Thanks for the link, Kiwi.
That is a great article. The Journal, as always, has great material...
Couple of things leaped out of the article:
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Numerous reasons for the ‘poor’ state of infantry marksmanship were given. They included the lack of suitable ranges near unit barracks leading to insufficient shooting practice, poor fire control by NCOs and junior officers, soldiers deliberately aiming off because training with blank ammunition encouraged them to do so, carriage of excessive amounts of ammunition encouraging profligacy, failure of instructors to instil the desire to shoot to kill, and other reasons. Few of the
complainants mentioned the difficulties of acquiring a target in the combat conditions that prevailed in Vietnam.
I know you two know this but a point or two on that bears voicing; The training complaints are almost certainly valid but the specific conditions in Viet Nam are more valid -- and the fact that the poor training prior was not rapidly adapted to the specific combat arena is troublesome. Not slamming Oz -- witness US performance in Viet Nam and today.
The problem is the bureaucracy cannot or will not shift gears with rapidity and a part of that problem is that the 'Trainers' (and Doctrine writers) are working in air conditioned comfort and tend to adapt what they write and do to cause minimum disruption to what is currently being done at home.
The solution of course is for Theater experienced people 9not short term visitors or observers) to do a trainup on units previously well schooled in the basics with local adaptations to a broad -- NOT specific -- doctrine. As an example from the article, the GPMG to the high ground rule is indicative.
Or an indictment...
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If caught in an ambush or a patrol encounter the enemy usually sought to break contact quickly and escape into the jungle. They were very skilled at doing this and—using high volumes of fire and fragmentation effect from AK47s, RPD light machine-guns and RPGs—often broke contact before the 1ATF patrol could organise effective indirect fire support. Artillery responding to an infantry call for fire support usually took about 10 minutes to get effective fire onto a target. Air support could take even longer. But Table 3 shows that in more than 60 per cent of cases, the enemy had already broken contact and escaped in less than10 minutes.
The western reliance on massive HE fire support to win small contacts is counterproductive. That time factor is ALWAYS problematic and numerous patrol actions have fizzled to naught due to the technique.
The 1ATF in Viet Nam was good, the only unit I worked with, 3 RAR, was better than most US units at most everything. Still, the number of VC / NVA initiated contacts they had was very similar to US experience.
If the other guy is initiating most contacts, you're doing something wrong.
Lastly, they wrote one very scary thing in that article. Last paragraph:
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Perhaps a future family of small arms will assist this process by capturing electronically the date, time, location, number
of rounds fired and sight picture every time the trigger is squeezed. Once analysed, this data might inform subsequent training and tactics leading to improved combat performance.
Metrics are great. Metrics lend weight to arguments :rolleyes: Metrics such as those lend weight to weapons. Not a good plan.
It is a good article but contains no surprises. From it, Wilf will probably derive different lessons but mine are:
- Doctrine must be broad and generic; excess specificity in an attempt to cover all eventualities and directed rigid adherence turn it into dogma and will get people killed unnecessarily.
- Doctrine MUST adapt to the enemy and all the METT-TC factors of the moment. If it does not, it is wrong and must be discarded.
- Training must be thorough and well grounded in the basics of the trade and must allow for theater or enemy, area and time specific modification. Rigid adherence to one model or 'system' of processes is wrong.
- Theater specific training should be rapidly implemented and be ongoing in theater. All too often, we do not do the latter to avoid 'hassling the troops.' Training isn't hassling, it's life assurance.
- A Volume of fire is no substitute for adequate accurate fire.
- Western reliance -- dependence even -- on supporting fires and lots of HE is rarely applicable in Small Wars and training that emphasizes its use is damaging to not only unit initiative and aggressiveness but also to actual prosecution of contacts and even the war.
- Weapons must be selected with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. If adequate funds are available, theater specific weapons should be procured and used.
- Units must be trained with broadest possible usage in mind if funds are limited. Adequate funds must be made available for theater specific weapons and training prior to commitment if possible and absolutely for follow on forces.
There is no one size fits all... ;)
Sommygun. Training and METT-TC. Amazing. :D
Training is supposed to take thought, it's hard work if you do it right.
Jones R.E.
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...You may be aiming at shadows, moving branches or just where you think the sound is coming from but you are aiming at a specific point in space. You can't physically see an enemy occupying that point, but you aim anyway.
Some times you see a few but not all, some times you see none, depends on many things; essentially if they're firing at you, you have targets, if vague and shadowy. The key is to fire low generally aimed shots; if your bullets go high, they won't impress anyone and they won't hit anything.
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...on a target range simulating those conditions, i.e. brush so heavy that you can't physically see the targets but you get indicators like gunfire sounds and movement.
Been done and was done at the olf Jungle Warfare School in Panama on a routine basis. What happens is that you get a few hits, IIRC the average was about 20-30%+, target placement dependent and enough to deter most opponents -- problem is that targets generally don't move so it's artificial. It works better against people because they have a fifty fifty chance of moving into as well as out of fire cones.
Wilf
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a.) In heavy forest/jungle you can't see the target but you still have to suppress them, so high volumes of fire across broad arcs is merited. The physics of dispersion means this will only work at pretty close range.
Agree except for the broad arcs; control in Jungle is very difficult and people do get out of line, ahead others or fall behind totally misoriented, etc. -- best solution with moderately well trained troops is to use a clock system. Fire is directed by a clock number and people restrain their fire to fifteen degrees on either side of that. As each clock number spans 30 degrees, that's easy -- if the word is enemy at 2 O'clock (or it's obvious that's were they are...), then everyone except the point and trail (men or parties) fire at from one to three o'clock. Point and trail get 270 degree arcs for obvious reasons. Most people in the good units in Viet Nam told their troops to flank into an ambush, fire one mag on full auto in short burst obver their arc and then switch to semi-auto. I'm genetically or geriatrically indisposed toward full auto so I always insisted on strictly semi-auto. I know, I know, we don't have to reload after each shot anymore; still...
NOTE; there are many variations, the above is a simple generic meeting engagement or ambush response. Train the basics thoroughly, apply METT-TC...
Whatever; the key is to make sure they aim below waist level and compensate for any slope -- some are amazed at what slope does to firing. Its effects are too often ignored; you can't do that.
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At longer ranges...This would also apply in the urban terrain.
True. Takes a lot of Ammo but not hard to train provided you can replicate the vegetation differences to a general level locally. Lacking real greenery, I've taken old shot-up E Silhouette targets and chopped them up a bit. Have also used camouflage nets which I then exchanged for new ones to the S4s distress and my satisfaction. We used BB guns to teach snap shooting in dense vegetation meeting engagements -- before there was Simunition and Paint Ball. :D
Whoever it was, they were smart Canadians...
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Originally Posted by
Chris jM
...whether this was the Canadian Army, their Bn or simply their recon pl ... had given up on the concept of double-tapping in favour of a slower rate of single, well aimed shots.
Yes they were...
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From my perspective, it's less a training problem and more a tactical problem.
You cannot separate the two; the one leads to the other and it has to be a continuous loop.
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I see the section/ squad commander being someone who should have the 'bag of tricks' up his sleeve and be able to pull them out as he 'reads the battle'. Controlling the wight of fire and method of movement comes down to training and drills, but templating how you shoot in what example, beyond the initial IA of returning fire, is to me unnecessary.
Control in the jungle is quite different than control in rolling terrain with some vegetation. Control in training is different than control in a fire fight. Combine the two and you are confronted with the FACT that ability to "read the battle" may be somewhat limited; ability to exercise control may be severely limited; the Leader may be a casualty and half dozen other things -- thus everyone has to know what to do. That occurs with good or even just decent training.
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One thing I beg to differ in is calibres. My experience is completely limited to that of training, but I don't really see the need for a 7.62 round instead of a 5.56 in close country/ jungle. Your either shooting to kill the enemy or shooting to suppress him, and I don't really see 7.62 penetration doing much in punching through cover to justify the extra weight.
First, an aside. Always shoot to kill, if you do that, it will 'suppress' the bad guys; shooting to suppress them will likely not suppress them or even impress them... :eek:
We can disagree on the caliber issue, not a problem. However, the 7.62 punching through cover is not the issue. The 5.56 being deflected by leaves is the issue.
I understand 10 mags is the norm for 5.56 carrying folks nowadays (way too much ammo and weight IMO) so you're looking at about 10 x 494g= 4.94 kg; a more sensible load seven mags of 7.62x39 would run about 7 x 750g or 5.25 kg kg. An adequate load of 100 rds of 7.62x51 would be 5 x 698g = 3.5 kg.
Thus I'm not sure I agree on the weight issue even if you add in another kg or two for the weapon. If one is more comfortable with additional ammo, add another 120 rounds, two Bandoleers of stripper clips and you only get another 3.5 kg = 7 kg. Small price to pay for more likely hits, IMO. YMMV.
All weapons are compromises, there is no perfect fit for all the variations possible in METT-TC. ;)