Shame as a combat multiplier
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Originally Posted by
slapout9
Also Sherman had an IED problem to, you know how he solved it? He had the civilians who would not tell him where the torpedo's(that is what they called land mines in the Civil War) were march down the road in front of his columns! The IED problem was solved real quick. Put that in an IO campaign for A'stan......I know we can't do that but we should......tie rich folks to the of front Humvee"s and search for IED's.....hey that sorta rhymes.:)
Also the first thing Sherman did was prepare a SPECIAL TAX MAP and his march to sea went right through the richest parts of Georgia where he collected his food and supplies and burned bridges,tore up rail roads and knocked down telegraphs. In short he made the rich folks poor and feel pain, he did not target civilians directly he targeted their support system more than anything. Victory because he new how to make a good Systems Map;)
One of the quickest things you learn in a combat zone is how much emotions effect actions. War is personal, and it cannot be reduced to a simple mathematical equation or engineering problem.
Two examples.
1. The scene in Band of Brothers the day after Echo Company discovered the concentration camp. They declare martial law and force the adjacent neighbors to clean the camp and bury the bodies. Echo Company used shame as an instrument of resolve. The other option would be to kill ever person in that town as punishment. I'm sure it crossed their minds.
2. In May 2007, after a raid, we discovered the videos of public beheadings in our town. Not knowing exactly how to react, I decided to force all the village elders to watch the video with me standing over telling them how utterly wrong and inhumane it was. I chose to use shame. In that instance, it worked. There was a lot of crying sheiks that day.
v/r
Mike
Going waaaaay off topic, perhaps. . .
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Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Granted Civil War history isn't my main field, but the answer isn't as simple as "Sherman had the idea and Grant resisted." And likewise the reverse isn't completely true.
Grant had learned the value, and practicality, of moving through the Southern countryside during the Vicksburg campaign. He also began to understand at that time that the Southern popular will would need to be defeated along with the field armies. But he also understood that Lee's ANV was a physical representation of that will, and that the Army of the Potomac would not likely close with and destroy that army without his physical presence. Actually, both Sherman and Grant were wary of the possibility of moving an entire army through the deep south, but over time both began to see the possibilities of that movement. Grant seems to have grasped the need to carry the war to the deep south first, but Sherman certainly came around quick enough. He was the one who was wary during the Vicksburg campaign of cutting loose from the supply lines and living off the county, but had clearly changed his tune when the Army of Tennessee cut loose through the deep south.
Both Sherman and Grant (and by extension Sheridan and many other senior Union leaders from the Western Theater) grasped the need to shatter Southern popular will and support for the cause. Such a realization seems to have come with slower speed and clarity to those Union commanders who spent most of their time fighting in Virginia.
Sherman's campaign certainly changed to a tune of punishment when they left Georgia and entered South Carolina.
I don't think I suggested (at least I hope I didn't) that Grant opposed it and Sherman won him over - only that he showed some resistance to the grand scale of what Sherman was planning. He worried if it was feasible with Hood maneuvering in Sherman's rear - remember, during the Siege of Vicksburg, he sent Sherman to Jackson to guard against Johnston's possible relief expedition.
No argument with any of what you said, though. I wonder if the phenomenon you notice is the result of minimal contact with the Southern population by officers and men fighting with the Army of the Potomac?
Getting back to the topic at hand, Firn is probably right, it seems a bit premature to judge the entire book and argument based on these snippets, but coming from Cavguy and the publisher's own description at Amazon, it does seem highly suspect.
Matt
One of my rare disagreements with Ken...
Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide. :D
Grant knew that he had to hit Lee again and again since the ANV was the CoG, not so much Richmond. So he hit him hard at the Wilderness. When the Federals broke off the attack Lee (and many Federal officers) was sure Grant would withdraw. He didn't, he moved to his left. This threw Lee off his game a bit but he rallied well to block Grant at Spotsylvania. So it went until U.S. stole a march on Bobby and crossed the James, but his Corps were slow in taking Petersburg and so the siege began. Grant lost about 55,000 (which were fewer men than the Federals had lost in the three previous years trying to do the same thing) to Lee's 33,000, the key being the Union casualties were a smaller % of overall forces. Since Sherman at the same time was “making Georgia howl” there could be no shifting of Confederate forces between the theaters. Also, when Early threatened Washington Grant failed to react as previous commanders had; which was to withdraw and rush north. He kept focused on Lee.
Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest. Grant had considered going west of Richmond with the same strategy but it would have unacceptably lengthen his supply line. He also factored in the desire that one of his attacks might break through to Richmond. Both Grant and Lee knew that a prolonged siege (whether around Richmond or Petersburg) would end the war in favor of the North.
Agree that neither Grant nor Sherman was a “great captain” per say, but neither was Lee (he was too Virginia centric and at times overly aggressive for the resources available to the CSA). In the aggregate, when one totals Grant's losses from Beaumont to Appomattox he lost fewer men numerically (and effectively won the war in the western theater in 1863) than Lee incurred from Seven Pines to Appomattox. Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing. Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?
I'm not sure we're disagreeing but we can if you insist...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Umar Al-Mokhtār
Seems you've been living in the deep South too long and have drank up all the Kool Aide. :D
Nah, your aim's off -- if you aimed...
I probably woulda fit for the Union. However, I don't drink Kool Aid; that's sugary stuff for all you kids...;)
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Grant formulated his strategy based on his greater manpower to make his flanking movements and keeping his supply lines secure. Lee was able to counter since he had the advantage of interior lines, but only because he was obliged to defend Richmond and his supply line to the southwest...
True -- Grant wasted him away and continually slipped to the SE. No great strategy but an admittedly effective one.Nor did I say he was -- I cited Thomas and Buford, both Union. Only Jackson whom I did not mention comes close to being great for the South. He was better than any of the others save possibly Buford and both of them died too young. John Gordon and Forrest may have become great with more experience; they didn't get it so they don't make it to greatness (whatever that is)...
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Grant used his obvious superiority in manpower and resources to defeat Lee, like that's a bad thing.
I hope not, that's the American way; has been in every war we've won and the two we lost (both due to really bad Generals; one northerner, one southerner). In any event, I didn't say it was bad, just that it was what he did -- which you corroborate.
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Was he supposed to just sit back like all the other AotP commanders before him?
No, nor did I say he should have -- I just said he wasn't a particularly great General and named two northerners (one from Kentucky, one from Virgina ;) )who were better. I think you're picking a fight where none need exist -- that ain't good Generalship. :D