This last paragraphs gets to a key point I try to make
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
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Today, however, we are thinking in terms of two rival political leaderships: insurgent and government, and two rival military forces: irregular and regular, with the people reduced to being the “objective” or the “terrain” being fought over. I am struck that we no longer can conceive of a people opposing us. Somehow, either insurgents or other political and military entities rise to oppose our actions—not as an expression of popular will, but in spite of it. Thus we feel if we can just shield (protect) the people from the depredations of the insurgents, the “popular will” will naturally fall our way. There’s a sense, dangerous in my mind, that, if given a fair chance, we will always get support. I don’t think that is a safe assumption. There are areas where we will go and governments we may seek to support, where the people will oppose us, regardless of how secure we can make them.
Phil Ridderhof USMC
The first being that the outside party is never actually conducting COIN themselves, that COIN and Insurgency are internal business, and much more a family dispute over governance than they are warfare, regardless of how violent that squabble may become (you can't truely hate someone you don't love, so family squabbles can be the worst kind).
So as an insurgent emerges from the populace to compete with the current government for the support of the same, it very much is a tug of war, with the support of the populace being the ultimate prize, and also the COG. A shared COG to be competed for, rather than respective friendly and enemy COGs to be either defeated or defended ala CvC. This is why I say that insurgency really isn't warfare regardless of how violent, and that to apply rules/principles of warfare rather than understanding and addressing root causes and employing that understanding in ones competition for the support of the populace is likely to lead to a tragic, hard to reach, and temporary in duration, solution.
As an outside party to such a competition, one is either trying to gain inroads with a land and people to serve your own national (or if a non-state actor like AQ, organizational) interests, you are conducting what US doctrine describes as "unconventional warfare." If, on the other hand, you already have a stake in this land/populace through the current government, you are likely to come in on their side in an attempt to sustain that status quo. In US doctrine we call this 'foreign internal defense'. To assume that you as the outsider are conducting COIN is the fastest way to get yourself into all kinds of inappropriate roles and develop no end to crazy mission creep. Just not a good idea, and yet, according to our NEW COIN doctirne, that is what we are doing. Bad bit of doctrine, IMHO.
So, while CvC is good knowledge (Scientia) to have, I always believe that understanding (Intelectus) trumps knowledge on just about everything except a standardized test. This is no standardized test.
1 Attachment(s)
Picture worth more words than I care to type...
OK, hopefully this is readable. The text hits some points I believe to be important, but the chart is how I see insurgency in relation to peace in every nation.
Most of us are fortunate to live in states that are happily bumping around somewhere down in the "Peace" bubble of phase 0 pre-insurgency. As the government becomes more out of touch with its populace, or the governance becomes "poor", the populace will trend up the curved line to the right. Now, an insurgent leader can artificially prevent it from trending up as well as right by choosing a non-violent approach. Also, a government can suppress violence as well and be horribly "poor". But once those artificial constraints are removed (If Dr. King had be replaced by a Black Panther-type leader; or the example of Tito and the former Yugoslavia), the populace will pop up to its natural state of violence on the curve above.
Important to always understand that the insurgent will flow back and forth between phases throughout his campaign, and even by region; also that he can win in any phase.
Equally important, is that in this model the role of the military is not to "defeat" the insurgent, nor to "create effective governmental services". No, the military is callled in as the populace moves up the curve thru the nexus of acceptable violence into phase I insurgency. Kitson would probably call this the transition from Subversion to Insurgency. That's fine, so long as one understands that they are merely two stages of the same thing, with the same root causes that must be addressed. So the military mission is not to achieve Nirvana, but to merely apply what force and governance assistance necessary to move the populace back down the curve into phase 0. This may require a bit of a nudge straight down, but not all the way to the floor, and only so far as necessary to allow one to begin pushing it to the left, and bringing in more foreign civil and HN capacity to move it left as well.
Many historic COIN "victories" merely crush the insurgent straight down. Removing the capacity for violence without addressing the root causes of poor governance. I call this "counterinsurgent" rather than "counterinsurgency" operations. Once that artifical constraint, usually a military boot, is removed from the populaces neck, they ALWAYS go right back to their natural state.
Transition Zone - Continuum
As to this:
Quote:
from MikeF
I would categorize these cases (Mike's Transition Zones) as Phase Zero of Mao's Three Phase Protracted War.
No. The Transition Zone is not linear (that is, does not apply to only one of the phases, whether Mao's or Bob's). It applies whenever the Political Struggle and Military Struggle co-exist.
As correctly stated:
Quote:
from Bill Moore
I would argue that when we talk about transitions, we're thinking conventionally and assuming sequenced phases. Subversion doesn't transition, it is constant and much like armed action can support the narrative, it can also support the subversive effort. Not all subversion is violence free (regardless of what the book states). What is the role of the military? One of its roles is to clearly put pressure on the fielded guerrillas and provide security to the populace (maybe to protect them, or in the case where they just won't like the counterinsurgent to oppress them) to allow the political process to unfold. I think you would agree that if there is no political process, then the insurgency won't be defeated, but if the military is skilled enough they may be able to suppress it.
Subversion and infiltration are just two examples of the Transition Zone continuum.
There is a more linear transition zone (e.g., between "Phase 0" and "Phase 1") in my chart. That is the vertical blue line starting off the Armed Conflict Spectrum. Both operationally and legally, there is a grey area between "no armed conflict" and "armed conflict".
Hope this begins to clear up the complex concepts inherent in transitions, which are not necessarily linear.
Note also that my chart is based on a simple Euclidian rectangle and straight lines. Reality could be non-Euclidian with all sorts of curves, etc. I'm trying to present some basic concepts.
Regards
Mike