Dr Paul Meshen the True Pseudo Ops Author
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Originally Posted by
JMA
Oh JMA! Please watch the references...might have to bring up the "P" word concerning that author but the duty expert on Pseudo Ops is Dr Paul Melshen at the Armed Forces Staff College. student2010 - Dr Melshen will be glad to talk to you, if you are serious.
The greatest pseudo terrorists of all time
This link came via the BSAP History group, it appears to be a short introduction to the book 'Only My Friends Call Me Crouks' by Dennis Croukamp
Referring to a question from an American:
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'What were your rules of engagement?' I told him I'd never heard of that term in my life until I saw the film of the same name. We only had one rule. Kill The Enemy.”
Link to article, which appears undated:http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-g...?Contentpage=1
Note this book was originally published in 2005 as 'Only My Friends Call Me Crouks (The Bush War in Rhodesia)' and was reprinted as "THE BUSH WAR IN RHODESIA - The Extraordinary Combat Memoir of a Rhodesian Reconnaissance Specialist" by Paladin Press in the United States.
Link to Amazon UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Only-Friends.../dp/0620293926
Link to Amazon.com:http://www.amazon.com/Bush-War-Rhode...1320788262&sr=
1967 ANC -v- Rhodesian forces
Hat tip to a BSAP History Group email directing attention to South African History Online (SAHO), whose purpose is to be:
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a non-partisan people's history project. It was established in June 2000 as a non-profit Section 21 organisation, aiming to address the biased way in which the history and cultural heritage of South Africans was represented in our educational and cultural institutions.
SAHO's mission is to break the silence of our past and to create the most comprehensive online encyclopedia of South African history and culture.
Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/
Prelude over.
There is a small collection of articles around 'The Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie campaign, July-September 1967', the ANC's first military operation; known as Operation Nickel by the Rhodesians, which makes interesting reading as it is before the insurgency really began in earnest.
Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/wankie-campaign
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How did the Rhodesians and South Africans experience this operation? What light, if any do these archival documents shed on the Wankie campaign? What did the Rhodesians-South Africans learn from their experiences with the ANC-ZAPU guerrillas? I also examine the controversial issue of South Africa's military assistance to Rhodesia. Do the archival documents shed more light on the South African government's assistance to Rhodesia? What resources did South Africa commit to Rhodesia?
The debrief at the end is IMO the best part; partly as I've met some of those involved and one is an old friend.
Link:http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/...ecurity-forces
1 Attachment(s)
Review of MR Article - part 1
From the article's lede (emphasis added):
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In the 1970s, a bloody insurgency took place in Rhodesia, now present-day Zimbabwe. African insurgents faced a settler-state determined to keep power in white hands. The government adopted a punitive and enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Many Rhodesian soldiers embraced the punitive approach to such an extent that they overextended the rules of engagement.
Based on the author's background,
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Marno de Boer is currently studying for an L.L.M. in public international law at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, after finishing an M.A. in the history of warfare at the War Studies Department of King’s College, London. This article is based on the thesis he wrote for his B.A. at University College, Utrecht, the Netherlands.
I expected more than what I got.
First, a statement as to factual accuracy (and my use of "DKI"), starting with an assertion by the author:
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The penchant to kill resulted in the frequent execution of prisoners, which hampered Rhodesia’s intelligence effort, something existing studies of the war often overlook.[85]
85. Cilliers, 218-35. For a discussion of Rhodesia’s intelligence effort without reference to the issue of prisoners; Godwin and Hancock, The Rhodesian War, 284 refers to Cocks (236) to show how the war brutalized white society; Moorcraft does not mention the execution of prisoners.
(1) J.K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (Beckenham: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985); (2) Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die - The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, c. 1970-1980 (Harare: Baobab Books, 1995, first published 1993 by Oxford University Press); (3) Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War: A Military History (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2008).
Throughout this review, I've expanded the author's citations (in the qotes) to present the full citation (which he presents the first time he cites the source).
DKI as to Godwin, Cocks and Moorcraft; but the author (de Boer) states that those sources do not refer to the "issue of prisoners" or "the execution of prisoners".
DKI means generally ("Denies Knowledge or Information sufficient to affirm or deny the truth of the claim made; and therefore leaves the claimant to proof of the claim"); here it means that I don't have the book and am left only with addressing the author's assertions. I do NOT assume that those assertions are true; nor do I claim they are false with respect to the sources he claims.
I have and have read Cilliers (typed manuscript). It does not contain any mention of "the execution of prisoners". Thus, de Boer's assertion ("The penchant to kill resulted in the frequent execution of prisoners...") is unsourced. To what extent, his other assertions hold up is beyond my materials and the amount of time I want to spend on this.
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One might expect (from an LLM candidate in I Law) somethiung of a legal discussion of Rhodesian ROEs. In that, de Boer disappoints. He does set out something of a "statement of facts" in his section "Violence Toward Civilians" (p. 8 pdf).
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Violence against civilians also supports the thesis that soldiers adopted and extended the punitive approach to counterinsurgency. About 19,000 African civilians died in the war. Partly this was a result of insurgent actions. They used force against uncooperative civilians, used them as cover, and targeted the rural health and veterinary services. This later caused a surge of malaria, rabies, and tsetse flies. As the war intensified, the government allowed more violence against black civilians. This punitive approach had started in 1973 with the imposition of fines on communities that aided insurgents. Brutalities against civilians were not yet accepted, but in the late 1970s Rhodesia used the term “killed in crossfire” rather liberally.[72]
72. Moorcraft, 38, 129-35. For a detailed account of ZANLA coercion in peasant communities, see Norma J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War Peasant Voices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
DKI as to the sources; esp. as to de Boer's bottom line: "Brutalities against civilians were not yet accepted, but in the late 1970s Rhodesia used the term “killed in crossfire” rather liberally." Cilliers does give just over 5K in "civilian KIAs" for 1973-1978 (p.242 type; p.143 pdf; snip attached)
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There was never a clear and uniform policy targeting civilians though. Actually, the cabinet always pushed for a tougher approach, while General Walls, Rhodesia’s most senior military official, tried to limit the freedom Ian Smith wanted to give him. At one point Smith, supported by several cabinet members, even proposed to abandon the “Queensbury Rules of waging warfare” and impose nationwide martial law. Walls retorted that if the cabinet really wanted that, it should resign and let him rule the country at the head of a military junta.[73]
73. Flower, 211. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly - An Intelligence Chief on Record - Rhodesia into Zimbabwe - 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987)
DKI as to the source.
The term “Queensbury Rules of waging warfare” is legally meaningless - as well as militarily meaningless, for that matter. Based on two of the quotes below ("regular police work", "the Rule of Law applied"), we might equate “Queensbury Rules" to the "Rule of Law" (using that somewhat ambiguous term as shorthand for the rules set by domestic law for peacetime law enforcement).
That situation is quite different from "nationwide martial law". Setting up a debate between "nationwide rule of law" and "nationwide martial law" is a strawman. An insurgency can be handled indigenously where the "Rule of Law" applies generally, but where the indigenous "Laws of War" apply locally. An example, of course, is our Civil War (the 1863 Lieber Code), and the consequent periods of Reconstruction and Redemption.
cont. in Part 2.
Read it and agree it's specious.
Too many instances of "it was said," "it seems," "it appears that..." My impression is that he took a predetermined position and cherry picked to support it.
His 'conclusion' is flawed at best, arguable in the case of every war and certainly not proven for the one he discusses.
I don't agree that the article necessarily reflects badly on Military Review. They publish a lot of articles of real merit and as many with no merit with an almost equal number of mediocrities. I think that sort of goes with the mission of the magazine. Been my observation over 50 plus years that about a third of the magazine on average has some worth and I've found that others agree -- where we sometimes differ is on which articles were worthwhile... :wry: