is indirect approach business. Focus on the needs of these long suppressed populaces, and on the poor governance that rules over them, and on the inappropriate influence the West has in this region. Create conditions that render AQ irrelevant and they are "deterred."
Or, you can just go kick the elphant in the Jimmy. Your call.
To all: Keep up the good discourse ...
your viewers in the peanut gallery are not losing interest. ;)
Just to keep the constructs in some sort of order, I'm looking at the positions (in this thread and several other current threads) as basically three:
1. Classic (conventional, establishment) counterinsurgency - e.g., Wilf as its proponent, joined by others.
2. Reformist counterinsurgency (the huge middle ground - which has its "conservative" and "liberal" wings, framing its own middle ground) - possibly most here at SWC ?
3. Revolutionary counterinsurgency - e.g., COL Jones seems to point in that direction (not quite Cord Meyer in his younger days - first three paragraphs in the last link are relevant to what I mean - but close IMO).
You are really not talking past each other; but are presenting very different constructs. Good work, all. :)
Actually, this is an extremely important perspective to understand
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I can't tell you, but if they're not cutting, they're not surgeons!
I've long believed that who you go to with your problem will shape remedy you are told to apply.
Go to a Priest, and he will recommend you pray.
Go to a bartender, and he will pour you a drink.
Go to your lawyer, and he will recommend you sue.
Go to a surgeon, and he will recommend surgery.
So, you are the head of a small country and you have been very focused on watching the balance grow in your Swiss accounts, but not so much on the concerns and needs of your populace. Western Governments have been very helpful in your endeavors, and extraction operations are in full swing. One day you look out your window and see that those malcontents in Provence X have taken up arms and are beginning to act out violently. You task your own security chief to do something about it, but not much changes and you suspect strongly that he has made some sort of "non-confrontation" pact with the rebels.
Meanwhile, the corporate heads of the western companies running the extraction operations have been lobbying hard back to their own governments about their concerns of potential disruption of vital resources (ok, their real concern is disruption of profits, but they know to shape their argument for the target audience). Ambassadors call on you and offer their assistance in your COIN efforts, and a Military coalition is formed and flown into your country to deal with the problem.
Now, if you ask a military officer what the solution to your problem is, what do you think he will suggest? After all, this is just a Small War, right?
Point being it is not the size of the war that determines the cause or solution to the problems that gave rise to the conflict. You must, as CvC warned, first understand what type of war you are in, not what size.
It reminds me of a significant emotional experience I had as an undergrad. I was studying forestry at Oregon State University, and was on an engineering track. Until I got to integration calculus, that is. My professor was a genius who would fill 5-6 blackboards with complex equations while he rapidly explained what he was doing. He would not, however explain steps based in Algebra or Geometry, as those were self-evident, and only focus on the calculus aspects of the problems. Now, those who have studied Calculus know that there are dozens of reducing formulas that must be memorized, and that there are a few basic types of problems. To solve an equation requires that one recognize first what type of problem it is, then set up the equation properly, and then simply apply the correct reducing formulae in the right manner to ultimately get to the correct answer. Simple, no?
Meanwhile, I was still trying to figure out the Algebra or Geometry step the prof had skipped. I was overwhelmed with data, and my circular thinking was causing me to think about options I didn't understand, and was preventing me from grasping the basics first and building from there. I earned a D+, but Dr. Stacey gave me an F so that I would have to take the course again.
Next term, I had a far less skilled TA, but my brain had time to finally commit the reducing formulae to memory, get up to speed on algebra and geometry, and then one day, like a curtain lifted, I could suddenly look at the problems and immediately recognize what type they were and apply the correct reducing process. I earned the highest score in the class.
This is why I am adamant (as is Galula) that COIN is civil government business. They own both the cause and the solution, and should never be absolved of that fact. Then, when the military comes in, I suggest highly that you call a specialist in this type of conflict to shape and implement the proper cure. These are big jobs, and there will be plenty of work for the total force, but use the right guys to scope the problem. SOF within the military are much like specialists within the Medical profession. Sure, you can have a general practitioner operate on your daughter's brain tumor, or, you can hire a specialist who focuses on that type of operation. The specialist if far more likely to be able to ID exactly what type of tumor he is dealing with and apply the correct treatment. The general practitioner may focus on surface issues, such as the size of the tumor, and prescribe the wrong approach based on that incomplete analysis of the problem.
Truth be told "Small Wars Journal" is a misnomer; but it has a nicer ring to it than "Populace-based Wars Journal."
So:
1. Be careful who you bring your problems to,
2. Size matters, but it does not determine the nature of the problem,
3. Causation is more important than Motivation, and that is more important than the tactics being employed, as one assesses a populace-based conflict and is shaping a program of engagement.
4. Never, ever, get in front of the Civil Government or the Host Nation when you assist them. You are there help fix them, not help them fix their populace.
All engagement must be tailored (and "none" may be the right amount)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
BW,
When are policmakers ever so enlightened? I think your theory is mostly sound but, as is often the case, people (politicians in particular) don't conform well to theories.
Secondly, one shouldn't assume there is only one solution to a problem and governance may not be the best. So I wonder if you are replacing one set of blinders with another since it seems you are arguing that, once deconstructed, these conflicts are always about governance.
Third, the US, as a third party in these conflicts, must operate within the constraints set by the host government or take our ball and go home. That latter option usually isn't feasible, so we end up with the nasty sausage-making business of trying to help and reform the host government at the same time. Take Afghanistan. For better or worse, our strategy is wedded to that government and, by extension, the governance it can potentially provide.
Fourth, as I've said before, there are limits to what "governance" can do. You may have the best government in history and there will still be people and groups who would rather go their own way and don't want any part. What do you do then? In Afghanistan, for example, this isn't uncommon.
Finally, and this is a point I've brought up before (and related to my third point), the nature of governance matters. What is it when one tries to impose an alien form of governance upon a populace? Is that governance or imperialism? That is happening in Afghanistan too. The West operates from a mindset that "Afghanistan" is a single nation with the clearly defined borders shown on a map. It has never been thus and there are many populations within that border who aren't interested in ceding authority to Kabul. How does your theory deal with populaces that are largely self-governing and neither need nor desire any "national" form of governance? These populations are not rebelling against "poor governance" since governance (outside their group) never really existed.
You see, I'm skeptical of this whole "governance" thing when it comes to Afghanistan. Our attempts to extend governance fail miserably because we don't understand the local conditions and we operate with a Western concept of what governance is supposed to be. We are wedded to the idea of a strong central government which can "control" the entire "nation" of Afghanistan and your theory would seem to argue that all we need is more governance in order to bring this to pass. It seems likely that Afghanistan, a Frankenstein colonial creation, may be an inherently unviable state. If that's the case, then it seems to me that less "governance" is required, not more.
Wilf,
Actually, if you have a burst pipe, the first thing you do is turn off the water - otherwise you'll have a lot more than the plumber coming to your house.
I would never suggest to impose ones governance on another. Rarely will it be proper, and never will it be apprciated.
And while I say that it is the failure of governance that leads to insurgency, often it may well be LESS governance that provides the solution. Particularly in a strongly tribal culture such as the Middle East and Africa.
This reminds me of how America almost destroyed our forests. Obviously our unregulated "cut out and get out" approach to the first 1/3 of the country was not sustainable, so we turned to the Germans who were experts on managing forests. They had cut down all of their wild forest years earlier, and had in place a very orderly, logical system of managed stands. This is the technology they brought to America and that we accepted as the "right answer."
So, step one to an orderly, managed, sustainable forest was to cut down all of the wild forests. And this is what we set out to do. Can't have disorder, you know, it is too difficult to manage.
I think westernrs take a similar approach to governance. First you must take out all of the "wild" governance and replace it with an orderly, managed, sustainable system.
I don't think this approach is any more proper for the governance of people than it is for the management of forests. Those who know forests understand the importance of bio-diversity, and the incredible inter-related order that exists within what looks like chaos and wilderness to an outsider.
Less is more.
As to WILF's pipes, instead of calling a plumber every 20 years when they go out, and looking at the 20 good years as success; I suggest that you consider what it is about your actions that may well be contributing to this regular failure? Is it some destructive mix you regularly dump into the system? Is it a failure to conduct proper regular maintenance? Are you perhaps using that handy pipe in the basement as a pull-up bar?
These things are systems, and our input to the system is major component to how that system operates. Perhaps you will still need to call that plumber, but if you understand your role in the problem more completely you will be less likely to blame the pipes or the last plumber for the problem. Human nature is to avoid blame. We must overcome our nature.
No, but I look forward to doing so
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
Hi Bob,
Are you drawing on
RK Merton's work on criminology? I'm just getting the feeling that, if you aren't, you should take a look at it since it seems to be paralleling your argument.
I suspect as we scratch into this we will find many parallels in many walks of life, as what we are discussing is not warfare so much as human nature; and human nature affects everything we do when we gather in groups.
As a former prosecutor I got a pretty good dose of dealing with three groups that I did not have much contact with prevously:
1. Criminals
2. Addicts
3. mentally ill
(And that was just the Defense Bar!!)
Clearly this experience contributed to how I look at things. Being an SF officer made me a more effective prosecutor (I love a good jury trial! The combination of mission, populace, opponent, strategy and tactics, etc. Each trial was like a mini-campaign); and having been a prosecutor makes me a more effective SOF strategist. We are all shaped by our experiences, and I recognize that mine are fairly unique.