Unauthorised leaking: a shock?
A twist to the latest round in open diplomacy, according to this opinion:http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/gl...11/07/05/leaks
Another thread: pointer to
There's a long-running thread 'Supply Routes to Afghanistan' on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6386
Something that does not change?
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For Britons and Americans watching the hard-fought progress of our Coalition troops in Helmand, the harsh reality is that Nato could do everything right in Afghanistan and still lose the broader regional campaign against terrorism if Pakistan fails to contain its internal militants. This makes the fight in Pakistan, and finding means to help Pakistanis help themselves, the most important battle in the world.
I relocated this article written in July 2009 by David Kilcullen and cite only the last paragraph as it is fitting; so my emphasis and repetition:
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..the fight in Pakistan...the most important battle in the world.
Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...urzon-do.thtml
Interesting comment on the relationship between poverty and extremism
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...ass-extremists
Quote:
Summary:
Policymakers have converged on economic development as a key to ending terrorism, in the belief that poorer people are more susceptible to the appeals of violent groups. In fact, in Pakistan, the poor are less supportive of militant groups than the middle class.
The ISI: an insider's view
Lt. General and former ISI Chief Assad Durrani has supplied to The Atlantic journal a text entitled 'The ISI: AN EXCEPTIONAL SECRET SERVICE'. Link:http://www.theatlantic.com/internati...inside/242471/
The intermediary writes:
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Durrani is not a booster for the Taliban; he is a hard core realist -- and his view is that Pakistan's generals prize the Taliban for its ability to give them "strategic depth". Whether you agree or not, his assessments are very much worth reading in full.
There are some moments to pause when reading, especially when you reach the Epilogue, cited in full:
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I do not know what all the ISI knew about Bin Laden's whereabouts before he was reportedly killed, or when the Pakistani leadership was informed about the US operation on that fateful night. But the fact that we denied all knowledge or cooperation -- even though the military and the police cordons were in place at the time of the raid, our helicopters were hovering over the area, and the Army Chief was in his command post at midnight -- explains the Country's dilemma.
The Atlantic intermediary ends with:
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The most important takeaway from this fascinating snapshot of the ISI, the Taliban, and Pakistan's view of America and its strategic choices is that Pakistan will never be a predictable puppet of US interests.