Secure & Hold - then what?
A veritable deluge of commentary today on Mali, plus Algeria and the effects way beyond the Sahel. Late in the day I have a couple that are worth reading.
Citing the International Crisis Group's regional analyst (Marc's colleague):
Quote:
This is linked to the Libyan conflict, it's linked to the Mali conflict, it's linked to 50 years of struggle by the Tuareg, it's linked to 20 years of struggle in Algeria...A security response is at best a partial response. Until a robust political, humanitarian and economic effort is implemented, the security effort won't solve these problems,
Link:http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_15860/cont...tguid=5y6vdwVX
For once, even if writing from the USA, a Mauritanian activist blogger; with a fascinating context and some stinging passages, especially on Western naivety. In summary:
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Mali’s problems did not start with the fall of Libya’s Qadhafi. They started even before it gained independence from France. A diverse set of ethnic groups were forced to coexist without much thought of the immense potential for conflict caused by that arrangement. France’s 25th hour short-legged attempt at Shock and Awe, is potentially a doomed effort because it is a decade late. Relying on inept militaries, and hoping to win a guerilla warfare without a credible strategy is a defeat waiting to happen. A decade into wars of pacification, Western nations should resist the urge to fight in yet another war without fully thinking through the consequences– potentially disastrous. None of this is an argument to look the other way on the spread of Jihadism, it is a call to think, then act decisively. Too much is at stake.
One wonders if the French military and those back in Paris realise this
Quote:
The skeleton of an untested idea became a doctrinal principle in France’s Operation Serval: we will stop the Jihadis, but the Africans will have to go north and defeat the enemy. The notion that an ECOWAS force with the backing of the African Union, and the necessary paperwork from the UN Security Council is a recipe for disaster. Rotten and corrupt militaries, commanded by equally corrupt leaders cannot be a credible partner once the shooting starts.
The African Union's previously over-riding principle, before Sudan's split comes back:
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The other principle complicating the matter is Africa’s biggest taboo. Today, no one is willing to recognize that Mali, like many most of Africa, is an artificial construct.
Link:http://dekhnstan.wordpress.com/2013/...in-the-making/
A Disaster Fifty Years in the Making
A native talks about the situation there, very important article. I think we should read it and understand..........
Quote:
Unlike some writings popping up with depressing regularity in English-language media, the current Mali crisis pre-dates Qadhafi’s demise, and even the appearance of Jihadis in the territory in 2003. In fact, Mali’s internal problems started even before it gained its independence from France. Azawadis sought desperately to have their own state when it became apparent that France was intent on abandoning the French Sudan. They latched on the mirage of the Common Organization of Saharan Regions (OCRS) created by the January 10, 1957 French law.
The OCRS covered areas in today’s Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Chad. Had it been retained, it would have been an Amazigh-majority state with considerable Arab, Songhai and Toubou pluralities. The project however had another purpose altogether: divide and conquer. it was a French ruse aimed at Algeria’s then independence rebellion led by the FLN. The idea was to keep the northern part of the territory as French, and offer the rest the option of independence.
http://dekhnstan.wordpress.com/2013/...in-the-making/
Mali Could Become the New Afghanistan, Only Worse
Mali Could Become the New Afghanistan, Only Worse
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AFRICOM's failure in Mali
A very short video clip of General Ham's speech in Washington DC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21192517
Quote:
We were focusing our training almost exclusively on tactical or technical matters...We didn't spend probably the requisite time focusing on values, ethics and a military ethos...When you put on the uniform of your nation, you accept the responsibility to defend and protect that nation, to abide by the legitimate civilian authority that has been established, to conduct yourselves according to the rule of law. We didn't do that to the degree that we needed to..
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21195371
A whole set of assumptions there, Western, not just American, about what a soldier in Mali does when he joins up. Importantly it ignores the fact a political settlement made in Mali led to thousands of Tuareg's being inducted into the national army.
As we now know most of them deserted, probably joining the rebels; citing a loyal Malian soldier:
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All these were here before, working with us. But they deserted a year ago. Maj Traore said the men had apparently gone to join the forces of the MNLA, a Tuareg separatist group which launched a rebellion last year in northern Mali.....But when they came back here, we found they were with the jihadists, and they wanted to take revenge on us. They want easy money. They think the jihadists have money - that's all. It's not about Islam...
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21136663
We are not united, just inter-dependent
The NYT reports on a divergence between the France and the USA over the objective (slightly edited):
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Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French defense minister, said recently “The goal is the total reconquest of Mali...We will not leave any pockets.”
But Gen. Carter F. Ham, the head of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, voiced more limited objectives. “We would all like to see the elimination of Al Qaeda and others from northern Mali....Realistically, probably the best you can get is containment and disruption so that Al Qaeda is no longer able to control territory.”
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/wo...mali.html?_r=0
Almost reminds me of the First Indo-China War, post-1945, when France the colonial power was amply supported by the USA with money, weapons and more, although not troops. Each had quite different objectives IIRC. This time I concede France is far richer, but has some gaps in its national armoury: heavy airlift, in-flight refuelling and (airborne) intelligence gathering.