Hey 120mm, violent agreenent
as to this:
Quote:
from 120mm
It would also help if we actually conducted diplomacy, and had a robust diplomatic corps, and used the DoS instead of the DoD to elminate the need to constantly "nip things in the bud" militarily.
but, given DOD Directive 3000.05 (Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations) and its progeny, the military has been (and into the foreseeable future, will be) tasked not only with the "M" component, but with the "DIE" components as a practical matter.
Tomorrow's armed forces will have to deal not only with the military "struggle" (the continuation of Politik by other means - mainly military, the "M" component), but also with the political "struggle" (a different continuation of Politik by still other means - mainly political, the "DIE" components). The injection of the political struggle into the mix will certainly impact the "moral-ethical and political-cultural domains" of our (US) armed forces.
We (US) have (doctrinally) apolitical armed forces. Moving aspects of the political struggle into their tasked missions will most probably give rise to moral-ethical and political-cultural issues which in the past have been consigned to the non-military side of the ledger - and which generally have been considered "political questions" constitutionally.
The general question, in a "DoD 3000.05 world", is how deeply do our armed forces become involved in "Politik" - that is, in formulating the policies that are the driving engines behind both the military struggle and the political struggle ?
More specifically, how deeply should individual members of the military, because of ""moral-ethical and political-cultural" concerns, become involved and respond to policy decisions made by the National Command Authorities ?
E.g., a decision to go to war ("Jus ad Bellum" for those who prefer Latin), where arguments are made for and against characterizing the decision as an aggressive war, a preventive war, a preemptive war (different, BTW, from a preventive war), a just war, etc., etc.
What should happen to "PVT-GEN Jakola", if (after he has considered all of the "jus ad bellum" arguments) he says "Hell no, I won't go" ?
Regards
Mike
Good questions on the questions, howsomeever,
I can take a shot at both.
Re: question 1. Once someone volunteers for that professional force and signs the contract without coercion, they lose all right to object to being told to do what they voluntarily took on. I think that means if you sign on, you're stuck. Don't want to be stuck -- seek other employment. Because it's a job, it's a trade, not a profession. Did I mention that entrance is not mandatory? Since it's not, the old saw 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.
Yes, draft or conscription changes that rule and conscientious objection is permissable -- probably should be encouraged... :cool:
On question 2, those engaged in the trade of soldiering have taken someone's Shilling, as it were, therefor they have an obligation to do what they're told. It as they say, goes with the territory. They do have the autonomy -- and IMO an obligation -- to exercise their own expert judgment in refraining from doing harm to an extent in executing the missions given as they see fit. They do not have the right to decline missions but have a responsibility to attempt to structure missions to best accomplish them at the lowest possible cost to own nation and force. If given a mission they do not believe is lawful or that is consistent with their values they may resign if possible or take the punishment prescribed for failure to follow orders or violation of their contract. Hopefully without whining about it in either case.
One always has choices.
Hyvää iltaa, Vanha Kotka ...
and a good evening to everyone else.
I'm not a great fan of DoDD 3000.05 et seq. - believing that the political struggle should largely be handled by civilian agencies (which would require a substantial shift in resources) in co-ordination with the military effort. As such, I've a bias and shouldn't be answering my own questions about who makes policy.
I'd like to see a more conservative presentation, updating Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (1957), and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960). Since Janowitz at least floated the concept of "constabulary forces", he might not be that far off re: some of the present doctrine.
I can think of no better person to educate us than you. :)
Kiitos ennakollisesti ;)
Mike
Chris has a point with clarity
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
and I agree with you that he wasn't clear.
I was not clear, and Chris is right to insist on precise language when discussing war, since so much depends on getting it right. So let me try again to present this idea of increasing the adaptability of our forces to provide the political leadership as useful a military as possible.
We now have a better understanding of a limitation on this concept, as Chris made clear, we want to remain within the legal constrains of preventive war. However, as Bob's W pointed out we routinely do prevention with our SF and other units in the FID mission. So perhaps we need to sharpen this distinction between what exact actions are legal and what are not.
The changing character but enduring nature of war that Clausewitz described is helpful here, since we now face a more transparent, faster paced, more competitive, more decentralized operational environment. These factors are changing the character of war in ways we have not fully anticipated or prepared our forces to address. I hesitate to narrow our focus to the operational environment because we actually must prevail in all environments. And there in lies the problem.
Preventive war legalities do not adequately arm us for the changing character of war. For example, we live in a time when there is a deep blurring of lines of responsibilities, missions, and roles that goes beyond purely defined war as a continuation of politics with other means. This blurring now has Soldiers making political decisions like a company commander organizing local a government, or a commanding general influencing a the leadership of foreign country. Moreover, humanitarian missions like the recent earthquake response to Haiti or the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico are not strictly war but rather roles where force is potentially necessary but not exactly the point of the mission. We now depend on our military to work with other federal state and local agencies, as well, as a cornucopia of international organizations, foreign governments and their military and civilian leaders.
So in this environment of multiple roles for our forces, defined as the full spectrum of operations, where Soldiers must be able to conduct, offense, defense, and the stability operations/civil support missions where does war and the use of force begin; when Soldiers are building water treatment plants, providing food and shelter or the requisite security to protect a population.
When does a Soldier have to stop preventing war; when even by the mere existence of an army can and does prevent war.
I'll give Chris his preventive war point a try as well here. Why is this a law? I imagine we would want to keep nations from using force when a less that lethal solution exists. For in it's extreme, preventive war would dictate all powers would attack all other powers to prevent being attacked.
I see the value in not using force if something better will work, but better than what. Avoiding war at all cost results in weakness and slavery. So where do we draw the line of demarcation between preventive war and preventing a war.
Exactly what is allowed under the law as it exists? Why would we not install metaphorical smoke detectors in our environment and train and equip our fire department to respond rapidly to the weak signals of the smoke alarm beeping? Should we wait for a raging fire before we react?
As a profession of arms we are tasked with the defense of the nation. Our duty is to make that profession as capable and useful as possible for ensuring that defense. In our environment of transparency, rapid change, more competition, and blurring of roles we need a profession with high resiliency, one that maximizes it's ability to see and react to weak signals so we can solve problem with the least cost in terms of blood and treasure of all parties.
Okay, I was not much clearer here, but the more I think about the tension between avoiding preventive war and how we need to build our profession, I find a clear line established by our founding fathers to provide an answer. The founders subordinated the military to the civilian political leadership. We can use structure to solve our dilemma. As Soldiers we simply build the best army we can with our signal detectors and all and allow the civilian political leaders decide when and how to use that army. In other words, military focus is on providing the capability to conduct preventive war, and political responsibility is the use of that capability.
Too many legalisms do not
a good professional military force make.
The thread title says the profession of arms. Perhaps, DoDD 3000.05, etc., has added the profession of politics as well. Even if that is so, the military is not and will not become the profession of law; nor would you want it to be.
That is particularly so where the legalisms deal with the issue of going to war (in modern jargon, engaging in an armed conflict), which in our (US) system is placed constitutionally in the hands of the executive and legislative branches.
These Wikis (read as neutrally as possible - read their caveats) illustrate the slippery nature of that international law topic: War of aggression (Crime against peace); Preventive war; and Preemptive war. I skipped "Just War Theories", which is really moral theology varying by religion.
Of course, if you want every trooper to delve into those topics, I suppose you could do that.
I expect more important things have to be done. Substantial civil-military operations have been added to the mix. That means that the military will have to make decisions on whether operations are to be governed by the Laws of Wars (LOAC; IHL) or by the Rule of Law (civil laws). That is a difficult enough area - tying in to ROEs, RUFs, EOF, etc.
All this being said, military law is certainly with us and is no longer the province of "Spaight's Ambitious Subaltern" (bold added):
Quote:
..... for an ambitious subaltern who wishes to be known vaguely as an author and, at the same time, not to be troubled with undue inquiry into the claim upon which his title rests, there can be no better subject than the International Law of War. For it is a quasi-military subject in which no one in the army or out of it, is very deeply interested, which everyone very contentedly takes on trust, and which may be written about without one person in ten thousand being able to tell whether the writing is adequate or not. James Molony Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911), p.18
Ah, the good old days. :)
A decent article from the ICRC on the "antiquity" of the Latin terms, Robert Kolb, Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum / jus in bello. No, they don't go back to the Romans.
Regards
Mike