Falcon II, Eagle II, BUFF 3, A-10G
They say if you do something long enough you witness it's rebirth. You all have remarkable insight into Air force weapon systems. The discussions on the A-10 and A-16 were very interesting.
I also agree with the many comments the Air Force is going though a challanging period of discontent and have lost the confidence of their boss - the Amreican people. I see that as a failure of Gen McPeak.
The Air Force has lost their focus. They need a close air support fighter and yet refuse to rebuild an imporved A-10. The F-16 was not a great ground attack fighter and not the best air-to-air fighter but if you ever had to deploy and need a multi use aircraft it was great.
I still want to bite my nails off when I read how the F22 and F35 are the end all be all. The Air Force should remember the numerous occassions where they threw all of the eggs in one basket. I remember the F-4s - did not have guns because some analyst told them the future would be fought without guns.
For your benefit allow me to describe my perspective. Master Avionics technician, QA inspector for motors and mainframe. I worked F-111, F-16, and F-117A. I have been a 'Gunslinger, Juvat, Bold Tiger, and a member of the GoatSucker Inn. I have since retired and worked servers, network hardware, as a Business Analysis, and dodled into South American terrorism.
I like Ford motor company's suggestion of building a modern mustang with the best of the old school. Beef up the engines, the avionics, and build new airframes. It may look and smell like a mustang but they have their own special identity.
Has it ever occurred to build a new A-10 that was designed around an even better gun with even more powerful engines. Airplanes are like race cars. High performance machines dedicated to taking mankind into another realm. But airplanes like cars can be rebuilt better. Or create a dual engine F-16, update the avionics and vectoring motors and you have a killer.
The worst thing the Air Force could do is only uby one plane from one source. For years we have seen a particular type of aircraft grounded for maintenance issues.
The Air force needs to really assess their missions and that means sitting down with the Army and finding out what are the Army's needs and what type of aircraft they are going to need to address them. I read several federal magazines and I do not see it yet. The Army is the Air Force's customer.
One final note - stealth is an illusion. You can defeat an aircraft using stealth.
The 22 and 35 need much more than stealth to survive. They have a combination of exceptional radar packages, integrated ECM packages, supperior weapons, and advanced engine technology.They need pilots. Drones are invaluable for C4ISR but they have a drawback which I have not seen discussed here. 15, 16, 18, 22, & 35 all have the capability to carry and deploy a tactical nuclear weapon. I turst an officer with this responisbility. Not certain I would trust a SPC.
The Air Force needs to sit down and replan for how to support the Army and the direction they are taking. They need to find and plan for their customer's expectations.
USAF getting by with a little help from its friends...
Then again, with friends like this, who needs enemies...
LINK.
What a piece of work that guy is. Hopefully, the average ten year old would realize that a split fleet like that is an invitation to logistic complications and unnecessary expense...
These guys get a vote too
From the IHT: World worries how U.S. will pay for stimulus
http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/...WT.mc_ev=click
I'm not sure what we're going to use to pay for any of it.
In a simmilar vein:
Does anybody have any feedback on the UK Joint Helicopter Command or the Joint Harrier Command?
I recall that. Didn't agree with it at the time.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
SethB
...they supported two tanker designs in order to prevent the entire fleet being grounded if a design flaw pops up later, and they supported one being larger than the other.
We started WW II with a number of aircraft designs in involuntary and unplanned competition with each other -- to see which had the best overall operational and survival rates -- induced by the war. Both the Army Air Force and the Navy/Marines effectively homed in on one design that was the most effective compromise in each category as being the most rational and effective solution.
That's why the P-51 and the F4U (not to mention the DC-3 and the AD-1...) continued flying for many years after their contemporaries disappeared. You can do one type, work very effectively and save both effort and money -- but it better be the best of type you can get...
Thus, I have no problem with a single type. I know that multiple types complicate inventory, clog the supply system and increase costs. The DSB does some good work and they do some less good work. Their logic is usually good and they need to be listened to -- but they are no more omniscient than you or I happen to be.
Quote:
They also argued that making the planes they fuel more efficient would reduce the need for tankers right off the top.
Even the AF has long been aware of that; has been working toward that goal and thus the possibility of a couple of hundred plus new tankers replacing over 500 KC-135s (out of over 800 built). That and this LINK.
After I visit some of these blog and see the basic posts,
I need to break myself of the habit of reading the comments...:eek:
Yet another legend in his own mind...
He's knowledgeable but not infallible. Server's busy, I'll try again later.
Good. Hard to believe, I know but
my wife and kids plus numerous friends and acquaintances say I'm sometimes verbally clumsy...:confused:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
In the debate over the future fighter force for Air Force, Navy and Marines, many of those issues are valid yet rarely heard.
Very true. With no technical knowledge to use in evaluating, I'm sort of skeptical about LO technology. I look at is as being like Armor on the ground: Yes, it provides some protection (Good) but it also engenders a false sense of security (Bad). It can be overcome by a counteraction and it tends to lessen reliance on skill and agility; the real keys to combat survivability. Not to mention I'm still waiting for the son of the Warthog to hit the order book...
Quote:
...at the same time one can and should be able to distill valid arguments from them, even when they are pushing an agenda.
Yep, given the way the processes operate today, one has little choice. Filtering becomes a necessity...
Thanks again for the link.
P.S.
Those same people say my attempts at humor often miss the mark, so that tells you that we need pay them little mind... ( :eek: )
Entropy, interesting brief.
However, like Ken (not that I am his peer), I think some of the argument is not that credible. For instance, do you have to escort ISR if it is unmanned, small, and stealthy?
I don't want to appear to be 'Air-bashing' but the key arguement that I think the AF has missed is 'affordability'. How bad is the threat of advanced capability fighter aircraft? Can a viable threat buy, maintain, train, and fly an advanced 4th or 5th Gen fighter force? Do we see that as likely? Would a lot of slightly less capable, yet much more affordable aircraft do a better job? Mass (quantity) has a quality all its own. :D
What if we had brand new F15s, with the latest electronics built right in, with the newest engine variants, with every update other countries have developed, etc? Perhaps made even better than the originals, with stronger materials, better engineering for superior maintenance access and reliability? Is it capable, especially if we could afford many more of them (at the rate of 3x or 4x as many F22s) of accomplishing much of what the F22 could do? Obviously stealth would be a limit, but it seems that the stealth requirement has turned our fighter fleet into a night-focused force.
I am not just stirring the pot, but hopefully learning about (and maybe even appreciating) my brothers in blue a bit more.
Tankersteve