General Vincent Desportes
General Vincent Desportes
Small Wars Journal Interview
by Judah Grunstein
SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)
Quote:
General Vincent Desportes is the commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center and author of The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris. Also see Judah Grunstein’s SWJ review of The Likely War.
Small Wars Journal: You said in your book that before any intervention, the strategic objectives (which are political) must be identified. Given the complexity (multilateral, inter-ministerial) of this kind of operation, which organism would be responsible for that kind of reflection and to identify the objectives?
Gen. Desportes: For one thing, in a lot of ways I’m defining a type of model for an ideal to attain. Now what we know is that in reality, it’s something that’s extremely difficult to do. And we notice that first we send the force to do something, and often the “end state” is defined after we’ve sent the force. The flagrant example is Afghanistan: first we sent the force, and afterwards we defined an “end state.” So the schema that we should know the end state perfectly before we construct through retroaction the coordination of lines of operation is an ideal schema. So what I’m defining is an ideal schema. What’s certain is that in fact governments respond most often in reaction, and in rapid reaction, and so the objectives are often contructed once we’ve launched the operation. So we’re pretty far from the ideal theoretic schema that I proposed.
Now, in France, it’s probable (and the Livre Blanc says it) that we’re missing a structure of coordination and analysis that can do this sort of thing. When I wrote my book, obviously, the center for crisis coordination (which is foreseen by the Livre Blanc and which is supposed to be part of the Quai d’Orsay) didn’t exist. Now, I don’t know if that center is functioning, but it’s probably that sort of center that reunites the interminsterial expertise that, from the outset of the crisis, allows the formulation of the diplomatic, economic, military and other analyses that allow us to define an “end state” before launching the operation.
General Vincent DesportesThe Likely War
by Judah Grunstein, Small Wars Journal
General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)
Quote:
Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus’ implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army’s freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author’s unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we’ve prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.
In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the “inheritor” of Cold War deterrence. What’s more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary’s technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn’t mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war’s eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy’s strength. “The use of the term asymmetric. . .” he writes, “reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own.” (pp. 45-46).
Future of COIN and war in general
I've heard a lot about the supposed "Crusaders vs. Conservatives" argument over how we will be fighting wars in the future (I also heard a bit about how it was slightly contrived). So I decided to add my two cents, a decision which could be as ill-advised as my decision, at age 2-3, to stomp on a fire ant mound while wearing sandals. Anyway, here goes.
I find plausible the argument that our wars will be increasingly irregular and that we need to put a greater emphasis on COIN, but at the same time, we need to remember that conventional warfighting is not dead. I read a monograph at the Army Strategic Studies Institute about the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, and how Hizballah didn't fight a pure irregular war, and that some of the Israeli problems may have been due to loss of warfighting prowess while bogged down in the West Bank and Gaza.
I accept the argument that the military still needs conventional warfighting skills, as well as COIN skills. At the best of times, a good military should be well-rounded, am I right? So it makes sense, given that there are still nations with large militaries that could pose threats to us, to retain the ability to give them an old-style smackdown.
Think about it. An Army that focused too much on conventional combat and virtually ignored the problem of COIN is one of the big reasons why Iraq has been so bad. It would hardly be better to ignore conventional fighting in favor of COIN.
If any of this didn't make sense, well, it's almost 0000, and I have class at 0800. I don't have the time to think any more tonight. Good night.
One last thought: We should preserve conventional warfighting because no one knows what the future actually is. Before Iraq, people were saying, "Well, wars are going to get so technology-heavy, and we'll reduce the number of boots on the ground, because we have Tomahawks and magic PGMs, and the like." I'm only 19, but even I know that the term "conventional wisdom" was not intended as a compliment.
Course syllabi for COIN at CGSC?
Are there posted course syllabi for CGSC courses (or other colleges)? I'm curious to see how courses, reading lists, etc. for staff colleges has changed during OIF/OEF.
I know they've changed, but I'd like to see specifically how.
Articles addressing the same would be appreciated as well.
Many thanks.
MCU COIN Leadership Seminar 9/23/09
Is anyone else attending the Marine Corps University sponsored COIN Leadership Seminar in D.C. on September 23rd? I managed to get a spot but I don't know a soul going. It hasn't been publicized very much but if anyone else is going we can start a SWJ section, maybe do some heckling. I'll be the guy in the back with a high and tight trying to hide my tiny silver bars from all the flag officers.
http://www.cnas.org/node/3314 ----link goes to the CNAS info page on the event, as I can't find the Marine Corps one, if one exists.
Counterinsurgency Leadership Symposium
I'm registered and will be attending. Registration is now full - here is the e-mail I got the other day:
Greetings ~
The Marine Corps University's Counterinsurgency Leadership Symposium is now just two weeks away. Owing to high demand, we had to close registration a month ago and we have accumulated a very long waiting list. Thus, if your plans have changed and you are unable to come, please go to www.regonline.com/cls2009 and enter your email address and the password you selected at initial registration to cancel your reservation so that someone else can attend.
A few reminders:
1. Seating at the event will be on a first come, first served basis, so you are strongly advised to arrive early. Check in opens at 7 am and the symposium begins at 8 am.
2. We have updated the list of books that can be signed during the event, as we have added a few speakers (http://www.federalconference.com/CLS/). You can bring any of these books with you for signature by the author, but no books will be for sale on the day of the event because of federal regulations.
3. You still have a few days to purchase the optional lunch. If you buy the lunch, you will have time to speak with the panelists and obtain book signatures that would otherwise be unavailable. To purchase the lunch, please go to www.regonline.com/cls2009 and enter your email address and the password you selected at initial registration to select and purchase your lunch.
4. Uniform: Military dress should be USMC Service "C" and Army Class "B" or equivalent / business attire for civilians.
5. Address:
National Press Club
529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
202-662-7500
6. Link to map: http://www.press.org/directions.cfm
7. Directions by Metro:
Take Metro to Metro Center.
Take the 13th Street Exit, take escalator to 13th Street; you should be at the corner of 13th and G Streets.
Walk one block south to F Street.
Turn right (West) and walk one block to 14th Street
Turn left and walk downhill to the National Press Building lobby.
Enter and take the elevators to the 13th Floor
8. Parking:
The PMI garage is located on the north side of G St between 13th and 14th Streets.
Car Park is located at the corner of 15th and F Streets.
Cost of parking in this area ranges from $20 to $35 per day.
9. Please direct any questions to paul AT nationalconference.com.
Wolves vs. Sheepdogs: People as the Weapon
When we talk about COIN Population Centric strategy it usually involves a sheepdog mentality. In other words, we are the sheepdogs protecting the sheep "the population".
Thomas Marks in "Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam" noted that Maoist revolutionaries in post Vietnam Asia were defeated through citizen militias. These militias, such as in Peru, were sometimes spontaneous in nature. They were not developed by the government. Rather the population rose upon their own against the Shining Path in Peru.
According to Mao, the people are the weapon. The guerrilla walks into a village and does not see sheep that need to be protected but wolves that can be used as a weapon. When he sees an old man, he does not see someone who needs to be coddled and protected, he sees an offensive weapon that can be used against the enemy.
This mentality, modified, can be used .by the COIN structure to utilize the population as a weapon rather than a big blob of mass that is merely separated from the guerrillas to "dry the sea." (referring to Mao's fish and sea analogy). Think of all the energy the population can provide the COIN movement when it is utilized in an offensive fashion.
Think of it this way, an old woman in an Afghan village is taught to use a knife in self-defense. When a Taliban comes to visit her she takes the knife and stabs him in the bladder, the kidney and then the liver and watches him bleed out. The news spreads around campfires in Afghanistan that an old grandma has just gutted a Taliban. She becomes a personality hero to those who want to resist giving more people the courage to rise up.
What I described above is exactly the kind of stories that were spread in China around campfires during the SINO-Japanese wars of families using knives to kill Japanese. Evans Carlson was one of those who documented them.
The people, according to Clausewitz, are what give energy to the warfighting machine. Mao following this dictum saw the people as the weapon. So should we.