Like that wise old Communist Philosopher said,
"You cannot legislate morality."
I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.
Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?
I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.
Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.
Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...
OK, what if COIn was in the USA?
Randy,
Two immediate comments on your questions.
The urban rioting in the USA, for examples Detroit '67 & Watts, LA '65 and much later in LA '92, all had IMHO a significant impact and some even speculated they were signs of an insurgency. How would those local communities reacted if the nation-state's response had been mainly foriegn troops, say the RCMP in Detroit or Mexico in LA? Would people like Ralph Peters be so "hardline" on the supposed 'effete' action taken? I doubt it.
David Kilcullen in his talks (see previous threads) makes this point, cannot immediately find the thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...hlight=chicago
You have a burglary / crime problem in your community, the local (US) police cannot cope and reinforcements are called for - imagine - the Iraqi police arrive. A police that follows different rules, operating styles - maybe less minimum use of force - and cannot speak English. My variation would be to have the Saudi religious police arrive on your campus and impose their rules.
My point is if you'd not do 'X' at home, why do it abroad?
A current, similar thread on these questions is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7776
Direct response to your first question
Mr. Borum,
As for your first question, about whether we should avoid civilian casualties, in my experience avoiding civilian casualties was always the best option. We would be having great success in our AO as a battalion, and as soon as we had civilian casualties, across the AO intelligence reporting would plummet and our Key Leader Engagements would grind to halts and we would gain nothing. This was Afghanistan and the death of one innocent seemed roughly proportional to the death of several dozen "bad guys."
I don't know enough about Islam to answer my thoughts on your questions about whether Islam is engaged through non-kinetic means. I know it isn't really in Afghanistan, just respected and allowed to be. Whether or not we should address Islam more explicitly I cannot speak to because I do not know enough.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!
...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.
As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.
Since I am in complete agreement with your post
It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
"You cannot legislate morality."
I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.
Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?
I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims
I was rather clumsily trying to make the point that in any given conflict which seeks as its end state to leave a standing, stable form of political governance upon whom the requirement will be placed to maintain said end state; it seems only wise that we recognize the fact that human beings and thus societies as a whole absolutely do not exist sans some sort of standards (be they Moral/judicious/social-norms, etc). This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.
I would probably liken this to when CVC was giving feedback to several officers trying to develop strategy in relation to possible enemy actions.
To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.
(well aware it ain't perfect but I'll try to look it up to get the wording more accurately, still pretty sure the point remains valid)
Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.[/QUOTE]
Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...
Could not be more in agreement.
I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use
You're kidding, right? Still, perfectly valid question. Really.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Michael C
As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.
My "You're kidding" was because I suspect you know the answer to the question. It is a fair question. What follows is not snark or smart aleck comment but my best if overlong answer to your question:
[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.
[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.
[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.
[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.
As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.
Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.
Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...:(
Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...
As for TTP, METT-TC applies ( * As it does for the asterisked item above) . For distinguishing between categories of persons on the battle field, my experience was that Cat 1, Cat 3 and Cat 4 were easy while for Cat 2, the majority of people to be seen on any FID battlefield, it was difficult if not impossible to diffrentiate. Thus one had to watch them closely, even suspiciously -- all of them -- but also avoid killing them if possible. That possibility must be weighed in your mind at each encounter and the decision must be made based, again, on METT-TC. I suspect you knew and know that, all I can do is affirm it.
As you also know, that unfortunately allows the Cat 2A person to have a chance at becoming a Cat 1 person. This is a disconcerting, even disheartening to some, aspect. It should not be, it just is part of the job, like rain or snow or heat or an 80 pound Ruck.
IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:
That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.
If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality. FWIW, I suspect Wilf knows as I do that you have a difficult job and are searching for answers. He's likely to provide you a better answer than I did. If he does, I doubt either answer will make a hard job one bit easier, you have to feel your way through it. You'll make mistakes, you'll do some things very well, some days will just be bad days. We all did or do those things and experienced the bad days. Goes with the job. There is no easy way. That's why it's a tough job and a lot of people don't want to do it.
My comprehension isn't great
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.
and I can prove that. I still do not fully understand your point as stated in the paragraph of yours that you and I quoted. Still, leaving that aside and going to this:
Quote:
This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.
Agreed.
Quote:
To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.
Agreed.
Quote:
Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?
They should not be but often are because the egos of the planners cannot visualize that the affected States may not be like nor want to be like said Planners.
Quote:
I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use
Agreed -- that was sort my point with the added fillip that anyone who expects Soldiers to do morality or social norms might not like what they get. So by all means, we should decide what we're building before we start pounding nails -- we should also be willing in addition to the hammer(s) to use a drill and some screws to avoid excessive pounding that might weaken parts of the structure... :wry:
Thoughts for your consideration.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Michael C
It seems that there is a huge movement on the SWJ forums (as opposed to the journal and blog) to get rid of yucky "population-centric COIN" that "wants to win hearts and minds." The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.
Very perceptive. Do you think it does offer such solutions?
If so, and not to be snarky in the least, your questions here and your Blog do not indicate that you've found any answers that really help. I say that only to point out that ALL doctrine is murky and must be applied with large doses of common sense and in accordance with an important acronym I will not repeat... :wry: ...In the end, it's down to bunch of men trying to feel their way in a lonely place with limited information and a population that may be hostile. Been done before.
We who urge caution have watched Armies make doctrinal mistakes by tilting too far to one side or the other; we're simply urging balance -- and, with respect to FID, pointing out there is no golden bullet and every war, every affected populace is different. There is no one size fits all doctrinal answer, never has been, never will be. That really is a good thing, it gives you the latitude to do it in a way that works for you.
Quote:
What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN?
There aren't any and I don't think anyone here has suggested not doing "population centric COIN." What many including me have said is do not think that will dispel all your problems and do not lose sight of the fact you are involved in one war at one place in one time -- the Army, as an institution, must work on a far wider scale of possibilities (and if you decide to stay in, so will you...).
Quote:
If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.
My understanding is that we have a number and they're available on BCKS and AKO. Both Armies tried to disregard it simply because it is messy and debilitating, it grinds down Armies. Unfortunately, Armies do not get to pick who they fight, the Politicians do that, much as Armies hate that and try (usually unsuccessfully) to divert the Pols...
Quote:
Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?
You don't and no one here to my knowledge has suggested otherwise. What has been said is that you will get some but not enough intel, that some will prove invalid due to local jealousies, disinformation and a host of reasons and it is not likely to get any better. It's a tough and dirty job with no pat solutions.
What I and some others have also said is that most such conflicts should be avoided by better diplomacy, aid and low key SF involvement to stop burgeoning problems before they require GPF deployment because those will always be messy and difficult. Your comments prove that that they are that. It will be no consolation but a lot of us discovered that 40 years ago and our forebears in the Army on the Plains in the late 19th Century probably had precisely the same complaints. As did a bunch of Alexanders folks in what is now Afghanistan 2,340 years ago. The tools may change, warfare may change but war does not.