How about a different question
Quote:
Originally Posted by
UrsaMaior
How tight are the ties within the SCO? Is it comparable to the NATO? Based on the above quotes its members do not want to settle their own territorial disputes (with each other or with other countries) -at least for now-.
Russia might easily get away with it (like the West has with Kosovo). If there is a vote in the UN sec council it surely can enlist an abstain from China.
A bit off topic but will the israelis risk their special connections to China (J-10 Lavi anyone?) by bombing her second biggest crude supplier (ie Iran?)?
How likely is it that Iran might be slightly more inclined to entertain suggestions from its newly found big bro in regards to its aspirations:eek:
Thank you very much laying it out in
such terms as someone like myself :o can absorb it well.
It would seem though if I follow that line of thinking it would be very easy for things to get drawn out of control by such circumstances as those "likely candidates" for example doing what they must internally in order to justify " hardening" themselves against said threat (villifying) Russia.
It only makes political sense there as well. How long exactly do Putin and others expect to be able to balance that with what their working at before it ends up causing more trouble than it helps their cause.
LOT's of leaders have tried that throughout history and it almost never works for long. Things get out of control either inside or outside, often both.
Also I thought your example with Sadam was quite enlightening, Either way he's no longer in charge (and hes not breathing anymore either) It would seem no more advisable that they worry less about external politics than that the rest of us recognize the internals.
Now & Then - 2008 & 1968 - Meeting the Bear
Ron made a point - what about the non-bear leader who has to follow internal politics that are contrary to a more rational external policy ? Georgia would suggest that he and his country would be in trouble. If we are talking about that situation being bi-lateral pathological between two ICBM powers, then we would MIRV each other to MAD.
Ran into two different views of a small country meeting the bear - one from now and one then. Both are successive weekly commentaries from Sanomat. The first is dead serious; the second has its comic moments.
Quote:
HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - FOREIGN
19.8.2008 - THIS WEEK
COMMENTARY: The international emergency number is 56-68-79-08
By Unto Hämäläinen
When the current EU Englargement Commissioner Olli Rehn was a fresh-faced Finnish student politician-in-embryo in the 1980s, a Soviet politician asked him during some bilateral discussions if he happened to know what the international emergency number was.
Rehn confessed he did not.
“It’s 56-68-79", said the Soviet politician with a broad grin.
.....
The atmosphere in Finland, too, is changing.
Just under a year ago, when Defence Minister Jyri Häkämies announced in Washington that Finland's geographical location brings three main security policy challenges: "Russia, Russia, and Russia", he was practically lynched in the market square back home.
Were Häkämies to deliver the same speech today, it would not provoke such strong reactions.
In historical terms, Finland is now faced with a new and challenging situation.
In 1956, 1968, and 1979, the nation's leaders really did not have much alternative than to hunker down and remain as quiet as a mouse in their own foxholes.
Now Finland's position is rather different. Parliament, the president, and the government can choose between two alternatives: either to join NATO or continue along the old path. And this is also well understood in Moscow.
Russia's most important objective "in the Finland file" is that Finland should remain outside NATO. If Moscow were now to start exerting pressure on Finland, it would also be pushing an EU-member around.
The fear in Moscow is also that then the Finns would rapidly exercise their option of joining NATO.
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/COM.../1135238763197
So, the lack of restraint by the Russians (because of their internal politics) could lead to Finland being pushed to do something (NATO) that would be adverse to Russia's external policy (for Finland). Here, the risk seems to be Russia's, unless it wants to engage in a costly war for little gain.
The situation was far different in 1968, when the Finns believed they were a candidate for invasion. Then it was Prague Spring, which became KGB Autumn. Here's the Finnish story and the merits of restraint.
Quote:
HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - HOME
26.8.2008 - THIS WEEK
COMMENTARY: Fears of Soviet invasion in August and September 1968
By Ilkka Malmberg
In the stands at the Olympic Stadium, during the annual Finnkampen athletics meet between Finland and Sweden, the rumour started to go around: hundreds of Soviet tanks had appeared behind the border, ready to attack.
The Kymi Jaegers were in position to the east of Hamina ready to repulse an assault.
In Lappeenranta, Finland’s own tanks had been moved up to the border zone.
It was the last week of August in 1968. Czechoslovakia had been invaded and occupied just over a week earlier.
The news from Prague unsettled the Finns mightily.
The eternal fear raised its head once more.
......
Back in Helsinki, the ship of state tried to hold its course. The government expressed its sadness at the occupation of Czechoslovakia and hoped for a peaceful outcome. It promised to monitor developments carefully. There was no overt criticism of the Soviet moves.
Deep depression had overtaken President Urho Kekkonen.
”Why the hell did I have to go and agree to stand for re-election? Now I’d be a free man to say what I think”, Kekkonen wrote in his diary.
.....
In any event, the rumour-mill had to be stopped somehow.
The then Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto and his Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen called in the editors-in-chief of the largest daily newspapers and warned them against jumping to overly hasty conclusions.
Karjalainen stressed that the occupation in Czechoslovakia was not having an effect on bilateral relations with the eastern neighbour, and he warned against stirring things up on the foreign policy front.
....
Another who learnt at the time that one did not go antagonising a superpower just like that was a 21-year-old summer reporter with YLE named Paavo Väyrynen (yes, that Väyrynen, later the chairman of the Centre Party and long-serving Foreign Minister).
Väyrynen had been making a radio report of the demonstrations outside the Soviet Embassy on Tehtaankatu, and had interviewed people taking part in the protest.
But the piece was never aired.
“There was talk that the Ministry of the Interior had phoned the newsdesk”, recalls Väyrynen with some ironic amusement.
“They probably didn’t want to have it told just how large the demonstration was. Or what the mood on the street was like.” .....
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Fea.../1135238966894
The various military "incidents" and "rumors of war" are quite humorous - today.
Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto, a Continuation War member of the famous Detachment Törni and a fierce anti-SovCom, must have pulled his hair at the un-readiness of the Finnish Defense Forces in 1968.
Prague Spring crushed, next stop Finland?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
The situation was far different in 1968, when the Finns believed they were a candidate for invasion.
Why would the USSR consider an invasion of Finland necessary in the autumn of 1968? I too have read the recent Finnish articles on the "invasion scare". Put them alongside the massive demo os the USSR Embassy against the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Finnish Communist party condemning the invasion.
I could be wrong, forty years on, wasn't the USSR reluctant to invade Czechoslovakia? Let alone it's Warsaw Pact allies.
One invasion under the Brezhnev Doctrine of a Warsaw Pact member was bad enough, to then invade a friendly, neutral neighbour who posed no threat, crazy IMHO.
davidbfpo
No reason for, or evidence of same, ...
Quote:
Why would the USSR consider an invasion of Finland necessary in the autumn of 1968?
that we can see from the viewpoint of 2008.
The Finns of 1968, having lived in fear of the bear for 20+ years, overreacted to rumors which multiplied. The point of the 2008 Sanomat article was that the government exercised restraint and quashed the "rumors of war".
The Finnish people's reaction against the Russian operations in Czech was quite real - and rational. By that time, the Finnish far left was well on the way to EuroCom, and away from SovCom.
The primary component in the Russian Czech effort was the KGB - a classic political infiltration operation - it brought Andropov some standing in the Politburo. Re-read that story Friday (Mitrokhin Archive, p.247 et seq - then that book's binding fell apart :().
Just finished a 7-part book review post on another discussion board, involving the Mauno Pekkala government of the late 40's. So, my mind is in the wrong decade - and a bit swimmy.
Your 40-year recall is pretty good - want to lend me some ?
Regards to our UK friends.
Mike
NATO urged to bolster Baltic defence
The US called on NATO to be better prepared to defend the three Baltic states from military attack, after Russia’s recent incursion into Georgia.
This should make for some interesting neighbors ;) Hmmm, looks like the Nordstream pipeline may be little more than a pipe dream :D
Quote:
In Brussels, Mr Volker said NATO was firmly committed to defending the Baltic states from attack because, unlike Georgia, they were signatories to the alliance’s Article 5, which guarantees defence of one ally by all the rest.
NATO must, therefore, send signals in the area of military “planning and exercising” that it intends to help shore up the Baltic states.
“Those countries are members of NATO; so if there is any attack on those countries we will all respond”
“We will have to make sure . . . that the Article 5 commitment is realisable not just as a political matter but as a military matter too.”
The Finnish Debate Continues
Some differences of opinion have been developing between PM Vanhanen and FM Stubb over NATO, and perhaps as to the Finnish response in Georgia.
Quote:
HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - FOREIGN
1.9.2008 - TODAY
Vanhanen: Strong support for Georgia but no sanctions against Russia
.....
Finland is ready for a rapid increase in the role of the European Union in Georgia and in other areas of the Caucasus that have been hit by instability, said Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre) on Friday. .... On the other hand, Finland is not in favour of sanctions against Russia in response to the war in Georgia and to Russia’s recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhasia. ......
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Van.../1135239093739
Specifically, on NATO, party politics enter the arena, with the SDP not chiming in officially.
Quote:
HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - HOME
2.9.2008 - TODAY
Stubb NATO comments raise questions
Vanhanen: Stubb spoke as party member, not Foreign Minister
.....
Recent comments by Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb (Nat. Coalition Party) in favour of Finnish membership in NATO have raised questions in Finnish public debate. .... Last week Stubb said in a speech to Finnish ambassadors gathered in Helsinki that he takes a positive view of possible NATO membership for Finland. .... In a radio interview programme on Sunday, Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre) wrote off the comments, saying that they were “more statements of the National Coalition Party than the Foreign Minister”. .... The Finnish government does not currently plan to apply for NATO membership. .....
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Stu.../1135239120512
This week's Sanomat commentary addresses the question of NATO as a defensive alliance - the point made by Stan's post above.
Quote:
HELSINGIN SANOMAT
INTERNATIONAL EDITION - COLUMN
2.9.2008 - THIS WEEK
Would Georgian NATO membership have prevented Russian military action?
By Raimo Väyrynen
The war between Georgia and Russia will inevitably lead to a re-evaluation of the nature and mission of NATO. NATO has defined itself as being in a state of change. In recent years the emphasis has been on the alliance being more of a crisis management organisation, and possibly only secondarily a traditional defence alliance. This way of thinking was also seen in the NATO report published by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs last December. .....
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Wou.../1135239124432
It also warns of limitations faced by minor members of the alliance, where a full-scale war would not be in the national interests of the major members; or if that were so, would not be in the interests of the minor member:
Quote:
(same source)
Each of the minor members of the alliance need to take into account that the leader of the alliance is not necessarily willing to provide assistance in a war that is of secondary importance from its own point of view, especially if the war was started by the alliance partner. This is the strength of a military alliance: it prevents member states from engaging in policies that are unwise. On the other hand, it could draw countries into attacks that they do not want to embark on.
My two cents worth at end.
The FIIA report on Nato (in English), cited in the Sanomat column, is here, with a link to its .pdf file.
Quote:
From Protecting Some to Securing Many - NATO's Journey from a Military Alliance to a Security Manager
Published 11.12.2007
Charly Salonius-Pasternak (toim.)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. .... Finland’s relationship with NATO will also continue to change, whether or not it ever joins the Alliance. Finland must independently evaluate and make its defence and security policy related decisions. ....
http://www.upi-fiia.fi/en/publication/10/
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs publication archives (many in English) are here.
http://www.upi-fiia.fi/en/publications/
I ponder whether Finnish reluctance on NATO is due to:
1. A fear that the major partners would not come to Finland's assistance - in that case, a Baltic-Finnish-Swedish alliance (re-creating the 1640 picture, without Ingria) would serve as well; or
2. A fear that Finland would have to send substantial forces overseas - thus, reviving the issues raised by Swedish Crown adventures from Gussy Dullfish to Charles XII, which involved Finnish troops as near a majority of the Swedish forces; and reviving the opposition to forced participation by Finns in Russian adventures (ca. 1810-WWI), which led to the Independence Movement.
I suspect that 2 is more important than 1.