Maybe not devastated, just returned to basics...
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
The problem with local governance in Astan is that it has been devestated by 40+ years of turmoil. Many of these problems are themselves tiny - in comparison to the regional strategic issues which BW and Ken have been discussing. E.g, two guys trade sheep, but one of the sheep is "defective". How does the guy with the bad sheep get what the parties consider fair justice ?
From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and were not constrained by Eurocentric concerns over equity and 'the rule of law.' Nothing wrong with the rule of law, it just doesn't have to be our version of law... ;)
Quote:
Another problem you might face with Marc and me is what we might do if the GoA partner is part of the problem and not part of the solution. All here might dwell on that question, which emerges as well in the more elegant area of regional geo-politics.
Why dwell on it -- it is a western imposition that the Afghans believed they were compelled to take in order to get some of the aid they desperately needed. It was a really dumb idea and the USA forced it down everyone's throat and we put one of Kipling's 'wily Pathans' in charge. He's being wily. What a surprise. They're untrustworthy. What a surprise. "The ANP tell the bad guys we're coming." What a surprise. There's corruption in the government. What a surprise. In one of my first dozen posts on this board over a couple of years ago I said, re the way things were then going in Afghanistan; "Welcome to South Asia." Still true.
Of course the GOA is part of the problem. We created it thus it's become our problem. ;)
Why, Counsellor, surely you noticed this:
"From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and..."
I do believe you missed the first part of my comment and that significant 'if.'
Which of course means that I do not have the foggiest idea how well the system that I know did work almost 40 years ago works today, else I might have made a more positive statement. :D
However, I'd hazard a guess that it works well in some places, less well in others -- and part of the 'less well' is due to ongoing conflict. Been my observation that no system of local government or law works that well when rounds get fired too frequently.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
My take is that we do have an obligation to clean up the garbage in a neighborhood, even if (1) we should not have been in the neighborhood in the first place; or (2) if we were there for a good reason, we should not have littered the neighborhood.
But, our obligation to clean up our garbage is subject to a limitation. We have to forego that obligation if in doing so we will worsen the neighborhood's condition. I believe that Astan is very close to that tipping point.
In reverse order, probably not that near a tipping point IMO.
On governmental change, good wrapup on our errors on the front page of SWJ by one JT (LINK). He agrees with you.
I do not. I'm afraid it might create more problems than it solves, not least because it would likely dump some on the fence Pushtuns off said fence. My personal view is that it would merely shuffle one group of Afghans doing what Afghans do best for another group who would do pretty much the same thing, just with different people. Plus, like it or not, the wishes of NATO must be considered, no clue what their reaction might be.
Our obligation clean up our garbage is also, I am afraid, subject to not get done because governments are generally loath to admit they erred -- and we surely did err in forcing the Bonn meeting, a Constitution with glaring holes and a President we didn't understand all that well. Still, in this case we have a new US Administration that is busy repudiating all those things it inherited from its predecessor that said predecessor did not shrewdly lock in to tie the hands of the USG for many years in the future. Does Afghanistan fit in that category? Dunno. We'll see. My suspicion is that we'll just try to nudge the Afghans to do their own changing. Doubt it will result in much improvement...
Noticed that a move of all US elements to the East is being considered; that will increase pressure on some Pushtun heavy areas if true and it is done. It may also relive pressure on some others -- or allow for an Afghanization. Fun times in River City...
As an aside on Iraq and Afghanistan; those people haggle for sport -- we have absolutely NO business getting in haggling contests with them. They are not going to do things in the western way, period. Two Rudyard quotes:
"Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old."
"And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.""
India is an interesting case
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Originally Posted by
slapout9
Bifurcation:eek: systems remain integrated (whole) when they provide mutual benefit which is why they were caused to form in the first place. (the governed ....the government.... and the binding consent to be governed) When they don't they begin to bifurcate (split apart) as in the Civil War(war of northern aggression). Which is why it is total bullstuff that democracies are stable. They are designed to be unstable :eek: there is always a party that looses with the ever present idea to bifurcate (split off from the system) or become violent or start an insurgency. Which is why we usually cause most of our own problems in the world.
India like to promote itself as "The World's Largest Democracy!"
A savvy friend of mine pointed out, that the dark side of that proclamation is that they have the world's largest suppressed minority. This is a country with a number of smoldering powder kegs beneath it. The growing middle class is a hope for a stabilizing influence, but only if it cuts across the class and culture divides that define this power.
I mention this, because our course in Afghanistan has pressed hard into Pakistan; and that in turn begins to apply pressure on India. On more good reason to consider an appetite suppressant in our approach to Afghanistan.
For every complex problem....
For every complex problem there is a pefectly simple solution that is entriely wrong. H.L. Mencken, The Baltimore Sage
I actually thought some of the earlier comments in this blog held a lot of insights.
Thinking about this problem in systemics: What kind of systems are we dealing with? Non-state, local/tribal, regional and cross-border, minimal governmental structures.
Somebody started out with the idea of closing off the Paki border, then a retort that (1) that is not possible; and (2) it is not desirable.
Then there was amish-mash of different ideas and strategies about how to "do something" or get out.
What systems dynamics approaches start with is an effort to identify all the basic complex systems and subsystems, and their interactions with each other. You start with what is there, not with what we would like it to be. You look at what's broken, not who is to blame. You figure out what the system (the peoples of these border and conflict areas) will realistically accept and the trade-offs associated with effecting your reasonably determined desired end states. Then you look for ways to modify, interact with, or improve the system's performance in some reasonably attainable manner not inconsistent with the desired end state.
I keep reading reports and opinions from some pretty well-informed folks about the various complex sub-systems, the minimalist governmental structure and resources, and the resourcefulness of opposition to us.
But nobody seems to have focused on putting a viable program or plan into motion that addresses the real system that is there, and what can credibly be accomplished by it. Just a lot of bits and pieces, and incoherent government-speak (or worse yet, military jargon). Folks bandying about old fashioned nation-state stuff about this country opr that country, and how to fix "it," when we all know that these kinds of places aren't really nation-states, and the problem definitions and solutions are well outside that kind of thinking.
Seems to me somebody ought to start defining these places based on the people (down to the smallest levels in the places that matter) that are there, what they are about, up to, or motivated by, and what, with our increasingly limited resources and capabilities, and the severe geography, weather, and economic limitations, we can realistically achieve.
Success in Afghanistan is a question, not an answer. What do we want to achieve in that real and complicated place, and how do we intend to attain it?
Steve
No, I realize your opinions are informed and insightful
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
Those thoughts didn't exactly spring from a vacuum: I've been through a fair bit of history and theory, and done business in the Gulf for many years. I know that on occasion we've waded into the region and messed things up, but I doubt that we can alter that by wading in again with the idea that we can set things right, or pressure others into doing so according to our prescriptions. Good intentions do not assure good outcomes, and the idea of the US trying to act as self-appointed spokesman for the Saudi populace strikes me as something that could yield all manner of unintended consequences, most of them undesirable and many of them downright horrible. I'd prefer to see less meddling, not more, and none at all until we've resolved our current entanglements.
I'm still very curious about what you'd like to pressure the Saudis to do, and what sort of pressure you think would yield positive results.
The Saudi's need to listen to their own populace, and open that dialogue so as to develop some reasonable reforms. Currently, they are talking reform, but really have no incentive to surrender much if any of the total control that they have employed for generations to control this populace. The times are changing though. Its hard to keep the "boy down on the farm" once he's seen Paris.
The perception that Bin Laden tries to play up is that the King is corrupt, and worse has sold out to Western influence as manifested in the U.S. relationship; and that good Arabs must purge the peninsula of this apostate influence, and that to do so they must first break the support of the U.S. to the King.
I recommend that the US adopt about 80% of Bin Laden's message. I agree that we have become too involved in the politics of the region as part of our Cold War engagement and efforts to ensure the flow of oil; and that we too believe that the King should be more sensitive to the desires of his populace.
Then announce and implement a program of lessening out "footprint" in the country, while at the same time facilitating ("carrots and sticks" to get the King to the table) a series of meetings between the King and representatives of key interst groups in the Kingdom to discuss reform. By doing this we disempower bin Laden tremendously. There is no need for the US to actually participate in the talks, and best if we do not. Hell, let AQ send reps. I suspect that only moderate change will come from this, but it will be much more than what would come without it. As an example, many in the Kingdom want a judiciary free from the King's control. That would be a huge change forward. More importantly we facilitate a much more positive narrative for us while at the same time disempowering bin Laden's ideological message in a major way. There is no fast answer; but we must change our approach. Currently we call Saudi insurgent's "terrorists" and enable the King's efforts to ruthlessly suppress these popular movements in the name of GWOT. This empowers bin Laden's message.
When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.
Hopefully this helps highlight the type of efforts I mean. To over-engage to this end is as bad as the over-engaging that we have done to date in the other direction.
Once we make some progress here, we can add issues like greater Saudi effort on the Palestinian problem; or less support to AQ, etc.