Well, I'm going to read his book because I agree
that Clausewitz has had undue affect on US thinking -- more correctly, the Germans have had undue effect on US military thinking and practice. The Germans and Clausewitz got a lot of stuff right and they do things that work for them. Unfortunately, we adopted some of their practices that do not work well for us. One prime example is our generalist approach to officer education and management. It works for the Germans because they have a great General Staff corps. We do not have that so it doesn't work nearly as well for us. :mad:
I agree with Melton that the center of gravity thing is vastly overused -- I do not agree with him that Jomini had much to offer and I suspect Billy Sherman had no use for Jomini either. The formulaic approach has not worked for the US Army in the many variations I've seen tried over the last 60 plus years. We're stil trying to do that to convince Congress we use objective measures to promote people... :wry:
Slap, I hear you on making war on the rich -- problem is that the poor get caught up in that and suffer even more while the rich tend to float out and survive. Sherman and Carl both were superior in their wars and their times. We just live in a different time.
I do agree that we are capable of doing our own thing and that we do better when we stop trying to copy others. Winston Churchill said "You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried all other options." What Winston missed is that we try the methods of others, find out they don't work for us and then finally cobble together an American way of doing it. We need to stop trying to imitate others. We are not they. They are not we. They are wee, we are not...
Grant's Strategy, that he sent his most trusted LT to execute
Grant will likely always be my favorite US General. One of his greatest accomplishments that he receives little credit for is the strategy to target the will of the Southern populace as his main effort (to which he tasked Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas; and ultimately Sheridan in the Shenandoah to execute), while he supervised Meade in the supporting, but critical effort of defeating Lee's Army and taking Richmond (in that order).
He, IMO, was the first leader to not only understand that merely killing soldiers or capturing capitals was enough in wars between nations, as it had been in the West for generations in wars between Kingdoms.
However, and this is a big however, not all wars are the same, I would be careful to extrapolate the success of this model developed by Americans during the era of America's rise, as the either "the American way of war" or as a model for all future war. Very dangerous, both counts. It works for what it was, and should continue to be applied to. It would be absolutely counter-productive to apply such an approach to resolving a conflict within a nation.
Because all wars are unique based upon the totality of the circumstances; and wars between states are a very different category than wars within states. The American Civil War was not an insurgency; it was a clear break along geographic, cultural, and political lines. It truly was a "War between the states" not a "war within the states." I add this, because many like to hold up our civil war as an example of the invalidation of the American principle of of the right to insurgency codified in our Declaration of Independence.
All wars, to varying degrees, are "hybrid" in execution
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Was the US Civil War a "Hybrid War?" - Were any of the actions by Irregulars, part of an insurgency? Was is a "Complex War" or a simple War?
Kind of begs the question as to why we don't opt for a unitary model of war? :wry:
And always have been. I just don't know how this whole "hybrid" fad helps anything, and here is why: As I look at warfare, the key to determining how to best resolve a conflict is to understand the purposes of the combatants first, then their tactics.
Tactics are something you must deal with, but the design of your operation must be shaped to address the opponents purpose for action. Certainly an insurgency and a state on state war can and will likely employ a mix of approaches to achieve their desired ends. This is human nature. But the combatants are both the protectors of ones political positions; and the means to get to ones political objectives. Understanding the political objectives and the role of the populace as the human terrain in which the conflict is taking place is critical.
So, for me, I toss "hybrid warfare" up onto the same shelf where you have (rightfully) tossed 4GW. Both are simply efforts to describe what we don't understand in terms that we do understand; and IMO, both are off track. War is constantly evolving and never changing (paradox) and is almost always hybrid in execution. Understanding the political perspective and objective of one's opponent gets you closer to determining how to best prevent them from getting to what they seek, and in turn disrupt or defeat the support to their own operation.
Steve, you seem to be pointing
to a lesson that hopefully would have been learned from our Iraq experience.
If one plans to hands the reigns over to a stable local govt you must have those reigns firmly in hand yourself in order to do so. We don't want to occupy and thats not necessarily a bad thing but you sure as heck have to own something to be able to give it away.
Probably way to much of an oversimplification but still...