Flash backs to TAC and SAC
Adam,
Once upon a time, there were Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Strategic Air Command (SAC). If I'm following your argument correctly, you're asking 'Why doesn't the AF to SAC stuff and the Army take back TAC?'
To an extent, this is a defacto situation. The Army has some short range fixed wing airlift, and CAS capabilities in the form of the AH-64 Apache and other attack helicopters. The AF has the big stuff; nukes, space stuff, stealth aircraft, long range airlift like the C-17s etc. AF Fixed wing CAS is already closely coordinated with Army folks through the Air Operations Center (AOC) which has an Army element participating in the Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) process. In short (and probably over simplified) a mess of CAS is at the joint land forces component commander's disposal already.
In COIN, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, communications (much space based), and mobility are the AF's big strategic contributions, as well as operating as a 'firebase in the sky'. Given the AF's internal politics (the majority of the general officers being fighter pilots) this doesn't sit well, as it causes people to question the value of the F-22. Ironically, the ISR, Comm, and mobility capabilities provided by the AF are staggering advantages for us in COIN, and make the AF's contribution to current ops absolutely essential to any chance for success, even though their contribution doesn't get the big air play in the media (hence support from elected officials). These poor folks are between a rock and a hard spot trying to balance what Congress is forcing on them, their internal culture, the needs of COIN, and vigilence against future competitors in air power.
I've met GEN Peck but haven't spoken with him much, and I know one of his peers at AU, GEN Miller and have spoken with him a bit. GEN Miller is the smartest fighter pilot I've ever met, and consistently demonstrates a thoughtful long range vision not limited by service parochialisms. I would be very curious how much GEN Peck talked about this article with GEN Miller, as it demonstrates a similar level of thought and consideration to that consistently displayed by GEN Miller. GEN Peck was trying to strike a balance between the ugly realities of small wars and the needs of the Air Force to preserve its capabilities for conventional exercise of airpower. Given the bigger considerations of the AF, I think he did a pretty good job.
I was especially impressed with the penultimate section; "Developing Airmen for Irregular Warfare". For a pilot to emphasize the need for developing people is a bit of a change as they normally focus on their air machines. Stressing the development of leaders and human capabilities in the Air Force is a step in the right direction, and I hope the AF acts on these thoughts.
Not bad for the successors of Army officers like Carl Spaatz and "Hap" Arnold (had to let the Army voice out of its box after talking Joint for so long :) )
Fixed Wing Close Air Support
In repsonse to Van:
Not really. What I was asking is why close air support (most effectively A10's) and any aircraft which is necessary for COIN operations are not available to the Army. I believe this is only to become more of an issue as I strongly believe that there will again be propellared support aircraft in service. They will most likely be operated and maintained near the front. Recent aviation diesel technology advances will allow it to use fuel used by almost any vehicle. Within 10 years we could have a scenario where an aircraft and small support crew are indeed attached to individual companies. I do believe the AF should be repsonsible for most of the issues you mentioned. I believe the AF should focus on air supremacy, transport and larger ordinance bombing. On the other hand the army should never be forced to, as in Vietnam, purchase fixed wing craft against congressional spending rules.
Generals Peck and Miller may be excellent examples of the kind of men needed to ensure inter-service cooperation, but unfortunately men of their caliber can not be ensured. That is what I am concerned.
In repsone to jcustis:
Able is not always what it should be. Also, getting people on the same page as I am sure you know and have experience with is no small task. This is especially so when you have generals on either side having a a pissing contest. Whether more men have died meaninglessly because of generals incompitence or arrogance is unkown. We only have to look at the last fifty years to see this. The goal of this concept is to accomplish what the creation of the AF was supposed to do, reduce inter-service fighting.
The answer to your first question, about 100
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Adam L
How many B-52 bombers are still in service? With the empasis and publicity on UAV's and fighter-bombers how many do you think will be in service in 20 years? I don't think we even have any bomber concepts in development these days.
Also, it only takes a few at the top to screw everything up.
To answer the second, probably none.
As to your first statement, see this LINK. Note it does not go into detail; manned / unmanned, etc.
The answer to your last statement is; true -- but no one has figured out a way to not have some folks at the top in one form or another... :wry:
I thought they cancelled that.
I was under the impression that they killed the 2018 bomber plan about 6 months ago and that the plan is to skip this in favor of an interim concept for now, entering service in 2018 (based on either f22, x23, f35 airframe,) with a next generation bomber entering service after 2030.
I'll look for the press release I saw.
Moving target, changes frequently
as is true with all big ticket programs. Plus, the news media are not a reliable source on that (or much of anything, for that matter...) :o
Congress, Psychologists, Psychiatrists and the Media
Interesting and fortuitous juxtapositioning... :D
Spooky, even...
I'd say the answer to your conundrum is "all of the above."
You may be correct but hard to say what the future might hold with respect to perceived cause or need -- not to mention that Congress is usually willing to fund high cost goodies that are produced in multiple Districts. Pork is pork, whether it's in WV or Johnstown for the 'public good' or in Costa Mesa and Spartanburg for 'protection for the American way of life.' We have a long -- too long -- history of not buying an item due to Congressional failure to see a need only to buy it later in large quantities for more money...
I have a neighbor who's a practicing Psychiatrist and based on numerous conversation the last few years, she totally agrees.
All true. Well, maybe except for the last paragraph
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
It may just be because I'm a political scientist ;) ...but I think its enormously easy to blame the "politicians" for things. Most--certainly not all, but most--that I know or have worked with show enormous commitment, energy, and intelligence.
If they appear to pander to the narrow desires of their constituents, it is because of the way we've designed the system, and because we reward at election time those that do most successfully. Surely that makes it our fault if we feel they're pursuing wrong-headed priorities.
I could offer a defence of the media as well, but I try to limit myself to one unpopular group per post :D
with respect to any meaningful defense. :D
I basically agree on the Politicians and the fact that much of the apparent venality of most 9nat all, as you said) is simply systemic -- in both our countries, different as the systems are. However, I think there's another factor that intrudes and is little appreciated. Their Staffs.
Most legislative staffers are hired for their nominal expertise in the area of concern, this is particularly true in the Committees of the Parliament or of congress. Most such staffers have an agenda and the legislator, lacking subject matter knowledge, is pretty much at their mercy. This has an often pernicious effect. Most often, I'd say... :rolleyes:
Dave Kilcullen on USAF's critical role in COIN (From the Charlie Rose Show)
Quote:
CHARLIE ROSE: Yes, but we what, 300, or 110 CIA and 200 special forces, the combination of that. But we had the Northern Alliance troops too.
DAVID KILCULLEN: Exactly. And my old boss, Hank Crumpton, who was a key player in that campaign, often says that, you know, the Afghans won against the Taliban. All we did was to enable them, using very flexible, agile approach, with small numbers of troops on the ground, and linking that to the (inaudible) system.
CHARLIE ROSE: And how much air power?
DAVID KILCULLEN: Well, air power -- there is a fascinating debate going on right now in the counterinsurgency community about the role of air power in counterinsurgency. Let me just -- we can talk about that later if you like. But let me just kick off that topic by saying that one of the things that Hank says is the most useful air asset they had in that period was, in fact, the C-130, that could deliver -- they could talk to a tribal leader or.
DAVID KILCULLEN: . and say, hey, what do you need? Well, people or assistance of various kinds, or food, medical supplies.
CHARLIE ROSE: And the Taliban had no means to shoot them down?
DAVID KILCULLEN: Yeah, well, they did, but we had air superiority. I mean, this is the thing. And I'm sure we're going to get into this. A lot of Army guys say, you can't solve complicated social and political problems from a flight level of 20,000 feet using guided bombs, and therefore the Air Force doesn't have a big role in counterinsurgency. OK?
That is so not true. For a start, the armies of the Western world haven't shown ourselves particularly good at solving those problems either. So it's not an air power-land power thing. It's about how we adapt to a very complicated environment.
But secondly, everything is easy if you assume air superiority. You don't need an air force to deny air superiority to a modern joint force. And you know, guys.
(CROSSTALK)
DAVID KILCULLEN: Sorry. Guys who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan will tell you that one of the most fundamental elements in that campaign was working out the system that allowed the Soviets to maneuver and operate in the hinterland of Afghanistan, and overstressing that system, particularly the air system, by the introduction of high-tech surface-to-air weapons that allowed us to essentially overstress the Soviets.
CHARLIE ROSE: Which we provided for the mujahideen?
DAVID KILCULLEN: Yes. And so you know, there's this assumption that if air power doesn't have a role in counterinsurgency. If air is doing its job right -- and you need a big air force and a powerful air force to do that -- if it's doing its job right, the ground guys shouldn't really notice it. What they should notice is the air support, the close air support for them when they are fighting the enemy. They should notice the ability to move troops around. They should notice the logistic support. But that sits under a bubble of air superiority, and I'm not -- we ignore that factor at our peril, because any smart insurgent knows that we require that, and will turn against us.
And this from SWJ’s COIN round up
Quote:
It is a strong presentation, showing that USAF’s thinking has deepened and matured. It delivers a sharp punch to the view that the US needs only ground forces —small, simple, and mostly suited to commando raids. Indeed, airpower is portrayed as pivotal.
This claim does not sit well with everyone. The Army and Marine Corps concept of irregular war ascribes far more value to, well, themselves. That is, to say no more, a debatable proposition.
Without question, certain valuable capabilities are unique to airpower. The doctrine paper cites three advantages that, while not always obvious, may prove vital to US success.
Minimal intrusiveness. Introduction of a large US ground force is a highly visible act, often breeding political resentment, especially in Muslim lands. US troops quickly become targets for attack by insurgent bullets, bombs, and broadcasts. This amounts to a grave weakness for a force engaged in irregular warfare, in which support of “the people” is of paramount importance.
These are two very good discussions on what Airpower can be used for in COIN. I could do without the rhetoric in the second piece:
Quote:
This claim does not sit well with everyone. The Army and Marine Corps concept of irregular war ascribes far more value to, well, themselves. That is, to say no more, a debatable proposition.
However, there is some truth to it - and unfortunately service parochialism is not an uncommon attribute unique to any one institution. It does not diminish the the value of the questions and observations put forward in the larger article, and when read in conjunction with Dave Kilcullen's piece I think it provides a tool for leveraging the Joint force.
Best Regards, Rob