Interlude: Is ADM Willard a poor strategist??
...because he states his strategy in his Posture Statement to Congress not in terms of a "future picture" but as an "evolving posturing of forces" that is realtionship-centric:
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USPACOM thus embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture. In concert with other government agencies, this posture is designed to simultaneously hedge against traditional and asymmetric challenges as well as advance alliance and partner-nation relationships. Extensive analyses clearly indicate a need to build an integrated posture framework that prioritizes adjustments by maximizing strength, balancing and biasing disposition, and sustaining readiness in all sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania).
The "future picture" strategy applies to situations akin to chess, where you are competing with an opponent to create a particluar endstate (the king being checkmated) it does not apply to Go where a player trying to achieve a predetermined end state will always lose to a competent player that works to maximize his shi or the potential opportunity implicit in his arrangement of stones (forces) and act upon those opportunities when it is most benficial, not in accordance with a particular timetable or to achieve "victory" in a particular area of the board.
Col Warden does not look at war as a game of Go, which is very dangerous as that is the game or primary adversary in the Pacific invented. Thankfully, Adm Willard appears to understand this.
Or is he falling victim to outdated thinking? Should he be stating what we want the Pacific security picture ot look like in the future and work back from it? Should he decide what that future picture might be? Can anybody or any group? If we can't state a desired future picture for a region like the Pacific, where does that leave the Warden strategic mandate?
I'll take a stab at this one...
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Originally Posted by
pvebber
Then he is arguing to fundamentally change the "American Way of War" which is that we employ military forces worldwide as the stick behind or diplomatic and economic carrots. It also begs the question of what constitutes a "threat to our survival"? Was WWII really a threat to OUR survival? WWI certainly wasn't. None of the wars since have been.
World War II was most definitely a threat to our survival. In the short term I agree that Germany and Japan could not threaten the US directly. In the long term, had the UK and Russia been knocked out, do you think we would have lasted long? Also, Hitler was working on his own nukes and a capability to either bomb the US or use intercontinental rockets to hit us. I would say we could not ignore the threat.
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If you are only going to war against existential threats why not just maintain a an ICBM force and tell the world, any country that threatens my existence goes away. You then don't need an Air Force.
Except that the USAF runs the land-based ICBMs... we tried this, it was called the New Look - i.e. use nuclear deterrence to allow conventional reductions. I think we are headed to a similar place now - manpower reductions to cut people will result in greater reliance on the deterrent power of nukes, along with the USN and USAF's ability to project power without boots on the ground.
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Which doesn't answer the question of what is broken with the current system? And why it is better to assume the Air Force can do everything and rule things out, rather than look at the joint force as a whole, and decide which service is most effective and efficient at providing desired capabilities?
I'm not sure what Col Warden would say, but I think his point would be that Iraq and Afghanistan cost a lot of money and weren't exactly winners. He seeks to reduce costs by using the most efficient and effective force, and posits that as technology improves that will increasingly be airpower (again service neutral). I don't think he'd say the USAF can do everything... but that it can do more than we give it credit for, and we should continue to improve.
I think that as directed energy weapons are fielded, you will see a massive increase in the ability of airpower to affect situations. The fact that you can use a laser as both a sensor and a weapon helps, as does the incredible ability to discriminate (very precise effects).
I think, listening to SECDEF's speeches and the deficit talk, that we will see the Libya model (air but no boots on the ground) increasingly become our preferred model for conflict. Not saying there won't be FID, some COIN, etc. but large scale nation building is off the books as long as we're in a serious fiscal crisis- it just costs too much. Before I get scoffed by the masses, think about the math- yes an aircraft is expensive. But take ONW/OSW as an example- while they cost a lot, we didn't lose any folks or aircraft, and we deterred Saddam from attacking his neighbors and his minorities. That alone saves billions over the long run in health care and replacement procurement costs. We were able to impose our will and generally achieve our objectives at a lower cost than the alternatives.
It's really a back to the future type thing, as we return to the 1990s model of using airpower to project our will.
V/R,
Cliff
We can disagree and still smile if we meet...
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Originally Posted by
Cliff
I'm not saying it was effective in resolving the situations completely, but like I said, you do what you can afford to when it isn't an existential threat.
I agree with that last but suggest that both your cases cite minor aims and part way solutions to the problems -- and the Kosovo thing is subject to the qualification of the KLA entry on the ground. Not to mention that in that operation the US -- indeed, the West in general -- got totally snookered by the Albanian Kosovars... :rolleyes:
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Agree that WWI probably wasn't, Civil War definitely was. I stand by my words on WWII - I don't think we would have co-existed with the Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Third Reich for long. I agree that in 1941 we were not threatened with immediate destruction... but how long before someone pulls the trigger do they become a deadly threat to you?
I think you just made my point. :wry:
IMO WW II was, for the US as opposed to many others, not existential -- in our case it was a contrived, indeed almost forced, entry (by FDR, devious old Dude...) into an ongoing war where we were not at the time threatened but which we entered in order to insure the removal or at least disruption of potential threats of great significance.
Both points more academic than of real import...:o