IISS briefing on Libya: key points
Update on Post 268.
The IISS panel noted:
- There was very little evidence of planning by the resistance movement, nor any attempt assemble ex-soldiers and use those soldiers who have changed sides.
2. It was not clear if air strikes would be decisive over the Gaddafi forces use of armour and artillery. Forces that were two brigades, mixed composition, with lots of armour and artillery; with one in the east heading for Benghazi and the other in the west. Impacting their morale, coherence and tactics was the key.
3. In the east the centre of gravity was Benghazi, a city of 500-670k over fifty square kilometres; which if defended long enough could get the "Sarejevo effect".
4. Civil wars last longer than expected and on Tuesday 'the government have the advantage, victory is probable not inevitable'.
5. Gaddafi had only forty aircraft available, 20% of his capability; helicopters had not been seen much, perhaps due to the profusion of mobile AA guns held by the resistance.
6. There was already in place an adequate naval presence, from the NATO Standby Force and the UK had already moved AWACS and tankers to Cyprus.