Absolutely not a given...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
TAH
#1. Pretty sure the answer is no in many cases. Most likely, it gets "held" at Brigade level or higher.:mad:
Commanders are people and the Personnel system can put an aggressive risk taker at Bde and give him Bn Cdrs who are moderately or highly risk averse -- that and all the permutations in between. He can direct them to be aggressive but short of an OER Driven Relief for Cause or preferring charges (both frowned upon in this modern Yankee Army...) he cannot make them do it his way. There are many ways to ignore or divert the wishes of one's Boss.
I've seen more than one aggressive Bde Cdr sabotaged by one or more Bn Cdrs. Co Cdrs don't have as much latitude as a LTC must be given but they, too, play that game. Co Cdrs know all theiur Troops and are generally protective of them, they can oput a brake on a Bn Cdrs ideas. Consider also that Bn Cdrs know at least some of their Troops, a good one will know many of his 800 or so bods -- and may be possibly protective of them. Bde Cdrs rarely know many or even any of their 3K or so souls and they know they've got a shot at a star so they tend to be more aggressive.
Doctrinally, Cdrs at all levels have a responsibility for mission accomplishment and for force protection -- how those two factors are balanced is very much an individual decision and all the METT-TC factors can play into that as well.
It's all about mission, people and a pot-luck personnel system. Every unit, ever rotation, every war is different. There are never any singular answers...
As for Yemen, we might have been that abysmally stupid but I'd sure hope not. Iraq, even if poorly done, made a little sense; Yemen would not make an iota. Hunting would be bombers is a LE job, not a military effort...
MRAP Future Discussion Paper
MRAP Future Discussion Paper
Entry Excerpt:
MRAP Future Discussion Paper
by Ryan T. Kranc
Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicle (MRAP) is a broad term encompassing three main vehicle categories with 28 specific types of vehicle. The vehicle family was procured and acquired in mass as a result of a growing improvised explosive device (IED) threat encountered in Iraq in 2004. Though there is no doubt that the MRAP family of vehicles has saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives since it was first fielded and placed into operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the MRAP should not be incorporated into the US Army operational structure for a number of reasons. It offers protection against a specific threat type and does not lend well to the higher intensity realm of full spectrum operations. The MRAP incorporation into current brigade combat team structures is as infeasible as it is impractical. Finally, further evaluation and analysis is needed in terms of DOTMLPF in order to more fully understand the long term impacts of MRAP inclusion and fusion into the force. Until those issues are resolved it would be irresponsible, costly, and infeasible to incorporate the MRAP into the operational structure of the US Army.
Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper
MAJ Ryan T. Kranc is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
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The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s
The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s
Entry Excerpt:
The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCTs
by Joe Parker
Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s
The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle had a highly publicized entry into the military ranks of vehicles, first with the Marines in 2004, and then eventually filling requirements with the Army to provide a dramatic increase in IED and blast protection than the ill-suited HMMVW for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rushed in to production by as many as nine separate contractors , the endstate resulted in an accelerated production of multiple variations of the MRAP, with the types roughly categorized as Category I, II, and III and based on number of occupants and mission specific mine/IED clearance operations Now, as the combat mission in Iraq has completed and leaders begin to discuss life beyond Afghanistan, the MRAPs usefulness is in question. The Department of Defense is actively pursuing a replacement for the HMMVW with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program , and the MRAP is facing an identity crisis. Is it a troop transporter or a combat system? What capability beyond the blast protection does it bring and how does that translate into future utilization? It would appear that the MRAP does have a future beyond our current conflicts as Defense Secretary Robert Gates instructed the military to incorporate it into the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTMOD) plan. What is yet to be seen is how well the MRAP incorporates itself into the BCTMOD plan, what role and capability it fills in the Brigade Combat Team, and what additional requirements it places on existing force structure.
Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT’s
MAJ Joe Parker is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served three years in Iraq as a platoon leader, brigade maintenance officer, and company commander. He holds a BA in Communications from Wake Forest University, and is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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